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Abstract 
 
Major sporting competitions, such as the Football World Cup and the Olympic Games have become 
global events.  For the organisers of such events, they are much more than a short-term competition, 
they present the opportunity to ‘re-imagineer’ nations and cities.  Scholars have discussed the 
commercialisation and financial opportunities of such sporting events, and their links to neoliberalism.  
But recent official claims about the social benefits and carbon neutrality have received much less 
attention.  This thesis addresses this under-researched area.  It documents and analyses the social and 
environmental claims made in the context of the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil, and explores how these 
played out in the rural state of Mato Grosso.  
This study is primarily based on documentary research and ethnographic fieldwork carried out in Mato 
Grosso.  It is informed by a critical management studies perspective and draws specifically on a neo-
Gramscian approach to environmental governance. This enabled me to go behind the environmental 
discourse in Mato Grosso and understand the realities on the ground. The findings illustrate how 
regional elites co-opted environmental governance mechanisms and appropriated the socio-economic 
benefits of the FIFA World Cup.  I focus particularly on a carbon offsetting project  which was supposed 
to plant 1. 4 million trees along the Cuiabá  River in order offset the CO emissions generated by the 
construction of the new Pantanal football Stadium.  As I show, this project was organised by an NGO 
manufactured by Mato Grosso based agro-industrial elites, who used it as a vehicle to further their 
interests at the expense of local subsistence fishing communities and the environment.   
 
Keywords: Elites, carbon-offsetting, environmental governance 
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-Chapter I - 
Introduction 
 
 
On the 30th October 2007 in Zurich, Switzerland, Brazil was awarded the right to host the 2014 
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup. A mix of political and footballing 
elites were present, including then Brazilian President, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva ‘Lula’, Brazilian Football 
Confederation president Ricardo Teixeira, Brazilian Sports Minister Orlando Silva, national team coach 
Dunga and retired striker, and now politician, Romario. On the day, Lula is reported to have said ‘soccer 
is not only a sport for us, it’s more than that. Soccer for us is a passion, a national passion.’ Ricardo 
Teixeira is reported to have declared that ‘over the next few years we will have a consistent influx of 
investments. The 2014 World Cup will enable Brazil to have a modern infrastructure…In social terms it  
will be very beneficial…Our objective is to make Brazil become more visible in global arenas…The World 
Cup goes far beyond a mere sporting event. It's going to be an interesting tool to promote social 
transformation’ (CNN, 2007). By 2012 these claims of social benefits were complemented by a 
declaration from the then FIFA President, Sepp Blatter, that the 2014 World Cup would be the ‘greenest 
ever’. This would be achieved through a combination of waste management and recycling, certified 
green stadiums and carbon offsetting programmes (FIFA, 2011b). 
This thesis is about these social and environmental claims. It documents and analyses the policies and 
measures agreed by FIFA and the Brazilian government in order to achieve them, and provides a critical 
case study of how they were implemented in the host state of Mato Grosso. The Mato Grosso bid was 
based on an infrastructure programme that would ‘re-imagineer’ the state capital, Cuiabá , as a green 
city with a brand new football stadium, light railway system and state-of-the-art airport. In doing so, 
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they would make a valuable social contribution to life in Cuiabá  and put the city on the tourist map. 
Moreover, once the host city status was secured, in line with FIFA requirements, the emissions 
generated from the construction of the new stadium would be offset by an ambitious reforestation 
project to plant 1.4 million trees along the River Cuiabá  which feeds into the world famous Pantanal 
wetlands.   
1.1: Sports mega-events as neoliberal vehicles 
 
Academics and politicians alike have long acknowledged the high profile position of FIFA and the 
positive benefits of being associated with the institution. Other than being admitted to the United 
Nations, joining FIFA or the International Olympic Committee (IOC) can be part of a wider political 
strategy by governments to be accepted as a nation state. Becoming part of the ‘FIFA family’ and 
receiving associated financial benefits has meant that it has historically been part of some nations 
development plans. Conversely, being removed from the ‘FIFA family’ has clear political and economic 
consequences (Sugden and Tomlinson, 2002, Death, 2011). However, the effects are not always positive. 
Some African football federations are dependent on FIFA money to be financially viable, therefore they 
are likely to accommodate FIFA and their ‘family’ on some occasions in ways which are detrimental 
(Giulianotti and Robertson, 2009). Nonetheless, the World Cup has been a firm fixture in the sporting 
calendar since the inaugural tournament in 1930. Hosting mega-events is widely regarded as an 
opportunity to achieve global exposure, for example, the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games were seen as a 
celebration of Hitler’s ideals and the 1995 Rugby World Cup in South Africa was seen by many as a way 
to welcome South Africa back into the global economy after the fall of apartheid. Since the 1980s sports 
mega-events have experienced massive change and today, they are largely influenced by the 
commercial opportunities available in contemporary professional sport. 
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It was the commercial and political opportunities which influenced the Brazilian government’s decision 
to bid to host the 2014 tournament. The story of how Brazil became World Cup hosts can be traced back 
to the bidding process of the 2006 World Cup. Officially, the hosting of a FIFA World Cup event is 
decided by a vote system which grants each representative of a FIFA federation one vote. In the final 
vote for hosting of the 2006 World Cup on Thursday 6th July 2000, South Africa were beaten by Germany 
by 11 votes to 12. The president of Oceania’s Football Association, Charles Dempsey, abstained from 
voting after he was reportedly pressurised into voting for South Africa by his colleagues after his 
favourite, England, were eliminated from the process. South Africa, angered by the lost opportunity, 
appealed this vote and prepared to take FIFA to the High Court. The case was settled out-of-court when 
South Africa were financially compensated and a continental rotation policy was introduced which 
would ensure the 2010 World Cup would be held on the African continent and 2014 in South America 
(Bolsmann, 2012, Tomlinson, 2014).1 
 
The 2014 bidding process was less controversial; in 2006 the South American countries Chile, Argentina, 
Colombia and Brazil expressed interest in bidding for the event. But by early 2007 all three of Brazil’s 
opponents had withdrawn citing austerity and financial instability in the global economy as preventing 
them from holding the tournament. Scholars were also beginning to challenge social benefit claims to 
hosting sports mega-events. As the only country not to withdraw their application, Brazil was declared 
winner on the 30th October 2007. The rhetoric of the economic and social benefits associated with 
hosting the World Cup were prominent for several decades. It is perhaps unsurprising then that the 
President of the Brazilian Football Federation, Ricardo Teixeira, made the claims he did as described in 
the opening of this chapter.  
 
                                                          
1
 In 2015, as part of the CIA investigation into FIFA corruption, it was exposed that the South African Football 
Association lost the vote to Morocco to host the 2010 World Cup. A reported US$10million was paid in bribes to 
Jack Warner, the then president of the Caribbean Confederation which ensured South Africa won a second vote 
and were declared as host (Withnall, 2015). 
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For Brazilian decision makers, hosting the 2014 FIFA World Cup could potentially bring substantial 
economic and social benefits, they were keen to showcase Brazil, and its major cities, as world players in 
a neoliberal economy. Neoliberalism is an economic strategy that seeks to have a heavier reliance on 
the use of market forces to control accumulation and distribution. It spread from the USA and UK 
around the globe through economic reforms that attempted to ‘re-scale accumulation opportunities 
through bilateral, regional and global trade and investment agreements, state restructuring, 
privatisation and the use of monetary policy and enhanced capital mobility’ (Newell, 2012a:19). Peck 
and Tickell (2002) suggests this led to the ‘rolling back of the state’, where the state had less control 
over trade, capital and people. Harvey (2005) proposes that neoliberal capitalism should not be seen as 
an economic approach, but a political project that seeks to change class power to capitalist elites. 
 
As a political project capitalist neoliberalism seeks hegemony. According to Simon (1991), hegemony is 
the relation of consent gained through political and ideological leadership. Political leadership is 
achieved through gaining authority in the political sector, actors in this sphere can defend their position 
through coercive institutions and their methods. These institutions include the justice system and 
military institutions with methods such as laws, prisons, the police and armed forces (Wittneben et al., 
2012). Ideological leadership is contested in civil society and occurs when the ideals of the ruling class 
become accepted as ‘common sense’ by other subordinate classes. This is achieved through institutions 
such as the church, schools, media and trade unions (Simon, 1991, Okereke et al., 2009, McNally and 
Schwarzmantel, 2009, Wittneben et al., 2012, Levy and Egan, 2003). The actors who contest these 
positions and seek to become the dominant actor are elites. Elites operate on a number of scales, from 
transnational global elites whose power crosses national boundaries (Cox, 1993, Cox, 1981), to local 
elites who have a disproportionate access to resources on a smaller scale (Woods, 1998). 
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1.2: Brazilian environmental policy, neoliberalism and ecological modernisation 
 
In the years after World War II, the environment was viewed as an externality in the global capitalist 
economy. However, scientific evidence pointing towards climate change has grown since the 1970s and 
has changed how political elites view the environment. Brazil’s role on the international market as a 
commodity exporter was unchanged over this period and continued under the neoliberal regime 
(Munck, 2013). The large amount of land and intensive agricultural processes needed to export 
commodities meant that Brazil had to deforest large areas. This became an international issue when in 
1987 the United Nations commissioned the Brundtland report that suggested an environmental crisis 
was underway. Deforestation, among other agents, were blamed as the causes of the crisis. In 1992 a 
World Summit was held where governments discussed how to address these problems. In 1997 
international political leaders reacted by creating the first ever global environmental legislation- the 
Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol only affected developed countries and as such, Brazil was not 
required to reduce emissions. Today, Brazil’s economic profile has changed and it is considered as a 
middle income country (BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).  The exploitation of mineral 
reserves, large infrastructure programmes and the conversion of savannah and rainforest to agricultural 
land have had large environmental impacts in Brazil. The Brazilian government are therefore now 
playing an increasing role in global environmental governance as the scientific evidence pointing 
towards anthropogenic climate change and public pressure to act increases. 
Mato Grosso is a key state in Brazilian economics, and at the time Morton et al. (2006) published their 
study, it was producing one fifth of the world’s soya beans. Part of the Amazon rainforest is in northern 
Mato Grosso and as such Mato Grosso has received intensive international criticism for its deforestation 
rates. The link between deforestation and soya cultivation was first made by Myers (1981). He 
illustrated how soya beans grown in deforested areas of the Amazon region were used to feed cattle 
which were exported to the USA and Europe and labelled this the hamburger connection. International 
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environmental NGOs have also been critical of this connection and Greenpeace produced a report which 
linked international brands to Amazonian deforestation (GreenPeace, 2006). This exposure to 
environmental criticism has been key in Mato Grosso decision makers developing climate change 
policies.  
The challenge for elites at both the national and state level is to maintain their social relations in a 
neoliberal economy whilst reacting to pressure from civil society on their environmental actions.  
‘Climate change touches more or less every aspect of economic life, and goes to the literal engine of the 
industrial economy-energy use’ (Newell and Paterson, 2010:94) and as such provides a complex 
challenge for decision makers. The preferred view of elites who support the neoliberal paradigm is to 
view environmental issues through the ecological modernisation paradigm. Ecological modernisation 
assumes there can be a mutually beneficial relationship between economic development and positive 
environmental outcomes through market mechanisms and technological innovation (Hayer, 1995, Mol 
and Sonnenfeld, 2000, Mol, 2003, Mol and Spaargaren, 1993, Fisher and Freudenburg, 2001). For many 
who view the environment in this way, they feel that ‘without some kind of proper financial 
compensation, short-term economic needs will take precedence over long-term stability’ (Porritt, 
2007:155). For this reason, the ideology that nature has to have a price tag in order to be saved became 
popular in both elite circles and public discourse. Publications such as the Stern report (Stern, 2007) 
which addressed environmental issues from an economic perspective became influential in helping to 
stabilise a financial approach to environmental governance as the ‘only’ approach (McCarthy and 
Prudham, 2004, Castree, 2008, Robertson, 2004). 
The ecological modernisation paradigm is exemplified by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol; the first international 
legally binding legislation on climate change. The methods for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) 
under the Kyoto Protocol all relied on technology, had considerable financial compensation attached 
and did not challenge the existing political, economic and social institutions (Bailey, Gouldson and 
Newell, 2011).  
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Emissions trading was one of these approaches and gave each high carbon emitting country an allocated 
amount of carbon credits. Those countries with surplus carbon credits gained through reducing carbon 
emissions could trade with those with a deficit. This market mechanism approach was assumed to 
create emission reductions as financial incentive would encourage efficient reductions. The European 
Union Emission Trading System is one example of this (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007). Another market 
trading mechanism was developed under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM allowed 
a developed country to invest in an emissions saving project in a developing country through the 
purchase of carbon credits, only the states that were subject to the Kyoto Protocol could purchase the 
certified emission reductions associated with this type of project (UNFCCC, 2013).  This approach to 
climate change was seen as successful by elites and in response to demand from both civil society and 
the corporate sector, a voluntary carbon market was established to support polluting organisations 
wishing to offset their emissions (Newell, 2012b, Sutter and Parreño, 2007, Alexeew et al., 2010). These 
moves have occurred on a number of different scales, at different times and with different results. This 
thesis studies these relations and unearths how the environment is used as a tool to enhance the 
interests of elites.  
 
1.3: Challenging ecological modernisation 
 
In order to unpack the consequences of ecological modernisation and in particular, carbon offsetting in 
Mato Grosso, I need to use an approach which challenges the ecological modernisation paradigm. Some 
scholars believe that the ecological modernisation paradigm does not adequately address 
environmental issues and acts as a vehicle for some elites to further their own agenda (Lohmann, 2012). 
In addition, they argue the social relations that are continued through ecological modernisation 
mechanisms such as carbon offsetting, can be ‘decisive in terms of how benefits of resource extraction 
and burdens of human induced environmental change are globally distributed’ (Newell, 2010:17).  
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These scholars broadly fit into a group who use neo-Gramscian concepts to understand how elites 
manipulate relationships to maintain power through the environmental movement (Newell, 2008). This 
view has most predominantly been used in the 21st century and is born from Marxist environmental 
scholars such as Benton (1998), O'Connor (1988) and Foster (2000). A Neo-Gramscian analysis is helpful 
to fully understand the dynamics of power and control. The framework is based on the concepts of 
Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci and predominantly his concept of hegemony, which focuses on power 
relations between actors from the state, corporate and civil society sectors on a number of scales 
(Schwarzmantel, 2009:10, Wittneben et al., 2012). This has then been applied to the environmental 
governance literature (Levy and Egan, 2003). 
One such example of this, Newell and Levy (2002) argue, is environmental accreditation and certification 
schemes created by civil society actors. They argue these have ‘created a space where corporate elites 
can re-create their dominance through environmental stewardship’ (Newell and Levy, 2002: 93). Their 
study of environmental governance through the neo-Gramscian lens allowed for a clear articulation and 
analysis of how social relations of environmental issues recreated power relations.  
Although there is a large amount of literature on how hegemony is created and maintained through the 
appropriation of environmental governance, there remains little theorisations surrounding how 
hegemony is achieved on different scales. Within organisation and management studies there has been 
a focus on secondary data and theorisations, instead of unearthing how hegemony works on the ground 
(Böhm et al., 2008, Spicer and Böhm, 2007).  Therefore, insights from the geography and Development 
literature are useful for the theorisation of scales and how actors can manipulate scales to secure power. 
Turner (1997) suggested that too often scholars dichotomise the local and regional and they should be 
seen as interconnected. Brenner (2001) furthered this, suggesting the political economy, culture, and 
ecology all exist and operate simultaneously at a range of scales. The local scale is inextricably 
embedded in the global scale which in turn is produced by various local scales. Swyngedouw (2004) 
further argues that these transitions occur through layers of ‘nodes and linkages, which are 
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interconnected in proliferating networks and flows of money, information, commodities and people’ 
(Ibid: 32).  It is this theorisation of scales and the agency of actors that are central to this neo-Gramscian 
understanding of environmental governance. This was achieved through pro-longed period of fieldwork 
on the ground to understand the realities of carbon offsetting.   
 
1.4: Situating elites in Mato Grosso  
 
Mato Grosso is in the Centre-West of Brazil and has parts of both the Amazon and Pantanal habitats. 
These two biomes are considered of global importance are both protected by being a UNESCO world 
heritage site (Ioris, 2013). The Pantanal, although less famous than the Amazon, is one of the most 
biodiverse biomes in the world. It is known for its variety of bird species and also has an abundance of 
Caimans, Jaguars, Giant Otters and Capybaras. In addition to these natural characteristics, Mato Grosso 
has experienced extensive in-migration through a Federal programme to ‘fill empty spaces’ and develop 
an agricultural industry. These agricultural lands form part of the ‘soya belt’ in Centre-West Brazil and 
are of strategic importance to the Brazilian economy.  
Mato Grosso is an interesting case due to the tensions between the ecological and agricultural systems. 
Deforestation in the upper basin of the Pantanal has led to sedimentation problems further south. The 
expansion of the agricultural industry has pushed cattle farmers further into the Pantanal and Amazon 
regions, further propagating the clashes between the natural and human realms. Environmental 
governance is essential in Mato Grosso and the ways in which the environment is protected by local 
elites is an important issue.  This becomes even more apparent when understanding the civil society 
sector in Mato Grosso. Unlike other rural states, there is not a large Landless Movement and the civil 
society sector is said to be weak (Jesus 2006). 
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Those outside of Mato Grosso view Mato Grosso in a particular way. Whilst in Rio de Janeiro I often 
spoke to people about my research in Mato Grosso. Most residents of Rio de Janeiro who I spoke to had 
never been to Mato Grosso and viewed it as a ‘backwards’ state. They would often refer to it as ‘hill-billy’ 
country and claim it was ruled by corrupt elites. Tourists from other areas of the country who I met in 
Mato Grosso thought it was ‘cute’ and ‘simple’. The organisers of the World Cup in Mato Grosso thought 
these opinions would change as a new infrastructure programme would ‘re-imagineer’ Cuiabá  into a 
green city with state-of-the-art infrastructure. 
1.5: Aims of the thesis 
 
This case study of a carbon offsetting project explores how local elites have co-opted the environmental 
governance mechanisms in Mato Grosso to further their own agenda, enabled by the global hegemonic 
project of neoliberal capitalism. My research is based on documents of a reforestation project in rural 
Mato Grosso and exposes the strategic relationships elite actors on a number of scales were able to 
secure through the ‘green claims’ of the FIFA World Cup. In exposing these ties and relationships I 
illustrate how environmental concerns surrounding the World Cup were used by elites to maintain and 
enhance hegemonic relations in Mato Grosso at the expense of the local communities and environment. 
These relations in Mato Grosso fed by the agency of some actors were used at a regional level to secure 
a favourable political climate for export-led industry. Again, through the agency of elite actors at the 
regional scale, the national project of development through exports was advanced. It is shown there is a 
dialectical relationship between the hegemonic projects at work at different scales through the agency 
of elite actors at these scales.  
The methods used to collect the data were important as there were no qualitative studies of carbon 
offsetting projects used in the World Cup previously. Initially, documentary analysis was performed on 
several official FIFA and Brazilian government documents which all claim the sustainability goals of the 
2014 FIFA World Cup were met. The originality of this thesis is that it goes behind these claims to 
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understand the process of how FIFA and local elites were able come to these conclusions and the 
benefits they received from this. In turn, this thesis then unpacks how hegemony is maintained and 
enhanced through the FIFA World Cup. My research was guided by an overall aim and research 
questions.   
My overarching research aim is to analyse and understand how environmental governance is used as a 
vehicle to maintain or enhance the position of local elites through carbon offsetting in Mato Grosso, 
Brazil. This is achieved by addressing the following research questions: 
 What are the political, social and economic contexts within which the Green River Project 
operates? 
 What was the process in which the carbon offsetting project was established and implemented? 
 How have actors on different scales been affected by the project?  
 
1.6: Thesis contributions  
 
This thesis uses a neo-Gramscian approach to environmental governance with scalar theory and a 
specific focus on elite agency to offer a case study which explicitly illustrates how claims made by elites 
are not matched by events on the ground.  This is achieved by using a carbon offsetting project in the 
context of the 2014 FIFA World Cup. In order to develop an understanding of the realities on the ground 
I conducted fieldwork over a pro-longed period of time. Through this understanding a theoretical 
framework which uses hegemony as the core concept was developed. In doing so, this thesis makes a 
contribution to existing literature in five ways. 
 
First, this case study gives empirical weight to Newell’s (2008) argument that there is evidence which 
suggests private actors assume public functions with regard to environmental governance. He called for 
further investigation into the relations between civil society and the corporate sector, this thesis 
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responds to this call. The call for empirical work is also complemented by the literature which highlights 
the flaws in the notion that NGOs are ‘unchallengably good actors’ (Holmes, 2010). The development 
literature has long questioned the influential role of the state in regard to NGOs (Tvedt, 1998, 
Foweraker, 2001). Recently, studies of environmental NGOs have begun to question the role of the 
corporate sector and in particular how private funding can influence the actions of environmental NGOs 
(Klein, 2015, Sapinski, 2015).  This literature argues that some decision makers in environmental NGOs 
have corporate, not environmental experience, and therefore decisions can be made within the 
environmental NGO which works for corporate, not environmental outcomes. This case furthers the 
argument in illustrating how the private sector can legitimately create an environmental NGO to work 
for the interest of the private sector. It shows how corporate elites in Mato Grosso were able to gain 
power and decision making capabilities through the creation of the environmental NGO, the NGO was 
then able to receive funding and carry out an environmental project which had little environmental 
benefit. 
 
Second, this thesis also contributes to the critical carbon offsetting literature. This literature challenges 
the ecological modernisation paradigm seen in contemporary environmental politics by arguing through 
various cases that commodifying nature will not save it (Bohm 2009, Bumpus and Liveramn 2008, 
Gilbertson 2009). Environmental governance seen through ecological modernisation has been open to 
academic critique since it began (Bailey et al., 2011). However, little action has been taken in political 
agreements to change how global decision makers deal with the environmental crisis. Case studies 
which critically engage with carbon offsetting are plentiful (Narain, 2009, Gilbertson and Reyes, 2009, 
Böhm and Dabhi, 2009), I add another case study to this literature through using a reforestation project 
used at a sports mega-event. 
Third, in addition to contributing to the carbon offsetting critique, I also add that within the 
reforestation project itself, there were some organisational problems. The NGO organising the project 
did not ensure equal benefit distribution for project participants, this was because the NGO was not 
23 
 
accountable. These arguments contribute to the discussion within the REDD+ literature surrounding 
equitable benefit distribution (Iversen et al., 2006, Mathur et al., 2014, Sommerville et al., 2010). I 
contribute to these arguments as previous studies have been written from practitioners within the 
project, or with the intended audience of policy makers. This thesis comes from a critical perspective 
and does not problematise the issues encountered in the same way.  
Fourth, this case study contributes to the small amount of critical literature on environmental claims 
and sports mega events. It directly speaks to Reis and DaCosta (2012) who suggest there is a gap in 
knowledge between what elites claim in terms of environmental sporting events and what occurs on the 
ground. The thesis shows how through hegemonic relations, unsubstantiated claims can be made and 
go unchallenged which results in the maintenance of the status quo. Reis and DaCosta (2012) took a 
documentary analysis approach to assess the environmental commitment of the Brazilian government 
to the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games. This thesis furthers this argument by using 
ethnographic methods to understand the commitments and realities of hosting an environmentally 
sustainable event.   
 
Fifth, this thesis also makes a contribution to the literature through the theoretical development of neo-
Gramscian approaches to environmental governance (Levy and Egan, 2003, Levy and Newell, 2002). I 
develop this theory by focusing on elite agency (Zanotti, 2011) and the use of scalar theory 
(Swyngedouw, 2004) to enable a deeper understanding of how strategic relationships on a number of 
scales further the global hegemonic project on a local level. This case study analyses how the carbon 
offsetting project has been used as a tool by elites to further their hegemonic project on three scales. I 
shall explain each in turn. 
 
The transnational capitalist class, those that have created power at an international level (Cox, 1981), 
have been able to maintain the status quo by claiming the carbon neutrality of not only the football 
stadium in Cuiabá, but also the World Cup as a whole. These claims work towards entrenching the FIFA 
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World Cup as a sustainable event. It also ensures that neoliberal ideology is accepted as part of sporting 
culture. Neoliberal sports events have massive profit potential for both FIFA and their corporate 
sponsors. It is therefore in their interests to ensure the World Cup is viewed as sustainable. By claiming 
the ‘green’ impacts of the World Cup through projects, official documentation and public relations, civil 
society actors were less likely to challenge the consequences of hosting an event. The ecological 
modernisation paradigm was effectively used to make these claims which also maintain the pre-existing 
power relations and social order. The thesis then contributes to the claim that carbon offsetting projects 
encourage the wider public, especially in the Global North, to continue their consumption lifestyles as it 
is assumed carbon offsetting can neutralise their activities (Lohmann, 2009a).    
 
At the regional scale, the regional elite, referred to as ruralistas throughout the thesis are a group of 
Mato Grosso based agri-business elites. The majority of this group were part of the Federal Programme 
to relocate farmers from the South of the country to the Amazon region to fill ‘empty spaces’.  They 
have some influence at the national scale on agricultural organisations and some individual actors have 
political positions. This group contribute to the Brazilian commodity export market and therefore are 
also important to national economics. Through the Green River Project, the ruralistas were able to 
deflect unwanted international environmental criticism. The legal boundaries of the Amazon and 
Pantanal biomes are situated within Mato Grosso, a state that provides over one fifth of the World’s 
soya beans. Nature and industry conflicts have drawn significant international attention and the Green 
River Project contributed to other environmental projects which claimed Mato Grosso to be an 
environmental steward.  
 
At the local level, the rural poor population were exposed to short-term developmental projects which 
further entrenched previously existing power relations. A previous project aimed at providing the 
villages with a sustainable source of income was stopped to accommodate the new reforestation project, 
this in turn has now stopped and has not produced an adequate income for the community as the 
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hegemonic relations in the village have continued. Previous critiques of development projects are 
reflected in this investigation (Ferguson, 1990, Pieterse, 2010).  
 
1.7: Thesis structure 
 
In addition to the introduction and conclusion, this thesis has seven chapters. The next chapter 
summarises the available literature on environmental and social benefit claims at the World Cup. 
Although some scholars have questioned the social benefit claims, there remains little literature on 
carbon offsetting at these events. Those that do discuss such projects are often quantitative and written 
within the ecological modernisation paradigm. To support this literature from a qualitative perspective 
the critical carbon offsetting literature is used. This literature explores concepts from the wider carbon 
trading mechanism and problems found in individual projects. Literature which discusses the role of 
NGOs is also consulted as NGOs have been seen to have a prominent role in carbon offsetting. This 
literature identifies how not all NGOs are progressive and some work to further the agenda of elite 
actors. This literature is supported by scholars who wrote about a supposed post-neoliberal turn in Latin 
America. This literature is important as it contextualises a policy created by the then President Lula to 
give progressive NGOs a greater voice in Brazilian politics. This understanding then lays the context for 
the following chapters. These chapters fill the gap of a study that is qualitatively driven, with a critical 
approach to a carbon offsetting programme at a sports mega-event.  
The third chapter in the thesis describes the process of collecting data. I describe the methods and 
approach taken to ensure I collected reliable data. As an inexperienced researcher who had never 
visited Brazil, the preparations for fieldwork were essential. However, not all the problems and 
challenges I encountered on fieldwork were prepared for and I critically reflect on how I met those 
challenges. Each of the data collection methods are described in turn and I discuss how I then began to 
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analyse the data. The chapter finishes with a section which discusses the ethics of conducting a cross-
cultural ethnography.  
The World Cup can be seen as one vehicle which hegemonic elites use to stabilise the hegemonic 
project, in turn FIFA as a civil society actor sympathetic to the neoliberal ideal, work to further entrench 
neoliberal relations. Development is seen as being inextricably linked to neoliberal capitalism and FIFA, 
like other neoliberal institutions have a ‘development’ programme which builds a defence against 
counter-hegemonic movements. Perhaps the movement which provides the greatest threat to 
neoliberal capitalism is the environmental crisis. Global hegemonic elites have tried to incorporate 
environmental concerns through the ecological modernisation paradigm. In turn, FIFA through the 
‘green goal’ programme at the World Cup have viewed the environmental crisis in the same paradigm 
and have tried to use mechanisms to support this. In the literature on environmental and 
developmental projects at the World Cup there are no studies that are critically embedded. The gap is 
identified in the context of carbon offsetting at the World Cup and I justify my thesis by addressing this 
gap. 
The first data chapter discusses how the global hegemonic project of neoliberal capitalism is played out 
at the national level through the World Cup. There was a significant counter-hegemonic movement in 
June/July 2013 when over 1 million Brazilians protested against the World Cup and associated public 
spending. The contestations around the World Cup and how it was organised proved challenging for the 
state who used military force as a coercive method to control the population. Throughout the chapter 
the links between the global hegemonic project and Brazil’s role within this is explored. Additionally, 
how the ecological modernisation paradigm was compatible within both Brazilian politics and FIFA was 
seen as essential in the organisation of the World Cup. 
Chapter five charts how the World Cup was experienced in Mato Grosso. The World Cup offered the 
opportunity to ‘re-imagineer’ Cuiabá  as a green city. However, impunity, profiteering and organisational 
corruption meant that the infrastructure programmes were unfinished or structurally unsound. This is 
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contextualised by the history of Mato Grosso. It was seen how clientalism and a close relationship 
between the political and economic sectors mean power was focused to an elite group. Although this 
group has changed over time, there are some common characteristics which can be found in 
contemporary Mato Grosso. One such example, the local media, is explored. Elite control of the media, 
a key civil society actor, can be seen to help secure the elite agenda in public discourse and ensure their 
social relations are stable. 
Chapter six focuses on the organisation of the carbon offsetting project. Under FIFA instructions, the 
Brazilian government ordered all new stadiums to be certified with Leadership in Environmental and 
Ecological Design (LEED) accreditation, a sustainable construction award. One aspect of this award is 
carbon neutrality which the Pantanal Stadium was certified by the Green River Project. This project was 
to plant 1.4 million trees to offset 711,000t of carbon dioxide. The organisational structure of the NGO 
as well as the project claims are exposed in this section. The project did not meet its initial claims and 
was able to change the methodologies used to certify the stadium as carbon neutral in time for the 
World Cup. This chapter highlights how the Green Action Institute is an example of corporate 
manufactured civil society.  
Chapter seven explores the Green River Project from the perspective of the local communities. It shows 
how consent was forced through coercion at the regional level. A legally binding behaviour order was 
issued to the residents which forced them to participate in the project, after it was initially met with 
passive resistance by the affected villages. The behaviour order was applied differently in the different 
villages and those in the tourist village were able to rely on personal contacts to negotiate the terms. 
Others in the villages of lower socio-economic status had to comply with the behavioural order explicitly. 
The final section of this chapter looks in further detail at the Payment for Ecosystem Services promised 
to the communities. Again, it is documented how these promises were not kept. 
The discussion chapter aims to link these levels together through an analysis of elite agency and 
hegemony. It is seen how the hegemonic project at different scales is linked to the global neoliberal 
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capitalism project. The actors at different scales have various roles to play in securing hegemony and 
achieve this through different methods. The Green Action Institute is seen as one mechanism to 
legitimately gain consent. The concept of hegemony is used to understand how and why actors are able 
to achieve their positions of power whilst scale theory is used to understand how local actors are linked 
to transnational actors.  
The conclusion ties these arguments together and presents the main findings from the thesis. The 
implications of the empirical data discussed throughout the data chapters are first discuss. Then the 
chapter moves on to give on overview of the theoretical contributions this chapter has made. I explain 
explicitly how I have furthered debates in key areas. The limitations of this study are discussed and 
finally, I suggest how this investigation could be furthered in the future.  
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-Chapter II – 
Literature review 
 
The role of sport to encourage citizenship, increase population health and even unite communities after 
warfare has been acknowledged by the United Nations (Levermore, 2011). The integral role sport plays 
in society was further acknowledged when in 2001 the role of Special Adviser to the United Nations 
Secretary-General on Sport for Development and Peace was created and sport was used a vehicle to 
achieve the Millennium Development Goals through peace (Beutler, 2008). In 2005 this relationship 
became part of the UN agenda when 2005 was named as the United Nations Year of Development and 
Peace through Sport and Physical Education (Taylor, 2004, Jennings, 2007, Levermore, 2011).  
 
Sport should then not be underestimated as a tool for actors to further their agenda. This literature 
review seeks to illustrate the literature available on the social and environmental claims made at sports 
mega-events. Mega-events are the focus of this thesis because, as we will see in the following section, 
they are commonly organised with billions of pounds available and used for political and economic gain. 
They therefore provide a diverse terrain in which to study. The first section of this chapter introduces 
the sport mega-event as a neoliberal event. The following subsections provide a review of the literature 
available surrounding the social and environmental claims made at such events. The second section of 
this chapter engages with the critical carbon offsetting literature. This is necessary as currently there is 
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not any literature which qualitatively engages with carbon offsetting at a sports mega-event. The third 
section of the literature review introduces the literature which suggests that not all NGOs are 
progressive. This supports literature from the carbon offsetting section which is cautious over the 
potential influence that state and corporate actors have over NGOs in the carbon offsetting mechanism. 
It also provides context for the fourth section which explores a moment in Latin American political 
history which gave extra opportunities for civil society actors to engage with political decision making. 
The fifth section of this chapter presents literature that acknowledges the potential of environmental 
governance projects to further entrench social relations. This literature, labelled under the neo-
Gramscian approach to environmental governance, will set the foundations for the understanding of 
how elite agency can influence environmental projects. However, this literature is weak when discussing 
the relationship between project claims and actions on the ground. The scalar theory is then discussed 
in the final section which links the actions of elites at the national scale to elites at the local scale.  
2.1: Sports mega-events as reflecting the neoliberal ideal 
 
Although international institutions such as the UN advocate the use of sport for positive social change, 
some scholars have been more critical on the linkage between sport and global political and economic 
structures. For example, the link between sport and neoliberalism has been discussed widely (Hall, 2006, 
Andrews and Silk, 2012, Coakley, 2011, Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006a). Coakley (2011) suggests 
neoliberalism closely associates with elite, organised, competitive and commercial forms of sport. He 
further argues that these sports then work to reaffirm and reproduce the neoliberal ideal through sport 
culture. Whereas sports that do not fundamentally reflect neoliberal ideas, such as football or the 
Olympic Games, have changed recently to become more suited to the neoliberal project. This process 
occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s when both the FIFA World Cup and Olympic Games were 
turned into commercial events (Horne, 2000). 
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Eick (2010) suggests that it was João Havelange, FIFA president from 1974 until 1998, who is widely 
regarded as the actor who turned FIFA into a neoliberal institution (Eick, 2010). During this time FIFA’s 
workforce changed from 12 to over 120 (FIFA, n.d). According to Eick (2010), these changes at the 
institutional level were also accompanied by changes that saw football players transformed into 
entrepreneurial athletes, creating a space where large corporations are able to promote a consumer 
lifestyle through exposure in sports environments. 
 
Both the Football World Cup and Olympic Games are viewed as sports mega-events, and scholars have 
discussed how both events reflect the interests of capital and neoliberal ideals (Coakley, 2011, Andrews 
and Silk, 2012, Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006b). Coakley (2011) argues the FIFA World Cup is 
characterised by intense competition, consumerist lifestyle and freedom of the markets and therefore is 
inextricably linked to the foundations of neoliberal capitalism. In a similar vein, but with a focus on host 
cities, Eisenhauer et al. (2014) discusses how the World Cup offers the opportunity for host cities to 
develop infrastructure programmes and become more globally competitive. This is because host cities 
are expected to offer shopping, elite tourism and other services for the wealthy, which, Hall (2012) 
suggests, is reflective of neoliberal ideals. In addition to the World Cup and Olympic Games bringing 
benefits for the elites who would enjoy the new infrastructure, FIFA, perspective host countries and the 
IOC have long cited the social and environmental benefits that hosting these sports mega-events can 
bring (FIFA, 2014a, Grix, 2012, Cornelissen, 2011, Ozanian, 2014). I will now present these in turn.  
 
Sports mega-events and social benefit claims 
Hosting the World Cup and Olympic Games frequently demands the construction of new stadia and 
services for elites who are able to spectate the tournament. In response to pressure from commentators 
who suggested that the local populations do not benefit from the World Cup, FIFA began to highlight 
ways in which local populations can benefit (Lee and Taylor, 2005). ‘Football for Hope’ is FIFA’s social 
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programme, and, although it has projects that fall outside the World Cup, it is central to the social 
benefit claims that World Cup organisers and FIFA make.  
 
However, within the sports mega-event literature there is an established body of literature that 
challenges the social benefit claims made by FIFA, the IOC and the host countries. Some scholars have 
argued that some groups do not receive either the financial or social benefits claimed and can be left 
disadvantaged from hosting the event (Tilley, 2006, Hagn and Maennig, 2009, Mol, 2010, Chalip, 2006, 
Hall, 2012, Whitson and Horne, 2006, Whitson et al., 2006, Black and Van Der Westhuizen, 2004, Horne 
and Manzenreiter, 2006a, Roche, 2000, Roche, 1992). Particular social issues that have been addressed 
by the literature include: the gentrification of urban areas in Beijing (Mol, 2010), South Africa (Tilley, 
2006) and London (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006b); ‘hiding’ unsightly parts of the city in Rio de Janeiro 
(Curi et al., 2011); urban regeneration projects which have not delivered in Atlanta (Andranovich et al., 
2001) and Sydney (Waitt, 2003); and a lack of economic benefit to local communities (Pillay and Bass, 
2008, Humphreys and Prokopowicz, 2007, Ugra, 2013), including access to sporting facilities (Whitson et 
al., 2006, Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004). These studies are largely quantitative or are written to 
influence policy. 
 
There is a wider body of literature that claims hosting sports mega-events can act as a catalyst for 
achieving political goals, sometimes with social benefit outcomes. These have been argued to have a 
legacy far longer than the sports event itself (Cornelissen and Swart, 2006, Hargreaves, 2002, Scambler, 
2005, Hayes and Karamichas, 2012, Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006b, Horne, 2007, Roche, 2000). The 
opportunity for local elites to re-frame dominant narratives (Black, 2007, Finlay and Xin, 2010, Fan, 
2006), attract foreign investment (Cornelissen, 2008) or further political ideologies (Close et al., 2007) 
are all perceived as potential political outcomes of hosting a sports mega-event. Scholars have also 
argued it presents an opportunity for host nations and cities to align with neoliberalism and 
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modernisation by speeding up urban development projects (Levermore and Beacom, 2009, Levermore, 
2011, Pillay and Bass, 2008).  
 
Developing the argument from Black (2007), sports mega-events can be said to provide an opportunity 
for local elites to improve, change, re-frame or create a new image of their location (Finlay and Xin, 2010, 
Black, 2007). A common starting point of this body of literature is the marketing perspective. In a 
marketing context, Fan (2006) describes how a nation has a brand image with or without nation 
branding. Sports mega-events can be seen as one mechanism to employ nation branding with the 
intention to change a country’s international image. Referring to national branding, rather than regional 
or local, Fan (2006) further describes how it ‘concerns a country’s whole image, covering political, 
economic, historical and cultural dimensions. The concept is at the nation level, multidimensional and 
context-dependent’ (ibid: 8). In the neoliberal context a good image is important to ensure trade, 
tourism and foreign investment (Harvey, 2005).  
 
In the sports sociology literature, this has been interpreted as image leveraging (Chalip, 2006). This 
literature is mainly focused on the identification of image leveraging mechanisms and quantifying their 
impact (Bob and Swart, 2009, Grix, 2012, O'Brien and Chalip, 2007, Ferrari and Guala, 2015, Beesley and 
Chalip, 2011). Whilst this is a respected and important line of enquiry, it falls short in relation to my 
thesis, as it does not address the qualitative impacts of changing an image of a host city. Grix (2012) 
goes some way to identify this trend when he suggests the literature is mainly focused on post-event 
analysis and is quantitative. In reference to the recent trend of developing countries hosting an event, 
Corneilsson (2010) argues that sports mega-events are seen as a key political ‘imagineering’ of the 
governments. According to her, it allows governments to showcase the type of society and state they 
want to create, with an ultimate aim to re-position them in the international order (Panagiotopoulou, 
2012, Sugden and Tomlinson, 2002). 
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Pillay and Bass (2008) suggests South Africa, the hosts of the 2010 World Cup, are a good example of 
this. The local organising committee in South Africa cited economic development targets as one of the 
fundamental reasons for hosting the tournament. Cornelissen (2011) discusses specifically how the 
ideals of neoliberal development, urbanisation and industrialisation were matched by both FIFA and 
South African policies, which enabled ‘re-imagineering’ through an extensive infrastructure programme. 
Donaldson and van der Westhuizen (2011) focus on one infrastructure programme, the Gautrain, a high-
speed train linking different areas of Johannesburg. The train was argued to allow Johannesburg to 
compete as a ‘world city’. Linking back to neoliberalism, Van Der Westhuizen (2007) claims that the 
symbolism of a new local infrastructure programme has global consequences and further entrenched 
the neoliberal ideology in South Africa. The demand of sports mega-events usually sees an increase in 
infrastructure development programmes, these programmes are seen as essential to ‘re-imagineer’ a 
space or place.  
 
Within the literature on the use of sports mega-events to ‘re-imagineer’, there is little qualitative 
literature that explores specific projects. The emergence of developing countries hosting sports-mega 
events is another dimension to this literature that has yet to be fully addressed. To date, there are no 
studies that engage with the social benefit claims, and in particular infrastructure projects, associated 
with the World Cup in Brazil.  
 
Sport mega-events and environmental claims 
 
As we have seen, there is a substantial body of literature which explores the social benefit claims of 
sports mega-events. In contrast, the environmental concerns surrounding sports mega-events have a 
relatively short history. Environmental concerns first arose in the 1992 Winter Olympics in Albertville 
and mainstream media considered this event an environmental disaster. Chappelet (2008) suggests the 
Winter Olympics were more susceptible to environmental criticism as they are largely located on 
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mountain resorts and therefore are ‘close’ to nature. Therefore, it was the pressure from commentators 
concerned by the Winter Olympics which started the Olympic movement toward environmental 
considerations. Nevertheless, the following Winter Olympics were held in 1994 in Lillehammer, without 
a centralised environmental programme. The Olympic organisers in Lillehammer did have an 
environmental agenda, although this was locally organised and perhaps more influenced by global 
politics. The main author of the newly released, UN commissioned, Brundtland report, Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, was Norwegian and provided impetus for the Norwegian government to become a global 
leader in environmental protection. The first Winter Olympics to have an IOC driven environmental 
programme was the 1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano, Japan (Leonardsen, 2007, Mallen et al., 2011, 
Schmidt, 2006, Cantelon, 2000). At the time, the IOC had been tarnished by accusations of corruption 
and drug use, adopting a new ‘green’ paradigm therefore was seen by some as a tool to reduce public 
pressure (Hayes and Karamichas, 2012). Since this first environmentally focused event, the environment 
has been embraced as the third pillar to the Olympic movement to complement the existing pillars, 
sport and culture (Schmidt, 2006). 
 
Arguably, due to the urban location of the World Cup, FIFA were slower to develop an environmental 
charter. Their response was the ‘Green Goal’ programme which aims to push the green agenda onto 
organisers of FIFA’s World Cup event and is created on the premise that the World Cup tournament can 
be environmentally neutral, if not friendly (Mander and Roberts, 2010, Mol, 2010, O’Brien and Chalip, 
2008). This is based on the assumption that technological innovation can overcome environmental 
problems (Fisher and Freudenburg, 2001, Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000, Mol and Spaargaren, 1993) and 
was created within the ecological modernisation paradigm.   
 
Today, organising committees of both the FIFA World Cup and Olympic Games are required to address 
environmental impacts as part of the bidding process, but to the extent these environmental projects 
are implemented is a contested issue. Preuss (2013) points to the time pressures associated with 
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hosting a sports mega-event. He argues it is often a matter of four years between hosts being selected 
and staging the event, therefore, environmental projects can be abandoned in favour of construction 
and infrastructure projects. Reis and DaCosta (2012: 60)  also claim that ‘there is still a significant gap 
between the written commitment of host governments and organizing committees, and the actual 
implementation of environmentally responsible events’.  
Reis and DaCosta’s (2012) assertion has little support in the academic literature on the Olympic Games. 
The majority of this literature is quantitative in nature and within the ecological modernisation 
paradigm (Andranovich et al., 2001, Essex and Chalkley, 1998, Malfas et al., 2004, Mol, 2010, Paquette 
et al., 2011, Samuel and Stubbs, 2012, Tomlinson and Young, 2006, Tian and Brimblecombe, 2008, Waitt, 
2003). Hollins (2013) doctoral thesis is perhaps the only publication which studies the economy, 
environment and locality in relation to the 2012 London Olympics. Although Reis and DaCosta (2012) 
suggest there is a gap between what is said and achieved, there is no literature which explicitly 
addresses this gap. This trend in literature is similar to that which covers the World Cup. 
 
Germany was the first FIFA host to systematically incorporate the ‘Green Goal’ into its planning for the 
2006 tournament, resulting in a pledge to stage a carbon neutral event (Schmidt, 2006). The ‘Green Goal’ 
forms part of the wider ‘Football for the Planet’ programme which was also created within the 
ecological modernisation paradigm. Central to these claims is carbon offsetting, as it is assumed 
emitting behaviours can be offset through emissions savings elsewhere (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). 
Both Germany and South Africa had carbon offsetting projects as part of their ‘Green Goal’ programme, 
which are now explored further. 
 
There are three academic articles and one official document produced by the Local Organising 
Committee that explicitly address carbon offsetting at the World Cup in Germany. Subsequent articles 
have discussed the results of these four key publications. Dolles and Söderman (2010) published in the 
‘Journal of Management and Organisation’, Mitchell (2007) published in ‘Sustainable Development, Law 
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and Policy’ and Schmidt (2006) published in ‘Environmental Health Perspectives’. These three 
publications came from management and policy level journals, which, by nature, would not address the 
socio-political implications of sustainability.  
 
These publications did not question the claims made in the name of these projects; that is, they did not 
study how they have been implemented on the ground. For example, Mitchell (2007) summarises the 
claimed achievements of the project, not the results. Writing on a bio-gas project, he argues that ‘not 
only will the eco-friendly biogas protect the local forests and decrease global greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions, but it will reduce the number of respiratory illnesses associated with traditional wood and 
kerosene-burning stoves’ (Ibid:5). Schmidt (2006:287) is vague and outlines the claims of the project 
organisers: ‘organizers of the 2006 World Cup…are striving for “climate neutrality” (i.e., zero impact), 
which they hope to achieve by offsetting the expected 100,000 tons of greenhouse gas emissions with 
investments in renewable energy and energy-efficient technology.’ A fourth article produced by Stahl et 
al. (2004) is the official document of the Local Organising Committee, hence providing the claims made 
by project officials. They describe one of three projects used to offset emissions that delivered cooking 
stoves to rural families: The ‘Family Clean Energy Packages’ project in Tamil Nadu, India, will ‘ensure an 
environmentally compatible and secure energy source for several thousand villagers...in addition, needy 
families are also given cows’ (Stahl et al., 2004:90). Being very descriptive, these publications do not 
engage qualitatively or critically with the offsetting projects and their implications. 
 
The only publication to criticise the offsetting projects is Hayes and Karamichas (2012). Their main 
argument centres on the methodology for calculating the emissions from the World Cup and how many 
tonnes of carbon would be needed to offset these emissions. They do hint at decentralisation of the 
projects: ‘it is evident that national and transnational environmental NGO’s have been instrumental in 
establishing and legitimising such schemes, and in measuring carbon offsets’ (Ibid:12). They also hint at 
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some project issues: ‘local land-use conflicts are common’ (Ibid:12). However, they do not detail these 
potential problems.  
 
The ‘Green Goal’ initiative for the South Africa World Cup was organised by individual host cities. Unlike 
Germany, South Africa did not incorporate the ‘Green Goal’ principles into centralised plans. Instead, 
each host city assumed responsibility for their projects and funding was privately sourced. Death (2011) 
and Ozinsky (2010) suggested this led to many projects that failed to complete, or did not even start. 
This is also acknowledged in the official literature of the World Cup organisers (Mokua, 2012:22). 
Scholars have tended to consider these implications more than the offsetting programmes (Death, 2011, 
Ozinsky, 2010).  
 
One of the carbon offsetting projects used to offset emissions from the 2010 World Cup in South Africa 
was the ‘Buffelsdraai Landfill Site Community Reforestation’ project in eThekwini municipality. Mander 
and Roberts (2010) produced an official document for the eThekwini municipality on the project and 
describes the project aim to ‘sequester some of the carbon emissions associated with hosting the 2010 
FIFA World Cup’ in Durban (Ibid:23). Throughout the publication it is not quantified how much carbon 
will be sequestered. Ozinsky (2010), in a conference paper, suggests that the eThekwini project has the 
potential to offset 12,000 CO2e over 20 years by planting 650ha of trees. He then describes the number 
of project participants, both employed and voluntary, but gives no qualitative analysis of participants’ 
experiences. Witt and Loots (2011) produce an academic article on the project from a gender studies 
perspective, focusing on analysing the roles of men and women. For example, the ‘local community 
members have been trained how to collect seeds, plant trees and how to maintain them….men were 
selected for the digging of holes and women for the bagging of trees in the nursery’ (Ibid:132).  
 
Perhaps the most engaged description of these projects is made by Diederichs and Roberts (2015). They 
suggest the Buffelsdraai Landfill site project had a focus on community benefits and created 81 
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permanent jobs. Project participants also received credits for planting trees and are said to have been 
exchanged for school fees, driving lessons, food and clothing in ‘tree shops’. At the time of the 
publication, the total value of trades was reported to be more than US $293,000. Finally, they claimed 
the landfill project would sequester 61,008 tonnes CO2e over a 20 year period, which was 20% of 
Durban’s calculated carbon footprint from the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The only critical reflections from 
Diederichs and Roberts (2015) are that they suggest that not all carbon offsetting projects are 
synonymous with sustainability. This a reflection of Durban’s failed attempt to find a suitable offsetting 
project for the UNFCCC-COP17 meeting. Second, that participants and spectators of sports mega-events 
do not see themselves financially responsible for contributing to their carbon footprint offset. This was 
in relation to a comparison between participation of the COP 17 offsetting programme where 
participants were asked to pay US$11 and the London 2012 offset programme, which was free 
(Diederichs and Roberts, 2015). 
 
Common characteristics of the publications that cover carbon offsetting at the World Cup can be 
identified. First, the authors who produce these publications work within the ecological modernisation 
paradigm. Second, they do not question power relations or qualitatively investigate the claims project 
elites make. Hence, the gap I wish to address in this body of literature is by providing an independent, 
qualitatively embedded, critical analysis of claims surrounding a carbon offsetting project associated 
with a sports mega-event.  
 
2.2: Carbon offsetting 
 
The literature that explores carbon offsetting at the World Cup has been shown to be relatively thin and 
lacking a critically engaged, qualitative investigation. I therefore now draw from the critical carbon 
literature to complement the literature on sports mega-events and support such an investigation.  
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Scholarly debates on carbon markets have been addressed by those who are supportive of the 
mechanism (Newell, 2012b, Newell, 2012a, Newell and Paterson, 2010) and those who question the 
fundamental principles of a market to reduce emissions (Böhm and Dhabi, 2011; Böhm et al., 2011; 
Lohmann, 2009; Lohmann, 2011). Bachram (2004) is largely cited as the first scholar to critically engage 
with the carbon trading mechanism and since this publication critiques have covered many issues. 
Wittneben et al. (2012) use Gramscian concepts to show how inequality is a fundamental characteristic 
of the carbon market. They argue that this market has been developed by elites as a mechanism to 
maintain their hegemonic position through alliances between elite corporate, state and civil society 
actors, mainly formed at the UNFCCC meetings. Those in opposition to such markets have been given 
little platform or opportunity to voice their concerns, and, as a result, the hegemonic project has been 
stabilised.  
 
Using this concept in the wider context, some argue elites are able to further entrench their social 
relations through the assumptions of the carbon market. For example, Gilbertson and Reyes (2009) 
argue that by buying credits, Northern countries are allowed to continue their polluting trends and 
procrastinate in ‘greening’ their economies, whereas Southern countries have to change their 
development strategies to accommodate the emissions of Northern countries. For example, Northern 
governments are able to develop chemical factories and coal fired power stations whilst Southern 
countries cannot (Alarcόn, 2009, Smith, 2008, Bello, 2009, Lohmann, 2012). This then propagates global 
inequality and as a result the existing social relations between the global North and South are continued. 
Moreover, other critical scholars have argued these projects would not be necessary if Northern 
countries reduced their emissions at the source and moved their capitalist societies away from fossil fuel 
use (Gilbertson and Reyes, 2009; Bӧhm and Dabhi, 2009; Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). These 
arguments form the basis of the stance which suggests the fundamental mechanisms of the carbon 
market increase inequality and work in the interests of economic and social elites. 
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Another critical argument of carbon trading is the conflict of interest inherent within the carbon trading 
mechanism (Smith, 2008, Lohmann, 2009b, Newell, 2012b). This is because inequality is produced and 
maintained through soft forms of power by actors with vested interest. Bumpus and Liverman (2008) go 
so far as to label some of the vested interest within the mechanism, such as institutional corruption. At a 
national level, they argue that conflicts of interest frequently lead to capital gains for Southern elites 
whilst the Southern poor are left isolated. Thus, this then contributes to the argument that the carbon 
offsetting mechanism increases inequality (Lohmann and Böhm, 2011, Böhm et al., 2011). 
 
Political elites are perhaps the group who have the power to challenge the vested interests of corporate 
actors within the carbon market, although to date they have been reluctant to do so. One argument 
suggests that the short-term economic gains available through the carbon market, compared to long-
term climate friendly solutions is more preferable for the voting cycle. Checker (2009), Narain (2009) 
and Gilbertson and Reyes (2009) all write about their concern that the inaction of political elites has led 
to an increased presence of corporate actors on the trading mechanism. This, coupled with the potential 
economic benefit for political and civil society actors, has led some to conclude that the market has 
manifested into a disincentive to actually reduce emissions. 
 
Böhm and Dabhi (2009), Cabello (2009), Lang (2009) and Reyes (2012) all suggest the nature of market 
trading means that pollution has the potential to make money, and is used as such, instead of an 
environmental mechanism. Trading games seen on the financial markets have been observed on the 
carbon market and accountancy methods which falsely state reduction claims have been found. These 
actions further support the arguments that the carbon trading mechanism works in the interest of the 
elite, not the environment (Böhm and Dabhi, 2009, Lovell and MacKenzie, 2011, Bailey et al., 2011). 
Bachram (2004) argues that when the mechanism was developed, most funding was directed to the 
market mechanism itself with little funding for regulation and monitoring. She further warns that the 
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market is ‘dangerously reliant upon the integrity of corporations to file accurate reports of emissions 
levels, and reductions. In practice, corporations such as PriceWaterhouseCoopers are acting as both 
accountants for and consultants to polluting firms, and as verifiers of emission reduction projects’ 
(Ibid:8). This then developed an opportunity for ‘corporate-led self-monitoring; and entrepreneurial 
verification schemes by consulting firms’ (Ibid:9).  
 
These arguments provide a broad overview of the general arguments within the critical carbon 
offsetting literature. There are several different types of carbon sequestration projects which can sell 
carbon credits to the market. One such type is Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD+), a programme developed by the United Nations to allow access onto the carbon 
markets for forested countries. It is assumed the financial incentive derived from carbon market 
participation would encourage them to keep their forests intact. This is seen as an important strategy to 
combat climate change as deforestation and forest degradation is thought to account for 15-17% of 
total global greenhouse gas emissions (Sukhdev et al., 2012).  
 
REDD+ works on the assumption that trees absorb carbon dioxide, which can then be quantified and 
sold as carbon credits. Supporters of this mechanism suggest there are a multitude of secondary 
benefits associated with REDD+ projects, including: biodiversity conservation, water management, 
employment and food security (Watson et al., 2013). However, similarly to carbon markets, there are 
some concerns that forest based carbon offsetting projects do not always achieve the claims they make. 
Gutiérrez (2011) also claims the fundamental organisation of these projects has changed since their 
inception on the market. She described how initially REDD+ projects were focused on small land owners 
but over time an increase in bureaucracy and transition fees has culminated in small landowners being 
isolated from the mechanism, replaced by large mono-crop plantations usually owned by large 
companies (Gutiérrez, 2011).  
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As REDD+ is a recent mechanism, empirical studies of individual projects are beginning to gain in 
number. Issues highlighted in the REDD+ literature include inequality of benefit distribution (Luintel et 
al., 2013, Gebara, 2013, Hayes and Persha, 2010) and issues of a lack of local participation (Tadesse et al., 
2014, Luttrell et al., 2014, Resosudarmo et al., 2012, Mwape and Gumbo, 2010, Leggett and Lovell, 
2012). These articles are all written by those working within the ecological modernisation paradigm and 
although they are critical of their studied projects, they tend to be observational and written for the 
target audience of policy decision makers, giving them recommendations for future policy development 
or projects (Adgar and Jordan, 2009). Literature that fundamentally questions the role of forestry carbon 
and does not work within the ecological modernisation paradigm, instead questioning power and 
cultural dynamics, are still relatively few in numbers (Kincheloe and McLaren, 2002:90).  
 
Similarly to the carbon trading literature, the carbon forestry literature suggests that forestry projects 
on the carbon trading mechanism can compound long standing exploitative relationships and enhance 
pre-existing power relations (Böhm and Dabhi, 2009, Corbera, 2012). In Bachram’s (2004) paper, she 
suggests that marginalised populations in rural Brazil were removed from their land during the drive to 
claim plantation land and include it within the carbon trading mechanism. This process was argued to 
conflate the position of the subordinated rural poor population.  
 
An empirical study by Iversen et al. (2006), which was written within the ecological modernisation 
paradigm on a carbon forestry project in Nepal, found that weak institutions allowed benefits to be 
appropriated by local elites. They point to inadequate institutional control that enabled elites to gain 
substantial shares from sales of forestry services to the detriment of the local, affected community. In 
another publication by Mathur et al. (2014) institutional control was seen as essential. They suggest 
institutions in their study ensured equity to host communities who have a lack of power relative to 
other actors. Both of these publications suggest that strong institutions and NGOs work to promote 
equity. There is an assumption that all NGOs and institutions within carbon forestry projects work for 
44 
 
the interest of local populations and the environment. It can be said there is little literature that 
explores the concerns of Böhm and Dabhi (2009) and Corbera (2012) that carbon trading can compound 
land standing exploitative relationships. 
 
A second issue in carbon forestry projects is the payment of participants. Gebara (2013) suggests that 
unequal distribution of benefits was present in the Juma Sustainable Development Reserve in Amazonas, 
Brazil. The conclusion to her investigation was that local participation is key to equitable benefit 
distribution. One reason she gives is that the local population have the ability to define what a benefit is. 
Sommerville et al. (2010) in their case study from Menabe, Madagascar, show that the distribution of 
payment for the community was unequal. They conclude that poor governance and particularly the 
vested interest of elite actors was the main reason for unequal distribution of benefits. Gross-Camp et al. 
(2012) report that in their observations of a project in Nyungwe National Park, Rwanda, project officials 
expressed concern about the impact of cash payments in poor, rural locations. Local elites and project 
officials feared that direct payments of money might be poorly used. They also reported that project 
elites had concerns with actually paying project participants, in this case, participants would be paid to 
not break the law.  
 
Aside from these problemisations of the carbon market and carbon forestry projects, there has also 
been concern regarding the governance of projects. Bailey et al. (2011) maintain that emissions trading 
reflects the organisational characteristics of neoliberalism, in that increased market reliance and little 
state interference is seen as the most efficient economic strategy. In environmental governance, this is 
labelled as ‘climate capitalism’ by Newell and Paterson (2010), and emission trading is seen to reflect 
this logic as pollution is quantified and traded on markets. According to the market logic, this would 
result in the most efficient way to cut greenhouse gas emissions. In opposition to this stance, Childs 
(2011) suggested carbon trading is the ‘tragedy of the commons’ of our generation. This suggests that 
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actors working independently, by nature, would work in their own interest. This could be contradictory 
to the common good of wider society as these individuals deplete resources through collective action.  
 
In addition to carbon markets reflecting neoliberal marketization strategies, it also entails the increased 
role of civil society. The spaces or voids which appear in the organisation of a project, due to the 
changing role of the state, are filled by civil society actors (Peck and Tickle, 1997 and Harvey 2005). This 
has been reported as a concern for Bachram (2004), but has had little attention in the carbon offsetting 
literature. In order to unpack this claim, literature from wider environmental governance field and 
development studies is now presented. 
 
2.3: NGOs 
 
The role of civil society actors, and particularly NGOs, in decision making has become more prominent 
as there has been a global shift from government towards governance. However, some scholars have 
argued that not all NGOs work in the interest of the groups they represent (Tvedt, 1998, Hodgson, 2006). 
Ford (2003) recommends that civil society actors should be observed as individual actors and analysed in 
relation to the ‘hegemonic constellation’ (Ford, 2003:129). He argues this is essential if it is to be 
established if the actor is challenging or acting to preserve the status quo. This is an argument echoed 
by Okereke et al. (2009) who fear that some civil society actors can be working to complement the 
transnational hegemonic classes within environmental governance. 
 
Choudry and Kapoor (2013) and Klein (2014) claim that some international environmental NGOs have 
played a role in facilitating the ‘green-washing’ of corporations. They argue joint initiatives between the 
corporate sector and international environmental NGOs often end in the corporate sector gaining more 
from the venture. Whilst there is argued to be some international environmental NGOs who have 
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entered into these agreements naively, some have entered strategically. Klein (2015) discusses the 
strategy of the environmental movement of the late 1970s and labels them professional 
environmentalists. This group of actors were ‘insiders’ who had access to the political elites, as a result 
they were able to lobby for tough legislation and commence legal procedures against polluting 
organisations (Ibid:203). In this respect, corporate actors saw environmentalists as a real threat and 
began to forge relationships with them to suppress their threat. During this period, Klein (2015) suggests 
the Environment Defence Fund (EDF), an environmental NGO based in the USA, was particularly 
sympathetic to corporations and formed relations with the corporate sector. 
 
Klein (2015) uses a contemporary example of EDF’s relationship with Walmart to illustrate how this 
relationship can become problematic. Between 2009 and 2013 the EDF received US$65 million in 
funding from the Walton Family Foundation, controlled by the founding family of Walmart. This amount 
of funding, and sustaining this relationship with the foundation, could have been influential to the 
actions of EDF when lobbying the state. In addition, EDF was also in partnership with Walmart, and at 
the time it received regular funding from the Walton Family Foundation, it was also delivering a 
sustainability programme for Walmart (Klein, 2015:209). Klein uses this and numerous other examples 
to illustrate how strategic relations have developed between corporate and some  civil society actors 
within the environmental movement.  
 
Other research into the relationship between environmental NGOs and corporate actors has yielded 
similar results. Sapinski (2015) identifies members of boards on international environmental NGOs and 
what he calls the G500, the 500 largest transnational companies. When a board member was on both 
the international environmental NGO and a G500 company, he labels this as ‘interlocking’. ‘Interlocking’ 
is said to be favourable for corporate actors because it creates ‘greater cohesion among corporate elites’ 
(Sapinski, 2015:269). 
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Similarly to the environmental governance literature, the development literature has long discussed the 
role of NGOs. According to Holmes (2010), NGOs have historically been seen as ‘unchallengeably good 
actors’ (Holmes, 2010:629) who act in the interest of the public good, usually against the state or private 
sector. There is now a growing body of literature which suggests that elites can co-opt civil society 
actors to deliver projects which further the elite agenda. 
 
However, it is not only elites in the corporate or state sector who form strategic relations; NGOs have 
also been seen to form strategic relationships to further their agenda. One such strategic relationship  is 
through partnerships with state actors (Banerjee, 2011, Klein, 2015). Foweraker writing in 2001 
develops this point further and suggests alliances between NGOs and the state can be seen as a strategy 
to ensure the longevity of the NGO.  Although this has its benefits, he is explicit about the drawbacks. He 
argues: 
 
‘they enjoy funding, credit, training and technical assistance, but only at the cost of 
their own vision and voice. The consequence is less grassroots mobilisation and less 
capacity to criticise government policy or pursue alternative solutions’ (Foweraker, 
2001:853). 
 
In this circumstance, Foweraker (2001) suggests that state sector elites have the potential to further 
their ideologies in civil society by funding NGO actors, through what Hodgson (2004) calls ‘manufactured 
civil society’. One of the first to discuss this phenomenon was Tvedt (1998) who argues development 
NGOs could be seen as ‘transmission belts’ of the state’s ideas.  NGOs can become tightly linked to the 
state, and as such they become a belt for transferring information and legitimisation from the core, the 
state, to the periphery, the population, or from developed countries to developing countries (Choudry 
and Kapoor, 2013).  
 
For some NGOs this is a desired outcome and competition between NGOs become stronger as more 
funding becomes available. Mercer (2003) argues that it is often international NGOs that are able to gain 
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significant power from this process, as when working in a host country, international NGOs are able to 
choose elite NGOs in the host state which best reflects their ideology. These elite NGOs in the host 
country then become professionalised into the Western discourse, this in turn isolates other civil society 
actors in the host country, if they do not share the same developmental view. In this sense the 
hegemonic ideology of neoliberal development then becomes further entrenched. 
 
The long-term consequences of this are inaction or inappropriate solutions to complex problems. 
According to Choudry and Kapoor (2013), ‘NGOs frequently undermine local and international 
movements for social change and environmental justice…in complicity with state and private-sector 
interests’ (Ibid:2). Through this system of funding the ideology of the hegemonic class is further 
engrained in civil society through relations of power. Or as Srinivas (2009) suggests: 
 
‘Whom NGOs serve may be less determined by the needs of clients and those they 
are meant to serve, and more by who funds them, to whom they are financially 
accountable and who ensures the resources needed for their activities’ (Srinivas, 
2009:618). 
 
These arguments are undoubtedly paralleled in the critical development literature. Where the 
management of some contemporary development projects have been said to maintain and enhance 
particular forms of relationships (Cooke, 2010) and pose new opportunities for elites to further their 
agenda (Cooke and Kothari, 2001, Taylor, 2004). To explore this set of literature in any further detail falls 
outside the remit of this thesis, but it is important to understand the link between neoliberal capitalism 
and poverty has been widely discussed by these scholars (Escobar, 2010, Levermore and Beacom, 2009, 
Boas and McNeill, 2004) 
 
2.4: Post-neoliberalism in Brazil 
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An opportunity for NGOs to become further involved in governance in Brazil was created by a particular 
moment in Brazilian political history. This was part of a wider movement in Latin America which saw 11 
left-leaning governments elected into office in 2005 and 2006. Some scholars at the time labelled this as 
a post-neoliberal turn in Latin America (Webber and Carr, 2013, Navia, 2009, Burges, 2009, Grugel and 
Riggirozzi, 2009, Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012, Escobar, 2010) and were hopeful that these governments 
would attempt to re-embed social principles in the market (Munck, 2013). 
 
The supposed post-neoliberal turn was seen as a reaction to a neoliberal project, which at the time, 
after ‘two decades of Washington Consensus policies, ha[d] left legacies of uneven growth, inequality, 
social conflicts and lacklustre democracy’ Grugel and Riggirozzi (2009:8). Grugel and Riggirozzi (2009) 
further argue that like other peripheral countries, Brazil was exposed to the neoliberal project through 
instruments such as the ‘structural adjustment programmes’ of the World Bank in the 1980s. The 
structural adjustment programmes in these peripheral countries were deemed necessary as inflation 
rates became unmanageable. For example, in 1986 Brazil had an inflation rate of 65% and over the 
proceeding eight years, six of these had rates of over 1000% (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2009, Oxhorn, 2009). 
According to Hoffman French (2009), the ‘structural adjustment programme’ in Brazil saw state 
monopolies on gas and petroleum eliminated and policies were created which opened the economy to 
foreign investment. This project began with the first democratically elected President Fernando Collor 
de Mello and was furthered by the succeeding President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002). 
 
The election of the left-leaning governments created a set of literature at the time that attempted to 
theorise the potential impacts social policies would have on neoliberal economies (Geddes, 2014, 
Castañeda and Morales, 2009, Munck, 2013). Some common characteristics were identified and 
included a fundamental aim to deepen democracy and to promote the ideals of social justice and 
equality (Navia, 2009). Others thought a post-neoliberal society would become more responsive to local 
traditions and communities (Grugel and Riggirozzo, 2012, 2007) mainly through the implementation of 
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small policies with grass roots participation  (Wylde, 2012, Burges, 2009). Yates and Bakker (2014) 
defined post-neoliberalism as ‘reviving citizenship via a new politics of participation and alliances across 
sociocultural sectors and groups’ (Ibid:3). Further, they suggested it would be achieved through 
‘establishing greater autonomy and self-governance through processes of cultural self-determination at 
a variety of scales’ (Yates and Bakker 2013:9).  
 
Under the Presidency of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva ‘Lula’ (2003-2011), it has been argued that some 
Brazilian policies were implemented that had these post-neoliberal characteristics. In the early stages of 
his Presidency Lula created policies which were designed to stabilise the economy to attract foreign 
investment, whilst also provide services for the absolute poor. Grugel and Riggirozzi (2012) acknowledge 
that although the policies were still within the neoliberal economy, the specific wealth distribution 
projects which provided services to the poor, such as the ‘bolsa de familia’ and ‘bolsa de scholar’, were 
post-neoliberal. To the extent they have been successful has been argued, Saad-Filho (2007) suggest 
they only solve the symptoms of poverty and paternalistic programmes do nothing to address the 
fundamental structure of poverty. In addition, and applying the argument of Grugel and Riggirozzi (2007 
and 2012), they also do not respond to local traditions by considering localities.  
 
In addition to the wealth distribution, scholars at the time saw policies which sought to develop 
participation in politics as post-neoliberal. This was important in wider global institutions as decision 
making through public participation was seen by many, including the United Nations, as a safe guard of 
democracy (Pateman, 2012, Pearce, 1997, Baiocchi et al., 2008, Avritzer, 2009). The presence of civil 
society, and in particular NGOs, in developing countries were seen as indicators of a deep democracy 
that could help promote good governance and effective policy (Rahman, 2006). This was essential to 
Brazilian decision makers in the socio-political environment of a post-dictatorship.  
 
51 
 
In Brazil, Organização da Sociedade Civil de Interesse Público (Organisation of civil society of public 
interest, OSCIP) are non-profit, civil society led organisations developed to increase public participation 
within state-led projects, whilst simultaneously filling the void left by the rolling back of the state 
(Giddens, 2013a, Bradley, 2005). It can be seen was Lula’s attempt to allow progressive NGOs a voice in 
decision making. An OSCIP can only become legally recognised when it enters into a partnership with a 
state department to deliver a project. It also has to demonstrate that the project could not be 
implemented by the state alone and could cover health, environmental or social issues (Lemos et al., 
2006, Peci et al., 2011, Grangeia, 2011, Albuquerque and Cavalcante, 2007, Koga, 2004, Alves, 2004).  
 
Brazil was not the only country to implement this type of policy. Countries in the global North, especially 
the UK, also experimented with giving NGOs more power and opportunities to deliver projects. An 
OSCIP could then be argued to follow a similar critique of the UK policies as discussed by Hodgson 
(2004). He argues that an NGO and state partnership could create a ‘manufactured civil society’ 
whereby the NGO loses its autonomy as the state funds and organises the NGO (Hodgson, 2004). There 
is the chance, from this perspective, that the NGO delivers the state’s goals and builds on government 
failure, rather than ensuring citizen rights and public participation (Giddens, 2013b, Giddens, 2013a, 
Foweraker, 2001). This argument mirrors the argument from the NGO literature above. 
 
These concepts identified by the literature show that carbon offsetting and the role of NGOs in  Brazil y 
are contested. They provide critical and qualitative support to the literature which suggests that not all 
sports mega-events deliver on their environmental and social benefit claims. This literature review now 
moves from the content of these arguments to the way in which scholars understand the problems they 
discuss.   
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2.5: Neo-Gramscian approach to environmental governance 
 
Scholars who write on the current environmental crisis can be separated by the paradigm in which they 
view the crisis. Those who align with ecological modernisation believe that the environmental crisis can 
be solved through technological innovation within a neoliberal economy. As the previous literature 
described, this can be problematic as these scholars are not critically engaged. Viewing the social and 
environmental claims from the World Cup within this paradigm would disregard the concepts discussed 
by scholars writing on carbon offsetting and NGOs.  
 
Other scholars, who were largely inspired by Marxist ecology literature (Foster, 2000, O'Connor, 1988 
and Benton, 1998), propose the capitalist system contributes to the current ecological crisis. In 
developing the ideas from Marxist ecology, Levy and Newell (2002) suggested scholars studying 
environmental governance at the time did not give enough attention to the role of the corporate sector 
and focused too heavily on state-society analysis. They then proposed a new approach, a political 
economy of global environmental governance which drew key concepts from Antonio Gramsci’s work. 
Noting the influence of other work from a variety of disciplines, they named this a neo-Gramscian 
approach (Levy and Newell, 2002). Central to their analysis was the role of hegemony. They proposed 
that elite actors working within environmental governance were able to secure their interest through a 
network of alliances which all contributed to maintaining the current social relations (Simon, 1991).   
 
The environmental NGO and carbon offsetting literature highlighted the role the corporate sector can 
play and, therefore, a neo-Gramscian approach which acknowledges this is seen as appropriate. This is 
further supported by Newell (2008) who, speaking of wider environmental governance problems 
suggests there is ‘increasing evidence of private actors assuming public functions of regulation and 
stewardship with regard to natural resources’ (Ibid:510). This framework has the ability to incorporate 
the issues presented in the previous sections. Newell (2008) further suggests the neo-Gramscian 
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approach to environmental governance addresses ‘the fact that global environmental governance 
cannot be understood separately from broader shifts in authority in global politics’ (Ibid:513). Therefore, 
the neo-Gramscian approach also would account for the historical moment when NGOs in Brazil were 
given more authority.  
 
The neo-Gramscian approach posits that the relations that build a system of elite alliances and 
connections allow the hegemonic class to produce ideological leadership in civil society and political 
leadership in the political sector (Daldal, 2014, Morton, 2007). Further, although these elite alliance may 
have divergent interests, but are all furthered by the overall hegemonic project (Simon, 1991, Gill, 
1993).  
 
This approach to understanding environmental governance is growing in popularity. Levy and Egan 
(2003) were among the first to apply this analysis on an empirical study. They investigated how the USA 
and European automobile and oil organisations reacted in response to climate change. They argued that 
these elites were able to secure their social position by lobbying political elites to work in their favour. 
They argue this would not have been possible without the role civil society played in legitimising their 
case, by doing so, hegemonic relations were secured by the automobile and oil organisations. Banerjee 
(2011) alluded to the neo-Gramscian conceptualisation in his paper which looked at internal colonialism 
in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Throughout his paper, and using different examples he argues how the 
lines between state and market authority are becoming increasingly blurred. He falls short of applying 
neo-Gramscian analysis, however, alludes to the dominance of the different actors within the state, 
corporate and civil society sectors and explores how relationships of dominance defines their power. In 
a smaller context, the neo-Gramscain analysis was also implemented by Dimitrov (2010) to analyse the 
UN Climate Change negotiations. He highlighted the power relationships and struggles that have led to 
poor performance by state actors in the climate change negotiations. Using a neo-Gramscian analysis he 
concluded that the hegemonic class did not want a globally binding contract and used their relations of 
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dominance to ensure the hegemonic project was not challenged. Smaller scale actors working outside 
the hegemonic project, then had to shift policy efforts ‘to national, bilateral and regional initiatives’ 
(Dimitrov, 2010:22) as the hegemonic elite dominated. Moog et al. (2014) once again reiterated the 
importance of civil society as the site where hegemonic ideology is produced and used the neo-
Gramscian analysis to problematize the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).  
 
The above studies took the neo-Gramscian conceptualisation and applied it to global scale 
environmental political analysis. These multi-national, large scale studies unearthed the relations of 
domination between the elite class and other actors associated with global environmental problems. 
They highlighted the legitimisation role of civil society in creating hegemony, also suggesting that civil 
society is the place where resistance manifests. The use of this conceptual framework has also been 
applied within the management and organisational literature, but on a much smaller scale. The 
application of this analysis commenced in 2007 with a study of how management hegemony is 
challenged through agency in organisations (Spicer and Böhm, 2007). Böhm et al. (2008) challenged a 
labour process theory stance that hegemony is produced only in the economic realm and argued it 
occurs in all three sectors, the economy, state and civil society. They also argue that within these sectors 
are formal and informal resistance. These studies show that the neo-Gramscian approach can also be 
applied on smaller scales. However, the neo-Gramscian approach is weakened by the inability to link 
these larger scale studies with smaller scale phenomena. To study the organisation of the carbon 
offsetting project would require an understanding of small scale organisation practices and the 
appreciation of how this fits into a wider hegemonic project. This thesis takes the view that this can be 
linked through studying the agency of elites at these different scales.  
 
2.6: Scalar theory 
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Elites can be seen to have the ability to transform spatially as well as temporally (Swyngedouw, 2004) 
and therefore are able to create new alliances to ensure their interests are served. Swyngedouw (2004) 
further argues that these transitions occur through layers of ‘nodes and linkages, which are 
interconnected in proliferating networks and flows of money, information, commodities and people’ 
(Ibid: 32). In changing these alliances at different scales, elites have the ability to secure their interests. 
At this point, it is perhaps important to identify the conflation of the terms scales and levels. Neumann 
(2009) suggests that Blaikie (1985) and Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) were clear when they described 
‘geographic scales’ as spatial and ‘hierarchies of socioeconomic organizations’ as levels. Sayre (2008) 
suggests households and cities are levels of social organization not scales. This thesis focuses on 
‘geographical scales’ and therefore from here on in, scale describes geographical scale.  
 
The different linkages described by Swyngedouw (2004) can be analysed through different geographical 
scales, first discussed by Neil Smith in 1992 (Smith, 1992). The process to analysing different 
geographical scales has been seen as an important concept to contemporary political ecologists who 
believe that each scale is ‘inseparably tied to the other, but the particular way they are related is open 
to social production’ (Brown and Purcell, 2005:609). This is developed from cultural ecology which 
Brown and Purcell (2005) argued saw the local scale as a closed system. Using scalar theory, the linkages 
of the wider political economy to lower scales can be used to analyse a phenomena. Brenner (2001) 
suggests the cultural ecology perspective misses that the political economy, culture, and ecology all exist 
and operate simultaneously at a range of scales. The local scale is inextricably embedded in the global 
scale which in turn is produced by various local scales. Turner (1997) labelled the thinking of the time as 
dichotomization of the local and regional. These scales are important as recent political ecology work 
has identified a trend which sees elites moving between these scales to secure their interests. 
 
Ramutsindela and Noe (2012) argue in their study of conservation in southeast Tanzania that although 
the conservation agenda is globally decided upon it is the local scale from which it is implemented and 
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the natural resource rights and benefits are contested. It is the actors who can work at different scales 
that have the powerful position at the local scale. Zanotti (2011) suggests that in the Brazilian Amazon, 
indigenous groups have struggled to gain power at the local scale and have created strategic ties with 
state and non-state actors at different scales in order to leverage their power at the local scale. They 
argue these ties have been forged through increased access to information and increased networking 
ability through building of logistical infrastructure. It is the ability of the elites then who are able to 
secure alliances at different levels that are important in how decisions at the national scale are 
implemented at the local scale. This phenomena is not new, Smith (1993) first discussed this notion of 
‘jumping scales’, a political strategy to challenge the structure of scale. Groups who are disadvantaged 
at one scale strategically create relations or pursue aims at a different scale. This ‘alters relative power 
positions as inter-local cooperation is replaced by inter-local competition. This increases the power of 
those that can ‘jump scales’ vertically or horizontally at the expense of those whose command of scale is 
more limited’ (Swyngedouw, 2004:41). Chernela (2005) working in the Brazilian Amazon argued that 
those who can actively scale the different geographical scales, named as an interlocutor, actively works 
in creating ‘the local’ culture and values. It is argued this then creates circumstances where elites 
manipulate ideology to suit their agenda.  
 
Scholars working in this tradition agree that scales are socially constructed (Neumann, 2009: 
Swyngedouw, 2004; Turner, 1997). According to Brown and Purcell (2005:610) ‘the social and ecological 
outcomes of any particular scalar arrangement are the result of the political strategies of particular 
actors, not the inherent qualities of particular scales’. It is the politics of the scales that provide insight 
into the power struggles and interests of the elite at each scale. As scale is socially constructed through 
political struggle they are fluid and constantly being created and re-created (Swyngedouw, 1997; Brown 
and Purcell, 2005; Neumann, 2009).  However, Brown and Purcell (2005) also argue that these 
structures can be relatively stable and under hegemonic processes can become semi-permeant. For 
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example, sovereign nations can be a semi-permanent scale, although another political project may see 
this differently and change the scale of the nation state into their interest.  
 
In order to understand this political contestation, it is essential to analyse the relationships among the 
scales. Brown and Purcell (2005) suggest that researchers cannot focus on a single scale alone as it 
forgoes the contestations between the different scales and how the relations among scales are socially 
produced. This, according to Neumann (2009:7) is particularly useful for political ecologists, as it 
‘highlights power relations and a dialectical approach toward nature-society relations’. Neumann (2009) 
advises that studies of scale should concentrate on the scalar practices of social actors rather than scale 
itself.  The networks that actors have within and between scales is reliant on their relative power 
(Neumann, 2009: 2).  
 
The theory of scales is helpful when understanding the mechanisms elites use to maintain their social 
position and manipulate relations to serve their interest. This is particularly important in a context 
outlined above where the carbon offsetting mechanism is rife with inequalities. The neo-Gramscian 
approach provides a theoretical framework to analyse the concepts presented in the first sections of the 
chapter.   
 
2.7: Conclusions 
 
This chapter gave an overview of the current arguments in the sports mega-event literature. Claims 
surrounding the social and environmental benefits that organisers made are starting to be questioned 
by scholars, particularly the social benefits. However, it was found these investigations have 
predominantly been quantitative in approach and were written within the ecological modernisation 
paradigm with the aim to improve policy. This is problematic when using the concepts highlighted in the 
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supporting literature which not only questions the appropriateness of carbon offsetting, but the 
intentions of the actors within the mechanism. 
 
I drew from wider critical development and environmental governance literature because these 
literatures are more established and allow for a deeper understanding of key concepts that can then be 
applied to my studied case. Key arguments, such as the role of NGOs and the maintenance of existing 
hegemonic relationships through the carbon market are central to this thesis. 
 
This phenomenon will be studied through a neo-Gramscian approach. This approach is critical of social 
hierarchies and relationships which allow for inaction or inappropriate action with regard to climate 
change. It also opposes the stance of ecological modernisation, that environmental protection and 
economic development are compatible through policy and technological innovation.  
 
A gap has been highlighted in mega-events literature which critically engages with a carbon offsetting 
project at the FIFA World Cup. This thesis aims to fill this gap in literature content. 
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-Chapter III - 
Methods and fieldwork 
 
 
This thesis is based on qualitative research and ethnographic fieldwork carried out between 2013 and 
2016 and the main aim of this chapter is to chart the process of collecting and analysing data used in the 
following chapters.  The first section describes the preliminary research undertaken and how I selected 
the case, then I discuss the methods I used in collecting the data during fieldwork. After a consideration 
of some of the challenges and dilemmas that arose using these methods I document how I analysed the 
data and the ethical issues and challenges I encountered during fieldwork.  Before going into the details 
of the research process it is important to briefly describe the approach that informed this critical 
ethnographic case study.  
My approach was generally informed by critical management studies.  To critical management theorists, 
mainstream theory is neutral and expects impartial management practice (Alvesson and Willmott, 1992, 
Alvesson and Deetz, 2000).  In contrast, critical approaches question ‘established social orders, 
dominating practices, ideologies, discourses, and institutions’ (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000:x). Taking a 
critical approach in this thesis allowed me to explore the ideologies and networks of actors which 
enabled the green claims surrounding the FIFA World Cup in Mato Grosso.   
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However,  my approach was also more specifically informed by the neo-Gramscian approaches to 
environmental governance.  In this tradition most empirical studies have taken a case-study approach 
using primary and secondary data to inform their analysis (Moog et al., 2014, Levy and Egan, 2003, Levy 
and Newell, 2002, Wittneben et al., 2012).  I follow in this tradition, however, I also incorporated an 
ethnographic fieldwork element in order to understand the realities on the ground (Creswell, 2013). By 
using observation, participant observation and creating relationships with participants I had the 
opportunity to fully investigate the claims FIFA made whilst also understanding the environmental and 
political struggles of participants (Bryant and Bailey, 1997, Bryant, 1997, Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003, 
Benjaminsen and Ba, 2009, Phuc, 2009, Zaidi, 2012).  Moreover, as Neumann emphasises, ethnography 
has the ability to highlight ‘the differing and sometimes conflicting perspectives on the environment and 
environmental problems held among various actors operating at local, regional and global scales’ 
(Neumann, 2014:6). 
Finally, it is important to note that like most scholars working within the neo-Gramscian tradition, this 
study is underpinned by a critical realist epistemology. Critical realism can be described as an alternative 
both to a positivist approach, where there is an object truth that only neutral researchers can obtain; 
and is also distinguished from relativist, interpretivist approaches, which suggest there is no object truth 
(Sayer, 2004).  In contrast, critical realism posits there is an existence of one real and actual world, but 
people know this world differently. Different interpretations of the same phenomena can lead one 
statement to be closer to the objective truth than the other.  It is the role of the researcher to explore 
the historical and contemporary, social and political factors, which may have influenced these 
interpretations (Sayer, 2000) in order to get as close to the objective truth as possible.  Moreover, as 
Reed (2005: 1623) emphasises in relation to organisational studies, critical realism is used as a ‘meta-
theoretical paradigm’ which seeks to explain the social relations that are reproduced and transformed 
through agency (Reed, 2005).  
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3.1: Preliminary Documentary Research and Selecting the Case 
 
When I first started my PhD, I was planning to study carbon-offsetting in mangroves in Indonesia which I 
had visited during a module on my MSc in Environmental Governance.  However, during my preliminary 
bibliographic research on carbon-offsetting, I discovered that major sporting events were starting to use 
carbon-offsetting to counter criticisms of their environmental impacts.  I have always enjoyed sports, 
especially football, and when I found out that FIFA had incorporated carbon-offsetting into its 
environmental strategy, I knew that I had found my research topic.   My preliminary online searches in 
late 2012 and early 2013 revealed that FIFA had released a sustainability concept document (Addiechi et 
al., 2012) for the 2014 tournament in Brazil, and that the Brazilian government  was planning to make it 
‘the greenest World Cup ever’. 
This preliminary documentary research allowed me to develop a research proposal to investigate 
environmental governance and the 2014 FIFA World Cup. The documents were all available online and 
were free to access. The FIFA documents were only available in English but the Brazilian Organising 
Committee releases were also available in Portuguese. From this data I was able to then build an overall 
picture of the sustainability claims and it became apparent carbon offsetting was a significant part of the 
programme. One of these projects was to offset the emissions from the whole tournament. The 
Brazilian Organising Committee had negotiated with BP Carbon Neutral to produce a portfolio of 
Brazilian based projects which were used to offset the emissions for hosting the tournament (Lopes, 
2011a, Secopa, 2012a, Noticias, no date)2.   
In addition to this large offsetting project, my preliminary documentary research showed that host cities 
would be responsible for carrying out carbon offsetting projects to offset the emissions of new stadiums.  
It also revealed that the Estadio Nacional Mane Garrincha in Brasilia  and the Pantanal Stadium in Cuiabá 
                                                          
2
 The details of the projects were not announced until early 2014, therefore it did not allow enough time to 
prepare a valid research proposal within the academic confinements of a PhD. 
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, Mato Grosso were the only two stadiums that had publically available data on the offsetting aspect of 
their construction programmes3. In Brasilia, the plan was to achieve carbon neutrality through 
purchasing carbon credits on the international carbon market, which would have made the credits more 
difficult to trace. In contrast, the new Pantanal Stadium in Cuiaba was to achieve carbon neutrality 
through purchasing carbon credits from a local reforestation programme called the Green River Project.  
This project, it seemed, would make a feasible case study as the carbon credits were to be purchased 
directly and therefore the key actors and claims would be easily available.  
 
In order to develop a research and fieldwork plan for investigating this case, I conducted further 
documentary research into the project. Throughout this time I obtained documents from Secopa 
(Zanetti, 2013, Secopa, 2012b) and local news outlets (Grosso, 2012, Neuman, 2003, Lumsden, 2009) 
which were invaluable in understanding the case. I understood the Green River Project was a bi-lateral 
agreement between the state government, Secopa, the construction company of the Arena Pantanal 
and the Green Action Institute. The project’s stated aim was to plant 1.4 million trees to offset 711,000 
tonnes of carbon, based on a method of planting seven trees to offset one tonne of carbon. The Green 
Action Institute also posted documents on their website, which gave more details than the press 
releases.  They provided names of contacts and gave me a clearer understanding of the project 
(Neuman, 2003). I tried contacting the Green Action Institute several times through the website but did 
not receive a response. 
                                                          
3
 FIFA published a press release in 2011 which highlighted the Pantanal Stadium’s environmental claims. With 
these claims I was able to produce a research proposal in 2012. 
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Once I had selected this case, I also started collecting further information on state and regional which 
were available through online media outlets. The local newspaper, Diario de Cuiabá , had feature 
articles and short news reports editorial which were helpful for getting a sense of local issues, and 
sometimes were directly relevant to my research.  A feature article on the health of the River Cuiabá  
(de Melo Resende, 2012) was particularly useful, for example.  Finding accurate maps however, was 
more tricky (Fig 1).   At the time when I left for Brazil in May 2014, the three communities participating 
in the Green River Project, where I planned to do most of my fieldwork, Barranco Alto I and II, and Barra 
de Arica were not documented on Google Maps.  Moreover, the hotel where I planned to work was 
placed in Santo Antonio do Leverger, 23km further South than its actual location in Pesquerio Florida.  
 
Figure 1: Location of Baixada Cuiabána in Southern Mato Grosso. My study sites were in the municipality of Santo Antonio de 
Leverger in South East Baixada Cuiabána, source: adapted from (CGMA, 2015) 
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3.2: Fieldwork  
 
The ethnographic research for this project was carried out in two phases: from May to September 2014 
and from June 2015 to September 2015.  The first period was planned to coincide with the tournament 
itself (June-July 2014) and enabled me to observe both the preparations for and excitement around the 
actual tournament. The second period was important for documenting the legacies of the World Cup 
once the media attention and excitement had died down, as well as further interviews with villagers and 
key actors.  
Before my first fieldwork trip, I was fully aware that I had to make thorough preparations. I had never 
visited Brasil, spoke no Portuguese, and was an inexperienced researcher.  I also had many pre-
conceptions about undertaking research in Brazil.  In terms of practical preparation, my first task was to 
learn to speak Portuguese. I sought contact with Portuguese speakers in Colchester and used Duolingo 
self-education tools and apps.  These apps proved very helpful and I continued to use them once I 
started fieldwork.  By the time I arrived in Brazil, I had some basic phrases at my disposal.  However it 
took about a month before I could begin to have conversations.  The second main practical preparation 
was to start making contacts with academics and key actors in Cuiabá  and finding possible places to 
stay close to the villages involved in the Green River Project.  
In terms of academic preparations, in addition to more focused bibliographic research, I had extensive 
discussions with my supervisors about ethics, safety and the practicalities of doing fieldwork. I was 
particularly worried about my impact as a Western researcher in the field. Riach (2009) suggests that as 
a researcher my research is influenced by my gender, class, national and racial attributes.  Other 
‘confessional tales’ by ethnographers who had ethical issues in relation to their impact in the field 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011, Neuman, 2003, Liamputtong, 2010) made me conscious of my potential impact 
on research participants. However, these concerns proved to be largely unfounded.  When I arrived in 
Brazil, I soon realised that the deeply engrained social inequalities were much more significant than the 
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North/South divide, and my presence in some circumstances actually broke down social barriers. I was 
also aware of being a single female in the field. This was perhaps the biggest struggle and something I 
had underestimated.  Before my fieldwork, I had not experienced a patriarchal society and did not 
appreciate how I might react to being treated as having a prescribed gender role.  In this sense, being in 
the field had a greater impact on me as a researcher than the research participants.  
Once I arrived in Brazil I spent one month travelling around, in preparation for going to the villages in 
rural Mato Grosso.  During this time I went to Brasilia and stayed in a European back-packers hostel and 
Mato Grosso do Sul where I visited local tourist sights.  Then I spent two weeks in Cuiabá  with a 
Brazilian middle-class family who could speak English. This initial period of fieldwork was important to 
understand Brazilian society in general. I enjoyed evenings discussing politics and reading newspapers.  
The time in Cuiabá  was especially important as I was able to experience both the middle-class and 
peasant life, which enabled me to fully appreciate the social and economic divides in Brazil. 
During this month of acclimatising, I met Dr Carla Valentini, a college teacher in Cuiabá . I first made 
contact with her in 2013 when researching academics working in the Northern Pantanal region. 
Although she could not speak English she was very keen to meet and help me when I arrived in Cuiabá . 
Within the first week I had accompanied her on a college trip to the Pantanal where she led a tour of an 
eco-hotel, and she also took me to Barranco Alto so that I could begin to map the region. Carla became 
very interested in my project and was intrigued that such a small, rural project could have caught the 
attention of UK researchers. She claimed that although she lived in the city, her heart belonged in the 
mata (countryside). It was a sore subject that both of her teenage daughters hated spending time in the 
countryside and both had ambitions to move to the chique (fashionable) USA. Carla later went to great 
lengths to arrange my interviews with the Green Action Institute, the Mato Grosso public prosecutor, 
and tried to arrange interviews with Secopa and took time out to accompany when I carried them out.  
After my two weeks in Cuiabá , I travelled to the Pousada Itaicy, a small hotel in Pesquerio Florida, which 
is one of the communities involved in the Green River Project.  While preparing for fieldwork, I had 
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made contact the hotel owner Robson, through a search of hotels near Barranco Alto.  I had emailed 
over 10 hotels and Robson was the only one to reply. He was keen for me to stay at the hotel as he 
spoke no English and had English-speaking guests arriving to stay during the World Cup.   So we had 
provisionally arranged that I would look after these guests in return for board and lodgings.  Although I 
was rather apprehensive about this provisional arrangement, once I arrived and met Robson I was 
reassured and working at the hotel proved invaluable for my fieldwork. It was close to the fishing 
villages of Barranco Alto I and II, and also facilitated access to key elite actors.   
The Pousada Itiacy runs weekend and five day fishing packages for elite tourists from around  Mato 
Groso and other parts of Brazil, as the River Cuiabá  is famous among fisherman for Dourado, 
Piraputanga and Pintado. It had eight rooms when I arrived which grew to eleven by the time I left the 
field. The rooms were simple in design and furniture but had access to satellite TV and air conditioning. 
A paved walkway towards the river led to the restaurant and covered seating area on the river bank. The 
restaurant was built by Robson and his late father and had wooden furniture- a luxury in Santo Antonio 
do Leverger.  It cost R$750 (£170) for one person to stay overnight with two fishing trips, meals and 
drinks. Due to this reason it was only the elite classes who could afford to stay.  To the outside, the hotel 
seemed a paradise in such a rural location, Robson would often profess to having the best Wi-Fi in Brazil 
as it was a great feat to get Wi-Fi in the area.  
Due to the rural location of the hotel I stayed on the premises as did other workers, this closeness 
meant I created relationships very quickly with the other workers. However, my closeness to the hotel 
owner’s wife meant that gaining their full trust was difficult. I shared my room with other workers who 
generally did not stay longer than two or three months before moving onto other jobs. During my 
second stay in 2015 Robson carried out renovations on the hotel and workers’ rooms. Throughout most 
of this period of fieldwork I slept in the hotel owner’s apartment on the floor, but occasionally shared a 
hammock with another female worker, and on some occasions we were given a guest bedroom.  
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3.3: Data Collection Methods 
Observations 
During initial stages of my data collection I used observation to become an ‘instrument that absorbs all 
sources of data’ (Neuman, 2003:381). I then used this knowledge to begin to filter the information that 
was necessary to my research and that which was not. This was particularly useful when in Mato Grosso 
du Sol, Brasilia and when I first arrived in Cuiabá . In addition to these observations I made visits to 
observe key objects in my research. Observations were used to understand the World Cup in different 
areas in Brazil and verify claims made by research participants and in documentary sources. My first 
observation was of the Estádio Nacional Mané Garrincha, the national stadium in Brasilia in April 2014; I 
later observed the stadium in September 2014. I observed the Maracanã, the football stadium used for 
the World Cup in Rio de Janeiro in July 2014 and September 2015.  The Pantanal stadium in Cuiabá  was 
observed in May, June and September 2014 and September 2015. Finally, the tree nursery in Barranco 
Alto was observed in May 2014, July 2014 and September 2015.  
The prolonged period of observations of the Pantanal Stadium, and in particular the shrubs and grounds 
were used to challenge claims made by Secopa. The observation in May 2014 suggested the shrubs in 
the car park were being planted that day and construction work was ongoing. The next observation in 
September 2015 reported the surroundings of the stadium were effectively crumbling. The claims 
surrounding recycled water, pond, plants and exercise area were able to be challenged based on 
observations. Observations of the tree nursery in Barranco Alto were also used to challenge claims made 
project organisers. Claims made by the Green Action Institute about their current activities were 
challenged in 2014 by the observations from the nursery. In 2015 when it was not possible to talk to the 
Green Action Institute, observations of the nursery confirmed the interviews with a SEMA employee 
(interview S8) and local residents (interviews PP 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) that the project had stopped.  
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Participant observations 
Participant observation was a particularly important method at the start of my fieldwork. I spoke very 
little Portuguese and relied heavily on the patience of Robson’s wife, Lunira, to communicate.  So it was 
unrealistic to conduct interviews in the early  phase of my fieldwork. However, participant observation 
allowed me to understand the social realities of the field. For example, through observation I was able 
to identify nuances in the vocabulary of the hotel owner’s wife.  Any male guest staying at the hotel, 
regardless of age was addressed as senhor (sir) by her, whereas any male who worked at the hotel, 
supplied goods to the hotel or was an obvious lower social class was referred to as menino (boy). It was 
due to these participant observations that I began to question my understanding of the social relations 
and realities of the field; consequently, this led me to refine my research agenda to be more aware of 
these relations. One consequence of this was that I chose my guide in the villages more carefully. 
Initially I had accepted offers from both Carla and Luinra to accompany me when conducting interviews 
in Barranco Alto I and II. However, it soon became obvious that their presence would affect the way the 
much poorer people in the villages would communicate with me. So, I asked Chacho, a fishing guide who 
had grown up in one of the villages to be my guide instead.  
Participant observation was carried out on a daily basis at the hotel. Due to financial constraints I agreed 
with the hotel owner, Robson, I would stay at the hotel from May until Mid July 2014- the end of the 
World Cup. I stayed for free in return for translating and hosting international tourists who could not 
speak Portuguese. By the end of my first stay at the hotel I was running the restaurant and typically 
working for 10 hours a day. After the World Cup I returned to the hotel and worked until October, 
during this time Robson paid for me to go on holiday with his wife and mother-in-law in Porto de 
Galinhas in North-East Brazil.  In my second period of fieldwork, the following year I ran the front of 
house of the hotel and restaurant and set up databases to track fishing guides’ use of petrol and bait as 
well as the amount spent on washing linen per month. I received a monthly wage, which was 3x the 
minimum wage--the price of a single person staying at the hotel for one night. I was frequently working 
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over 12 hours a day. Throughout this time I was also conducting fieldwork, observing and analysing my 
surroundings.  
In addition to the Porto de Galhinas trip I also spent time in Rio de Janeiro half way through my 
fieldwork in 2014 and again at the end of my field work is 2015. On the first visit I was accompanied by a 
friend during the World Cup semi-finals and finals where we watched the matches on Copacabana 
beach. It was during this time that I observed the protests in Rio de Janeiro following Brazil’s defeat by 
Germany. On the second visit I was accompanied by my brother, who also returned to Mato Grosso with 
me for two weeks. Having these people with me at these key stages of my field work proved invaluable. 
On both occasions I was suffering from fieldwork fatigue where the stress of learning the language, 
working and conducting research were taking its toll. Their enthusiasm and curiosity about my fieldwork 
and even my ability to speak Portuguese gave me the confidence and energy boost I needed.  
 Interviews  
During my two fieldwork trips I conducted 61 formal interviews and numerous informal interviews. My 
formal interviews were in structured and semi-structured formats depending on the participants profiles. 
The length of interviews varied from ten minutes to several hours, although not all parts of interviews 
were recorded.  
Informal interviews are described as having no pre-determined themes (Neuman, 2003).  In my case 
they usually started by casual conversations with hotel guests while I was working at the hotel.  If 
relevant, I recorded these informal interviews afterwards in my field note diary. I found they were a 
good way of identifying general patterns and discovering if individual guests had knowledge or 
experiences that I could explore further in a semi-structured interview.  Through these informal 
interviews I identified one guest as being the author of a scientific paper I had read on Barranco Alto. 
After we had arranged a formal interview he then put me in touch with a worker from SEMA who had a 
large impact on my data collection. Not all informal interviewees gave consent as is discussed in section. 
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Semi-Structured Formal Interviews 
I conducted 37 semi-structured formal interviews with residents in the three communities involved in 
the Green River Project, Barranco Alto I and II, Pesquisa Florida, as well as the neighbouring village of 
Barra de Arica. I prepared for semi-structured interviews by having a loose list of themes or discussion 
points to cover. The interviewee did not know these themes beforehand and were allowed to leave the 
intended subjects if they felt appropriate (Barbour, 2014, Hennink et al., 2011, Jenner et al., 2004). I 
recorded the interview in my notes after it was conducted and I wore casual clothes, usually denim 
shorts and t-shirt with flip-flops. Conversely, structured interviews were used when conducting 
interviews with participants with a professional or elite background. The questions for these interviews 
were pre-prepared based on my own research which I gave to the interviewee before the interview 
(Harvey, 2011, Richards, 1996).  These were typically conducted in the participant’s offices and used 
both a voice recorder and paper and pen. In addition, I dressed in office wear to make the process in line 
with their everyday activities (Harvey, 2011, Creswell, 2013).  
 
In view of considerations about personal safety, I did not conduct interviews alone.. As previously 
discussed choosing an appropriate guide for these interviews was essential in light of the local social 
relations and I decided to turn down the offers of Lunira and Carla Valentini. I felt having these white, 
middle-class women with me would prevent participants from engaging fully in my research or could 
even prevent me from gaining access. Gaining access to the research participants was a continual 
process of negotiation between myself, the participants and the gate keepers (Lumsden, 2009) and as 
such it was important both myself and the participants could trust the gatekeepers. It was on these 
grounds, that I accepted Chacho’s offer to be my guide. 
 
Chacho is a fishing guide at the Pousada Itaicy who grew up and still lives in Barra de Arica.  He was a 
favoured guide at the hotel and on his days off he would come to the hotel to hang out. He had never 
met a foreigner and was almost as intrigued about my life as I was about his. Most of his family 
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continued to live in the communities along the river bank and after I told him about my research project, 
he was very keen to help out. His out-going personality meant he was well-known and liked in the 
villages. Newly single after his wife left him for a man from ‘the city’, he was also keen to restore his 
pride and viewed being seen out and about with a gringa  (foreigner) as a help. But this friendship 
worked well for me too. As in many places, a single woman was seen as a threat to many of the married 
women (Liamputtong, 2010) and being accompanied by a man was helpful in breaking down initial 
barriers. As an outsider, I also felt safer walking around the villages with someone who was well-known.  
Chacho was particularly patient with me and enjoyed explaining the local dialect, he would also tell 
participants to slow down and speak ‘proper Portuguese’ so I could understand, instead of the regional 
dialect. 
 
Access to research participants from Barranco Alto I and II largely took the form of snowball sampling 
led by Chacho. The villages were small and everyone knew each other. The news that a gringa was 
conducting research in the area created curiosity and when I first visited people already knew about my 
arrival. Although people knew my presence, my only participants were those introduced to me by 
Chacho or who approached us when they saw me.  One problem related to conducting interviews in the 
villages was negotiating the time off for myself and Chacho to go the villages.  Chacho was employed at 
the hotel as a day worker, and could only go when no-one needed   a guide; and I was contracted to 
work six days a week but could only take breaks when there were no guests. When the opportunity to 
go to the villages arose I would pay for the petrol for his boat and typically bought him lunch as a good 
will gesture for accompanying me. I bought the fuel from Robson who bought fuel at the local petrol 
station.   Negotiating with Robson over this fuel was   sometimes tricky when he did not want his petrol 
used, or did not want to go and collect it.  
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I also gained access to participants through connections with the hotel workers. One of the first semi-
structured interviews I conducted was with the grandfather of one of the hotel workers who was from 
Barra de Arica (PP15). During this interview our cultural differences were exposed and it reinforced my 
worries about being a Western researcher. This experience led me to change my approach to recording 
interviews with people in the villages. Recording interviews cross culturally can create some issues 
(Liamputtong, 2010) and Mangen (1999:117) specifically warns that ‘recording can inhibit respondents 
or cause them to decline to participate: some cultures are not attuned to non-official interviews at all, 
especially when they are being recorded.’  
 
I was keen to do this interview because the man formerly worked at the Usina Itaici, a sugar mill that 
was in operation in the area from the late C19th until the 1950s,  and he still lives in the community he 
was born in. He had a great wealth of knowledge on the history of the village and the change in living 
conditions over time and I felt he could provide extensive details on the realities of life in Barra do Aricá 
and the region. However, this interview was paralysed by my use of recording equipment.  The 
interviewee had never met a foreigner before and I used my iPhone 4 to record the interview. For me, 
the iPhone 4 was two models out of date and handed down from my step-father when he bought the 
newest model. In contrast, the interviewee he had never seen a smart phone before, neither had the 
people surrounding us at the table wanting to watch the interview. As I was setting up the equipment to 
record it was obvious he felt intimidated by the phone, whereas everyone else was fascinated. 
Throughout the interview he kept looking at the phone as it was laid on the table between us. The 
phone became a symbol of our cultural differences and as a result, the interview was much shorter and 
less informative than I had hoped.  
 
This interview occurred early on in my fieldwork, and was a catalyst for changing how I recorded 
interviews with residents from the villages. Chacho and I would collate the information and I then would 
write down the interview afterwards. This has been advocated by other ethnographers such as Poulin 
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(2007) who suggests that conversational interviews are common in ethnography and are routinely 
recorded after. This method worked better than recording the interview on my phone, although some 
minor problems occurred. Chacho was functionally illiterate and was uncomfortable sitting , watching 
me write down our conversation; again this was a cultural barrier between myself and him. To counter 
this, we discussed the interview and I wrote key notes. After I had returned to hotel and when I was 
alone, I would then make longer notes. This three stage process to recording the interview was labour 
intensive, but an effective way of negotiating barriers between myself and research participants which 
ultimately led to richer data.  
As I gained confidence as an interviewer, I began to use prompts in the later stages of my first field trip 
(Taylor, 2011). Due to the language and cultural barriers, I found prompts a good tool to help 
participants focus.  In particular the pamphlet produced by the Green Action Institute, which outlined 
the results of the Green River Project, was useful for beginning a dialogue. The participant could then 
reflect on the photos and claims made by in the pamphlet instead of answering my direct questions. The 
photos in the pamphlet also jolted the memory of some participants about their interactions with the 
Green Action Institute and SEMA. For example one participant in Barranco Alto II (PP11) after seeing the 
photo of the resident signing the TAC in SEMA’s office in Cuiabá , remembered the hardship of travelling 
60km to sign his TAC (see chapter 7 for details).  
In addition to using prompts when conducting informal interviews in the villages, I tried to ensure each 
interview was with an individual participant. Inspired by the work of Liamputtong (2010) and Scheyvens 
and Leslie (2000) I specifically wanted to consult women. Scheyvens and Leslie (2000) suggest it can be: 
 ‘very difficult for the researcher to gain access to women, partly because women are 
extremely busy, and time to sit and talk may be restricted to late evenings when it may not 
be appropriate or practical, for a researcher to visit women’s homes. In addition to this, 
women are rarely given roles as official spokesperson for a community thus they are not 
the first people outsiders are likely to encounter’ (Ibid:119). 
Throughout my research I found this to be true. Initial relationships whilst at the hotel were formed with 
workers, the women typically worked as cleaners and cooks who were, to me, always busy and had few 
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rest periods. The male fishing guides and groundskeeper were free when I was- typically a two hour gap 
when clients took their afternoon nap. Because of this, I made key relationships with the fishermen, 
such as Chacho.  
I also encountered difficulties trying to interview women when in the villages. It would not have been 
appropriate, especially with married couples (interview PP8) to ask for individual interviews. When it 
was possible I tried to interview people individually.  Sometimes this meant Chacho and I accompanying 
them as they went about their daily activities. On some occasions we went to the bar in the village 
where we could sit over refreshment. I was keen to interview individuals alone as I did not trust my 
language skills to identify and understand the nuances in answers from interviewees who were 
apprehensive about the presence of others. I was also unsure Chacho would understand my 
reservations and aid me in studying this. Overall, I was able to interview two women alone in the villages, 
significantly they were both workers in a bar and were only alone due to their job. Additionally, I was 
able to interview female workers in the hotel and although they did not contribute to the data collection 
they were key in developing my understanding of the realities of the field from a female perspective. All 
other women were interviewed with their husbands or partners present. 
Structured Formal Interviews 
In addition to my interviews with residents in the communities, I carried out 24 structured formal 
interviews with key actors associated with the Green River carbon-offsetting project.  These included 
journalists, researchers from the state University, politicians, representatives from government 
departments, and the Green Action Institute (see the appendix 1 for more details).  All of these 
interviewees were given an interview schedule ahead of  time. This had three purposes: to allow 
participants to prepare answers and perhaps increase their willingness to participate, and help me to 
feel more relaxed interviewing (Harvey, 2011, Creswell, 2013, Stephens, 2009).  I recorded these 
interviews in Portuguese with a Dictaphone and transcribed and translated them afterwards.  This group 
could be divided into two groups, elites I met in the hotel and professionals based in Cuiabá .  
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As already noted my gatekeeper for the interviews with professionals in Cuiabá  was Dr Carla Valentini, 
but I also had access to local elites at the hotel, where Robson was effectively the gatekeeper.  In the 
data I obtained from most of these interviews, there was very little personal opinion and for the most 
part, the information provided went little beyond data I found in documentary research.  Interviewees 
were typically only available for one interview, and significantly I was unable to obtain a follow-up 
interview with the Green Action Institute. The only follow up interview I had was with the former head 
of Secopa who frequently visited the hotel.  Overall, gaining access to this group was harder than the 
semi-structured formal interviews. 
Qualitative text books often discuss formal interviews as the researcher in the position of relative power 
(Pile, 1991, Barbour, 2014, Creswell, 2013, Hennink et al., 2011, Jenner et al., 2004, Mangen, 1999, 
Stephens, 2009). However, recently, increasing attention has been given to elites within both human 
geography and organisational studies (Harvey, 2011) and there is now some discussion around the 
challenges involved (Welch et al., 2002, Smith, 2006, Richards, 1996). McDowell (1998) for example, 
discusses how in her research in the city of London she took on a number of roles depending on the 
interviewee, from ‘playing dumb’ for older figures to ‘brusquely efficient’ with older women (Ibid:2138), 
and Smith (2006) found that in her experience some respondents from a less senior position wanted to 
exert authority over her during the interview. 
I experienced two main types of response from professional and elite participants. The first was that I 
was seen as in danger and in need of nurturing. Interviewees (CS1, 6 and 7) commented on how brave I 
was to come to Brazil alone when I did not speak the language or know anyone. They would then ask 
what my mother thought of me being in Brazil, one (CS7) asked why I did not have my boyfriend with 
me, not even asking if I had one. In other cases, I was seen as a young, educated middle-class student 
who had left leaning political beliefs due to my ‘protected’ upbringing. This was particularly evident in a 
conversation between Robson, the former head of Secopa and Blairo Maggi. They were discussing the 
protests surrounding the World Cup and blamed the ideologies of young people; as I fitted this category 
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they were happy to suggest that living with poor people at the hotel would educate me in the political 
and economic system and then I would understand why the poor should not receive our attention.  
Perhaps the most difficult interview was with the Green Action Institute. During the interview the 
manager, technician and secretary all answered my questions. The following extract from my field notes 
explores the body language and tensions evident in this interview:  
 ‘The manager was about 5ft 5 but had total control of the room, she strode into the office 
in black patent stiletto heels and a tight, figure hugging dress. Her hair was dyed a platinum 
blonde and wouldn’t have been out of place walking around Canary Wharf, yet she was an 
environmental technician in Cuiabá. She was cool in her body language and gave an 
impression of fierceness which I would not like to challenge, her speech was fast and 
abrupt. Her fingers were littered with gold rings, I counted three individual gold rings on 
one finger! Her iPhone 5 was constantly bleeping as we were talking and when she wasn’t 
checking her phone I felt she made an uncomfortable amount of eye contact with me 
particularly.    
The second woman wore flat sandals and jeans. Her loose fitting bright orange top was 
plain as were her hands. The woman was more welcoming than the manager and gave the 
impression, to me at least, that she wanted to talk. Whenever she spoke she had a habit of 
looking towards the manager as if to ensure she was saying the right thing.’ (Extract from 
field notes: reflections on interviews 21/5/14).  
Among the elite actors interviewed through contacts at the hotel, the most significant was with the 
former governor of Mato Grosso and current Agriculture Minister, Blairo Maggi. This interview was 
arranged by the former head of Secopa, who had previously worked for the Maggi group and the two 
were good friends. He invited Blairo Maggi to fish at the hotel and to discuss Robson’s idea for a new fly 
fishing business at Maggi’s new 5* resort.  Given this context, I had conflicting roles.  Blairo Maggi does 
not conduct many interviews with the media and is very wary of environmental researchers. In 2005 he 
received the ‘golden chainsaw’ from Greenpeace due to the damaging impact of his agri-businesses and 
had an international reputation for his anti-environmental stance. Mikecz (2012) suggests constructing a 
barrier between an elite and the media is common with elite actors and therefore it was quite a coup to 
secure this interview.  However, I had arranged my accommodation with Robson, and my relationship 
with him was key to my fieldwork.  If I asked questions that were deemed inappropriate, I would have 
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jeopardised Robson’s potential business plan, and my relationship with Robson, and possibly my 
research project.  
 
In effect, as Mikecz (2012) warns, this elite interview was little more than a public relations exercise for 
Blairo Maggi, who did not stray from available official versions. My questions were non-probing and 
neutral and I collected little new data.  One striking feature, however, was the way Blairo Maggi took an 
interest in my personal background throughout the interview, and towards the end our roles almost 
reversed and I became the interviewee (Harvey, 2011). The questions I asked him about conservation 
and the Pantanal were answered quickly and then he reversed the question and asked my opinion.  
Given the context, I almost certainly responded with a very watered down critique of neoliberal 
conservation.   Although this interview did not contribute much new data it did have other 
consequences.  Afterwards Blairo added me as friend on his personal Facebook account and asked me 
to stay in touch.  More significantly, Robson and Blairo Maggi discussed the business plan and they now 
run a fly fishing business from Blairo’s new resort. Later Robson bought me a bottle of wine and said 
that Blairo Maggi would not have been so open to the idea of creating the business if he had not 
enjoyed his day, which was partly because of my interview.  Due to this ‘symbolic’ interview I had 
contributed to the creation of enhanced networks of elites within Mato Grosso!  
  
While most of the key actors, accessed through gatekeepers stuck to their organisational scripts and 
narratives.  I did make some contacts independently as a result of serendipity (Baxter and Chua, 1998) 
and these often proved invaluable. The following is an extract from my field notes and recounts how I 
met Marcelo, the mayor of Barrão de Magaço. At the time, my brother was visiting me during my 
second fieldwork trip and I had taken him to the town of Barrão de Magaço : 
‘Arriving on the river bank, the shops and avenue were as I remembered from last year; 
even the fish restaurant with the loud music was as busy as I remembered. The freshly 
caught fish being served to a great mixture of families, extended families, couples and 
friends. Then, Conor [my brother] starts laughing hysterically. ‘Lauren, look at that bloke, 
what an idiot, he forgot to tie his boat up and its drifting down the river!’.  
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Marcio, one of the 5 garcons and the most colourful character from last year was the man 
in the river. Still laughing, I tried explaining to Conor that I know him and maybe he’ll take 
us out on the boat. ‘Of course I can Lauren, just give me a little while and I’ll come back. I 
need to go upstream, but I’ll come back and we can catch some Crocodiles’ was Marcio’s 
response when I asked.  
Excitedly me and Conor sat down to lunch, discussing what we would actually do if Marcio 
caught a crocodile. After 2 ½ hours, it was becoming increasingly clearer that Marcio wasn’t 
coming back. Whilst both of us are used to being stared at by now, the lack of sleep and the 
heat was making us more irritable. This was not helped by an old man ‘who looks like he 
should be on the cover of a National Geographic magazine’ – according to Conor, sat beside 
us and kept trying to talk to us. Conor, not understanding and myself, understanding very 
little due to his accent, tried to talk to him politely. 
‘Oi, oi, vem ca. Conversa com os touristas’ the old man shouted to a very white, very well 
dressed middle-aged man passing on the other side of the street. ‘Oh no! not again’ I 
thought silently, I just want to have a conversation with my brother. It was one of the very 
few times we had been alone. ‘Oi, boa tarde’ said the man, ‘my name is Marcelo, I am the 
profeitura (mayor) of Barrão de Magaço’ (extract from field notes. 18th August 2015). 
Although I met Marcelo late in my fieldwork, he became an important informant. He was able to 
confirm residents’ accounts of the Green River Project that residents in Barranco Alto I and II gave me.  
He was particularly well placed to do this as he had a holiday home in Barranco Alto as well as Barrão de 
Magaço. In addition he provided information regarding the small-scale agricultural processing projects 
in Barranco Alto and Barra do Aricá, described in chapter 5. 
 
3.4: Data analysis and Triangulation 
 
As I began to develop my understanding of the field site, my data collection began to become more 
focused.  As Scott Jones and Watt (2010:163) emphasise data analysis begins in the field as 
‘ethnographers let data emerge from the field setting’.  My initial fieldwork plan primarily aimed to 
understand how communities involved in the Green River Project were affected by the carbon offsetting 
project.  This changed when I understood how the Green Action Institute was created.  A second fact 
was that I also realised that Pesquisa Florida, which was misleadingly referred to as Barra de Arica in the 
Institute’s documents, was actually very different from the other villages affected by the Green River 
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Project.  Whereas Barra de Arica, Barranco Alto I and II are communities of peasants and fishermen, 
Pesquisa Florida is a small tourist village comprising two hotels and about 40 holiday homes, all owned 
by prosperous outsiders.  The following two life stories illustrate these differences. 
Robson the hotel owner in Pesquerio Florida was was born in 1974 in Altas Garcas, a wealthy frontier 
town in the soy producing area in Northern Mato Groso.  His mother was originally from Goiás and his 
father from Sao Paulo and they migrated to Altas Garcas to better themselves, although neither were 
farmers.  Robson went to the local public school in the town, which he emphasised was of a better 
standard than most public schools in the country.  Aged 18, he then studied business administration at 
the State University in Cuiabá, but left after two years because ‘I wanted to stop learning how to make 
money and actually make money’.  He began working for John Deere, farming machinery manufacturer, 
first as a sales rep, but quickly worked his way up to the position of sales manager in Mato Grosso.  At 
the age of 26 Robson quit his job with enough money to purchase five plots of adjoining land in 
Pesquiero  Florida, where he built the hotel.  Over the nine years he has owned the hotel he continues 
to invest his profits, he expanded the hotel and built a new apartment for his family, as well as a 
restaurant, kitchen, land staff living quarters.  His family has private medical care and use of three 
vehicles, including a multi-purpose vehicle. He has also used his wealth to act as a guarantor for the 
purchase of eight boats, six of which are now owned by fishing guides who work at the hotel. 
Carlito’s story in contrast, exemplifies the lives and profiles of people in Barranco Alto I and II and Barra 
do Aricá where he was born 56 years ago. His grandfather worked at Usina Itaici as a factory operative. 
His father was working at the Usina when it shut in the late 1950s and he starting fishing to make ends 
meet.  Carlito’s grandfather taught him to fish and now he makes his living as a fishing guide. He 
attended primary school in Santo Antônio do Leverger, as there was no school in the village then, but 
left after fourth grade to help his mother and younger siblings. Today he is functionally illiterate. His 
intentions were to always live in the community, even though his three children live with their mother in 
Cuiabá he hopes they will one day move back and have their children here. His house in Barra do Aricá 
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was built on his grandfather’s land by his father and uncle, and his brother has the official land rights to 
the plot now, which has five houses on it, housing various members of the family. He bought a 
motorised boat which he purchased on credit from his employer and receives the ‘bolsa de familia’ and 
R$30 a month for each child that attends school.  Carlito is seen as a successful person in the village as 
he also has a car. He told me that he is often teased about his work ethic as he has had full time 
employment for most of his working life--, whereas most people in the village are employed on short-
term contracts.  Today, his brothers and sisters have moved away. One sister lives in Barrão de Melgaço 
with her husband, whilst his brothers all live in Cuiabá, working in construction or retail. He has aunts 
and uncles in the village, who make living by growing vegetables on the beaches of the river Cuiabá and 
Aricá-mirim and selling them to restaurants; or survive on the money from the government. 
Once I started to grasp the history of the Green Action Institute and these contrasts between the 
communities involved in the Green River Project, the wider political and social relations of elite actors in 
the area had a much more prominent part in the data collection. I also paid much more attention to 
researching the histories of the state, the villages and the Green River Project.  After extending the 
scope of my research, simultaneous data collection and analysis meant that themes of power and 
relations of dominance became much more prominent.   Drawing from data analysis techniques from 
grounded theory, my data analysis was influenced by Strauss and Corbin (1994) in that it was a process 
used simultaneously with data collection. Their approach to data analysis had three main steps: 
deconstruction which initially examines the field for concepts; construction which builds the concepts 
into a framework of five components: casual conditions, phenomenon, context, intervening conditions, 
interactional strategies and consequences; and finally confirmation which checks the hypothesis. The 
final stage will result in  ‘a story, a descriptive narrative about the central phenomenon of the study’ 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990:116).  
An example of the early deconstruction phase of my research during the first period of fieldwork, is the 
way I began to filter information obtained from participant observations by grouping research 
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participants. In my fieldwork proposal I had categorised participants into two main categories: residents 
of the affected villages and key actors involved in designing and implementing the project (e.g. from 
Secopa, the Green Action Institute, etc.).  However, once I arrived in Pesquerio Florida I had to modify 
these categories take into account data generated through my interactions in the hotel.  Initially,  I 
categorised the participants I saw every day into three distinct groups: workers, guests, and the hotel 
owners. Each of these three groups provided very different data as the following extracts highlight: 
Doctor from Cuiabá (HP2) discussing the riverine communities along the river Cuiabá. 
Pousada Itiacy 27th July 2015. ‘These people who live here on the river, they are simple 
people. They do not want to read or write, they do not want cars; but more obviously they 
do not want to work. They are happy to do nothing, they just live off what the government 
gives them. I mean, it is not a lot of money, but they are happy with that.’ 
Fishing guide (HP1) to me after overhearing part of an interview (S2) with a retired judge 
from Cuiabá who has a holiday home in Barranco Alto, August 2014. ‘What he said is not 
true. He reckons he has lived there for 30 years, but he knows nothing about the 
community. He says he has friends there, but it is not a friendship if one thinks he is better 
than the other. He doesn’t know anything, I promise.’ 
Categorising participants this way helped me to start building a picture of social relations and 
corresponding perspectives as well as identify commonalities among particular sets of actors.  In 
particular, it allowed me to capture different class perspectives on the social world (in line with the 
principles of critical realism), to code and analyse the data in a systematic way, and to triangulate 
different perspectives with other sources.  
After my first period of fieldwork, I spent several months towards the end of 2014 processing the data I 
had collected.  This involved transcribing interviews, coding all the data, and trying to build a preliminary 
picture from my initial findings.  It was during this phase that the neo-Gramscian framework proved 
particularly valuable for my data analysis.  Insights from Newell and Levy—who argue that one way 
elites preserve their hegemonic position is by co-opting environmental governance and creating new 
networks that further their agenda— were crucial for helping me to make sense of the role of elites in 
creating the Green Action Institute and shaping the Green River carbon-offsetting project.  Additionally, 
as ethnography goes beyond the collection of data and involves the writing, conceptualisation and 
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representation of the studied phenomenon (Marchetti et al., 2013), a heuristic model used by my 
supervisor Steffen Boehm was very useful.  This model highlights the potential interactions between 
state, the corporate sector and civil society in the construction of hegemony.  It enabled me to 
conceptualise the relations between different actors, get to grips with the realities that I had 
encountered on the ground in the project area, and link these to wider processes.  
This period of data processing and analysis set me up for my second period of fieldwork from June to 
September 2015.  During this second phase I was then able to focus on the legacies of the World Cup in 
Mato Grosso and the region, and carry out further interviews to address any missing data.  This was 
important to ensure the reliability of the data and the accuracy of the representation that I present in 
this thesis.  
  
Finally, due to the nature of the data collected, triangulation was a very important part during data 
collection and analysis, and in the writing of this thesis.  My research objective was to explore the claims 
made by organisers of the World Cup in Mato Grosso. Their claims publicised in documents and media 
reports and were mainly challenged through observation and interviews. But there were often 
contradictions between the versions of events offered by different actors, whether in documentary 
sources or interviews. The following example from Chapter 7, which explores the villagers interactions 
with the carbon offsetting project, illustrates this.  The Green Action Institute claimed that the wells 
supplied to the villages as an ecosystem payment were chosen by the communities in a democratic, 
public participation process that involved several meetings. Counter-claims made by project participants, 
SEMA and observations challenged this.  It took a lot of work triangulating these different sources to 
check the validity of different claims (Jenner et al., 2004, Jones, 1987, Esposito, 2001) and the reliability 
of different actors, before I made an evidence-based decision that this decision had been taken without 
consultation.  
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3.5: Ethics and challenges 
 
My ethical considerations in the field were based on the four principles identified by Diener and Crandall 
(1978): ensuring no harm to participants, ensuring there is informed consent, no invasion of privacy and 
no deception. I also considered the British Sociological Association and the University of Essex ethics 
codes and obtained approval before starting fieldwork.  
Informed consent implies the interviewees and other participants were aware of my research agenda 
and have an appreciation of the facts, implications and future consequences of their participation. 
Consent for interviews was obtained according to the profiles of participants. Professional and elite 
participants gave consent in a written consent form (which I had produced before starting fieldwork).  
Villagers were first approached by my guide who explained my research, and if the person agreed to talk 
to me, I again explained my role and the purpose of my research and gave them the opportunity to 
decline. Initially I planned to record consent audio-visually as advocated by Benitez et al. (2002). 
However as highlighted in an earlier section, the use of technological devices was inappropriate.  
Ensuring no deception was involved was important in my research and I had to take a pragmatic 
approach given the fact, that I entered the lives of most of the people I met at the hotel in my role as a 
worker. Tindana et al. (2006) suggest that in some contexts it can at times be inappropriate to gain 
informed consent from participants when they do not have a direct impact on the research. In my case it 
was impractical to explain to every guest my role and gain consent regardless of their position in my 
research.  So I only gained consent of individual participants who directly contributed to my data 
collection. Invasion of privacy was also considered in the context of data collection in the hotel. There 
were obvious problems of disrupting interviews with participants whilst I had to complete tasks for my 
job, also the difficulty of switching between client/research participant roles.  
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Storing data and guaranteeing confidentiality were also important considerations.  So I took care to 
store my data on a password protected memory stick, which I kept in a safe and on returning from 
fieldwork the data was stored in a locked cupboard at my University. The names of the villagers have 
been changed to protect them, however, the elite actors have not been changed. These actors gave 
permission to be named and anyone who is familiar with the area would be able to identify them in any 
case.    
I have already discussed some of the challenges involved in my data collection.  But it is important to 
note that the biggest challenge I faced during fieldwork was navigating my relationship with Robson. 
Robson was influential in whom I researched and there were several occasions when he did not approve 
of either the participant, or their views as the following entry from my fieldwork diary shows:  
Robson (C2) to me about fishing guides. Pousada Itaicy 4th September 2014. ‘I do not know 
why you talk to these people. They do not know anything useful. If you need to know 
anything, just ask me I will help. These people will do nothing to improve your life, so why 
waste your time with them?’ 
This particular incident occurred when I was collecting information on the history of the villages. I tried 
to collect as many different histories and opinions as possible in order to obtain rich data. But Robson 
clearly felt that this was a waste of my time.  
Reeves (2010) also acknowledges difficulties with gatekeepers in Organizational studies. In her study of 
a Probation hostel for sex offenders in the UK she found the manager had the ability to open and close 
access routes for participants as well as be involved with the research process. The manager was also 
able to enhance his power by controlling the researcher as well as the researched. 
‘As the manager also ensured contact with me on a daily basis while the fieldwork was 
being undertaken, his control of the transmission of information to both higher and lower 
strata of organisational levels of staff meant that his power was enhanced and maintained 
during the fieldwork period.’ (Malloy, 1976:317)  
There are some commonalities between her research and mine. In addition to the availability of petrol, 
and the interview with Blairo Maggi previously discussed, I had to continually negotiate over my dual 
roles. There were times, when collecting life stories that tensions would arise between my responsibility 
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to the participant and my duties as an employee. Life stories were particularly difficult as it often 
involved participants reflecting on difficult times in their life. Scholars have discussed the issues 
associated with the researcher finishing an interview having collected the data they need and leaving 
interviewees to pick themselves up again. I tried to mitigate against this as much as I could by continuing 
a conversation after the formalities of interviews were over (Oliveira, 2010b), although this was 
sometimes compromised by my other duty as a worker. 
Dona Maria de Souza, a hotel guest, was one such example. Over the two periods of fieldwork I met her 
16 times in total. She became interested in my research and I approached her to conduct formal life 
histories.  She belonged to the ruralistas class and as a woman had a different story to those frequently 
documented.  Unfortunately, towards the end of the my first fieldwork stay her husband died in a car 
accident- which immediately brought to an end our interviews and our relationship returned to that of 
client/hotel worker. She then approached me during the second field trip in order to finish her life story. 
In this circumstance, and in line with other critical management scholars who have used oral history 
methods I ensured Maria was able to set ‘the conditions and terms on which the interview took place’ 
(Śliwa, 2013: 196). Although the whole of her story was not all used in this thesis, she found recalling her 
life therapeutic after her recent and tragic loss, stating it was something she felt compelled to do. 
Switching between researcher and hotel worker was a particular dilemma in this case, as I had 
responsibility for her well-being but also had to attend other guests. 
3.6: Conclusions 
 
This chapter has described the main phases of the research that underpins this thesis. It started by 
discussing the reasons for selecting this case, before describing the initial stage of documentary 
research and the preparations I made before starting my first period of fieldwork.  I then moved on to 
describe my data-collection methods, and how the focus of my research widened as I started to 
understand the relations between elite actors and local people.  As is common in ethnography, data 
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analysis occurred simultaneously with data collection.  However, I also emphasised the period between 
my fieldwork trip was very important for making sense of my findings.  It gave me an opportunity to 
think more deeply about the implications of the neo-Gramscian approach to environmental governance 
and its relevance to my case study.  As a result, in my second period of fieldwork, I had a much more 
focused sense of the gaps in my data, and was able to ensure that I followed these up in a systematic 
way in order to ensure reliability and accuracy in the way I present my findings.  In the final section of 
the chapter, I also discussed ethics and some of the ethical and practical dilemmas I faced in combining 
my role working in the hotel and carrying out research.  
Finally, it is important to note that in the course of the chapter I have also sought to discuss how I 
overcame some of the challenges of doing fieldwork.  These included how I negotiated the issues arising 
from my initial lack of fluency in Portuguese, recording and gaining consent from participants who are 
not literate, as well as the relationship with gatekeepers.  Throughout the chapter I also referred to 
some of the challenges that arose from being an outsider, and a young single woman in a patriarchal 
society. More time in the field might have allowed me to collect further data, but this was not feasible 
within the time constraints of a PhD.  Moreover, it is unlikely to have enabled me to gain access to key 
informants such as those at the Green Action Institute who refused to respond to my requests for a 
second interview.  Nor would it have enabled me to access documents on how the contracts and 
infrastructure projects in Mato Groso were organised, which unavailable in the public domain.  Overall 
the limitations have been acknowledged, turned into an advantage whenever appropriate to create a 
concise case study that contributes to the neo-Gramscian literature on environmental governance.  
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-Chapter IV - 
Environmental and social benefit claims 
at the 2014 FIFA World Cup 
 
 
International media images of Brazil usually include a tropical beach setting with beautiful and scantily 
dressed women dancing to Samba whilst men play football on long, white beaches. These common 
images of Brazil contribute to Bellos’ (2003) claim that for most Brazilians, football is their religion. 
Futebol está no meu sangue (football is in my blood) is a common expression when discussing football 
and was documented from participants as diverse as a 64 year old retired Judge who lives in Cuiabá, to a 
17 year old student in the town of Santo Antonio do Leverger. For the 2014 World Cup organisers, 
passionate Brazilians would be able to celebrate the global footballing event in their country for the first 
time since 1950. The organisers also promised fans would be able to participate knowing that they 
would benefit socially through infrastructure improvements, in addition to environmentally friendly 
practices which would lead to an ecological neutral event. Sustainability promises of social benefit and 
ecological neutrality were common in the planning stages, the event itself and in the reports around the 
legacies of the tournament. This chapter outlines these promises and how they were challenged.   
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The first section of this chapter explores the FIFA discourse of an environmentally neutral event with 
social benefits. I document how the sustainability theme was evident in official documents, the opening 
ceremony and the choice of mascot. Aside from discourse, FIFA and the Brazilian organising committee 
made claims surrounding the outcomes of what an environmentally friendly tournament with social 
benefits would mean. These were first published in a sustainability concept document which is 
discussed at the end of the section. 
 
The second section explores the environmental claims that were made. These were all based in the 
ecological modernisation paradigm. I focus on carbon offsetting as it exemplifies mechanisms typical of 
the ecological modernisation paradigm and is one of three strategies FIFA advocate to host a sustainable 
tournament. I also argue, these ecological modernisation practices had to sit within the domestic 
policies of climate change and I chart how a conservative faction in domestic climate change politics 
were able to gain a controlling voice which led to the reliance of ecological modernisation practices.  
 
The third section of the chapter focuses on the social benefit aspects of the World Cup. FIFA, through 
their ‘Football for Hope’ programme, aimed to help alleviate poverty through football, these 
programmes are outlined before the focus moves on to how the social benefit claims of the World Cup 
organisers were challenged in the June/July mobilisations of 2013. In turn, the Brazilian government 
tried to quash these protests through the coercive methods of the military police. This mechanism to 
control the population is documented through witness statements. Finally, I explore grass-roots 
experiences of the protests in Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro and Cuiabá  during the World Cup itself. 
 
4.1: Sustainability claims of the 2014 FIFA World Cup: Defending the environment 
and empowering youth in underprivileged communities 
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On the 12th June 2014, the FIFA World Cup began with an official opening ceremony in Sao Paulo. The 
opening ceremony aimed to introduce the Brazilian people and nature to the world and also welcome 
travelling football fans. President Dilma in her speech to the capacity crowd declared the FIFA World 
Cup as the ‘cup of all cups’ (Tzanelli, 2015). The official version of the 2014 tournament is a positive 
environmental legacy left by increased attention to waste and recycling, green stadiums and carbon 
offsetting. Further, FIFA and the Brazilian organising committee also claimed a positive social legacy was 
left with youth empowerment and actions against poverty. This section shows how these claims were 
made. 
 
The opening ceremony of the tournment in Sao Paulo acknowledged both the people and environment 
of Brazil through a celebration of Brazil’s biodiversity (Fig 2), 600 dancers dressed in various costumes 
designed to depict Brazilian wildlife (BBC, 2014). Themes of unity with each other, and the environment, 
were evident in the banners around the stadium reading juntos num só ritmo (all in one rhythm) 
(Arruda, 2015).  
 
Figure 2: The opening ceremony of the FIFA World Cup, Brazil’s biodiversity was celebrated (Cavalcanti, 2014) 
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One example of FIFA and the Brazilian government’s commitment to staging a ‘green’ games was the 
selection of the mascot. Mascots were first introduced in the 1966 World Cup and are used by World 
Cup (and Olympic) hosts to represent the theme of the tournament and national identity (Griggs et al., 
2012, Melo et al., 2014, Freeman et al., 2006, Knight et al., 2014). The mascot for Germany in 2006 was 
a life sized lion named ‘Goleo’ without an environmental theme.  Weszka (2011) suggested that the lack 
of affiliation with Germany resulted in poor sales of toy versions of the mascot. Learning from this, the 
2010 World Cup developed a mascot with strong links between the hosts and the tournament. The 
mascot was a football playing leopard named ‘Zakumi’. According to van der Westhuizen and Swart 
(2011), ‘ZA’ represents South Africa and ‘kumi’ is the number ten in various languages across South 
Africa. The choice of mascot in Brazil highlighted Brazil’s environmental importance and could be said to 
serve two main purposes. First, Fuleco, the name of the mascot is a combination of the Portuguese for 
football and ecology and therefore symbolised a connection between the two (Fig 3). Second, the 
selection of the animal, a three-banded armadillo was said to increase awareness of different Brazilian 
biomes. The three-banded armadillo is an endangered species in the Caatinga habitat in the east of the 
country. Although species in the more famous Amazon may have been more well known, the choice of 
the armadillo was said to draw attention to Brazil’s diversity (Melo et al., 2014). Through the mascot the 
tournaments ‘green’ theme was continually reinforced. The mascot appeared at all matches, on official 
merchandise and was part of the marketing programme. It therefore contributed to the ‘green’ ethos of 
the tournament. 
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Figure 3: Fuleco the 2014 FIFA World Cup Mascot, the name comes from the Portuguese for ‘football’ and ‘ecology’ (Segalla, 
2013) 
 
The first official document which stated Brazil’s ‘green’ potential was the ‘Sustainability Concept’ 
document released in 2012 by FIFA (Addiechi et al., 2012). It described how FIFA expected the Brazilian 
government to incorporate sustainability themes into the tournament. The graphics running throughout 
the document (Fig 4) can also be seen to develop green themes; trees, hills, oceans and rivers can be 
interpreted and visualised in the graphic, which appear in harmony with the cogs of industrialisation. 
This graphic works to reiterate that the environment and economic development are compatible. The 
‘Sustainability Concept’ was part of a wider environmental and social strategy by FIFA which is officially 
organised through the ‘Football for the Planet’ programme and ‘Football for Hope’ respectively.   
 
The ‘Football for the Planet’ programme suggests the environmental strategy of a FIFA World Cup 
should be organised around three main themes: monitoring and compensation for greenhouse gases 
emissions resulting from the activities, certified green stadiums and waste management and recycling 
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(Birth, 2014). The ‘Football for Hope’ programme suggests the World Cup can be used as a tool for 
sustainable development through social inclusion and practising citizenship (FIFA, 2016).  
 
Both the Brazilian Government and FIFA claimed to have achieved this for the 2014 World Cup. In 2015 
a sustainability report of the 2014 World Cup was released (FIFA, 2015). In a prologue, the then FIFA 
President Sepp Blatter wrote: 
 ‘from waste management and carbon offsetting to capacity-building and inclusivity, 
the implementation of our sustainability strategy has led to many achievements that 
we are proud of. I am convinced that our experience in Brazil leaves us well placed to 
further integrate sustainability considerations in our future FIFA World Cup 
operations’(FIFA, 2015:5). 
 
 
Figure 3: The design of the FIFA World Cup which appears on all official documentation has ‘green’ themes (Addiechi et al., 
2012) 
The official version of the FIFA World Cup presented by these documents is a successful tournament 
with multiple benefits for both the environment and local populations. In order for this to have been 
achieved, FIFA’s ideas had to align with the Brazilian Governments. The following extract from the 
‘Sustainability Concept’ document (Fig  5) (Addiechi et al., 2012) illustrates how FIFA thought the 
Brazilian Presidential directives and FIFA’s sustainability principles align. 
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As this extract shows directive four and five speak directly to the sustainability claims. The Brazilian 
government were keen to host a ‘green’ event as it provided them with the opportunity to ‘re-imagineer’ 
Brazil into a safe country to invest in after the 2008 financial crisis. It would also contribute to the 
attempt to change dominant narratives around deforestation in Brazil, particularly of the Amazon. 
Finally, it would show that Brazil can develop economically in harmony with the natural environment, 
aligning with the ecological modernisation paradigm.  I first explore how the effort to defend the 
The 13 directives that outline the Brazilian Government’s policy agenda, adapted from Addiechi 
et al. (2012), are summarised below: 
1. Expand and strengthen democracy  
2. Increase economic growth  
3. Implement a large-scale and long-term economic development project  
4. Defend the environment and guarantee sustainable development  
5. Eradicate poverty and decrease inequality  
6. Improve working conditions and facilitate access to formal employment for youth  
7. Guarantee access to quality education and vocational training  
8. Transform Brazil into a scientific and technological power  
9. Improve access to quality health care  
10. Provide citizens with basic necessities such as accommodation, sanitation and transportation  
11. Promote Brazilian culture and dialogue with other cultures  
12. Guarantee civil security and combat organised crime  
13. Defend national sovereignty through an active and proud presence of Brazil in the world  
 
The FIFA World Cup and the FIFA World Cup Sustainability Strategy will contribute to the 
achievement of many of these directives. A few examples to illustrate this are listed below:  
• Directive 4: The aim of FIFA and the LOC to minimise and reduce the negative impact of the 
FIFA World Cup on the environment is in line with the Government’s efforts to defend the 
environment and promote sustainability.  
• Directive 5: Through Football for Hope, FIFA will support programmes in Brazil that combine 
football and social development, thereby empowering youth in underprivileged communities in 
their fight against poverty and unequal access to opportunities.  
• Directives 6 & 7: Through specially designed capacity-building programmes for a number of 
groups involved in the World Cup, FIFA and the LOC will support their pursuance of long-term 
employment.  
• Directive 6: The Ministry of Sports and the Ministry of Labour estimate that the FIFA World Cup 
will generate 710,000 jobs. Of these, it is expected that 330,000 will be permanent jobs, while 
380,000 will be temporary positions.  
• Directive 10: The 12 Host Cities are investing considerably more in public transportation than 
would be the case without the FIFA World Cup. These investments will positively impact on the 
quality of life of citizens, thereby leaving a lasting legacy. 
Figure 5: Presidential Directives and FIFA’s interpretation (Addiechi et al., 2012). 
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environment and promote sustainability was played out in the preparations for the World Cup. Second I 
explore the ‘Football for Hope’ programme and the contribution this made to eradicate poverty in Brazil.  
 
4.2: Directive Four 
 
In order to reduce the negative impact of the FIFA World Cup on the environment, FIFA claimed in their 
sustainability report the 2.7 million tonnes CO2 were compensated through carbon offsetting (FIFA, 
2015). Carbon offsetting is the focus of this section as I explore the political context in Brazil and why 
carbon offsetting was viewed as an ideal mechanism to reduce environmental impact.  
  
To offset the calculated emissions, the corporate social responsibility arm of British Petroleum (BP), 
Target Neutral, were consulted. They are the non-profit branch of oil giant BP and strongly advocate the 
use of carbon offsetting to achieve carbon neutrality4. Carbon offsetting was one again used by BP 
Target Neutral who chose five Brazilian based projects, which were already accepted onto the CDM, 
which FIFA then purchased carbon credits from (Fig 7). These carbon credits would be used to offset the 
travel and accommodation of all staff, officials, teams, volunteers and guests. It also included pre-World 
Cup activities such as the Confederations Cup in 2013 and the ceremonial team draws in 2011. FIFA 
reported that those emissions that were not under the direct control of FIFA, such as travel and 
accommodation for ticket holders, production of food, beverages and merchandise and construction of 
new stadiums were not offset under the FIFA programme (FIFA, 2011b). As we will see in the next 
chapter, all stadiums wishing to offset their emissions had to do so individually.  
                                                          
4 BP Target Neutral also work as consultants and purchase carbon credits through projects approved by 
them and other certification organisations (Murray and Dey, 2009). They also provide consultancy work 
for mega-events and devised the offsetting strategy for the 2012 Olympic Games which BP co-
sponsored.  
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However, independent organisations have begun to raise serious problems and inaccuracies in the 
results to some of the projects. On behalf of the World Rainforest Movement, the Centro de Memoria 
das Lutas e Movimentos Socias da Amazonia (2013) (Memory Centre of Struggles and Movements) 
conducted an investigation into the Purus project. They exposed problems relating to BP Target 
Neutral’s claims. They suggested there are 18 families within the project boundary, not 18 communities 
as BP Target Neutral claimed. They further suggest that these families are subsistence farmers, not 
deforest agents again claimed by BP Target Neutral. As the Purus project now prevents access to the 
rainforest, the 18 families have had their livelihood taken from them. Another problem they highlight 
was the construction of a five classroom school to cater for the 18 families and a health centre, of which 
The carbon offsetting projects used to offset FIFA’s emissions from the 2014 World Cup. 
 
1- Energia in Amazonas was a project based in a saw mill which used Forest 
Stewardship Council certified timber. Saw dust and other waste products were then 
given to a local power plant and they claimed to supply 80,000 local residents with 
56,000MWk of energy per year. This project has reportedly also been approved by 
Greenpeace (BPTargetNeutral, 2014).  
2- A fuel switching project in Kitambar, Pernambuco was a ceramic factory and changed 
the fuel to power its kilns from native wood species to a mix of wood residues from 
nearby sustainable plantations. The company also claim to provide flu vaccinations, 
dental care, health insurance plans and basic food baskets to its employees.   
3- The third project which offset emissions from the 2014 FIFA World Cup was another 
ceramic factory. In the Millennium ceramic fuel switch, locally sourced rice husk 
replaced logged local trees from the Cerrado. It claimed that 30,000m3 of native 
woodland was saved annually by this project. In addition to this, the company also 
claim to support a local female football team, provide guidance on registering for a 
formal bank account for its employees and provide injury and life insurance.   
4- The Itabira and Santa Isabel ceramics project in the state of Rio de Janeiro, was 
another ceramic industry fuel switching project. They claim two factories previously 
used oil and now use wood residues from the paper and pulp industry to fuel their 
kilns. Similarly to other projects, they also claim to deliver educational, health and 
food supply services to the local community.   
5- The final project is the Amazon based forestry programme Purus. The Purus project 
reportedly preserved 36,000 hectares of ‘pristine’ rainforest. In addition to this, they 
suggest that 18 communities living along the river benefit from carbon credits, 
training on sustainable agricultural techniques and environmental education (FIFA, 
2014). 
 
Figure 5: Five carbon offsetting projects used in the World Cup 
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the maintenance and employment of staff were under the responsibility of the local state.  When the 
state actors were questioned they reportedly responded that they were not informed about these 
constructions and could not afford to maintain them. 
 
Another environmental project that received criticism was the programme which saw the Brazilian Local 
Organising Committee asked Brazilian companies to donate Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), 
carbon offsets that companies had brought on the international carbon market. This had three purposes: 
a free way for FIFA to offset emissions; good public press for the donating companies; and a reduction of 
available CERs on the market- which was hoped to contribute to an increased demand and thus price 
(Darby, 2014, King, 2014, Nuttall, 2014, Secretariat, 2014). The success of the Brazilian Organising 
Committee in delivering a carbon neutral event through this mechanism was acknowledged by the then 
head of Corporate Social Responsibility at FIFA, Federico Addiechi. He suggested FIFA will continue to 
offset emissions in this manner and are already looking into programmes for the 2018 World Cup in 
Russia (FIFA.com, 2014b)5. Criticisms of this project were made by Darby (2014) who calculated that the 
voluntary donations were a token effort by all concerned parties. Officially the final result was 550,000 
tonnes of donated credits, only 19% of total overall emissions of the tournament. Darby (2014) also 
noted that during this period the price of CERs were around €0.50/t, which makes biggest donor, 
Tractebel Energia’s 105,000 tonne donation worth only €50,000. He concluded this was minimal 
compared to the company’s €1.7 billion turnover in 2013.  
 
 
Brazilian approaches to climate change governance  
 
In order for these carbon offsetting programmes to be successful and to further project the green 
narrative, the Brazilian organising committee for the World Cup also had to sit within the domestic 
                                                          
5
 However, he has since left his post due to the 2015 CIA investigation. 
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climate change debates in Brazilian politics. Ecological modernisation is the dominant paradigm in 
Brazilian environmental politics and according to Ames and Keck (1997) there is history of a strong ethos 
of appropriation of the country’s vast natural potential by human enterprise. This can be said to date 
back to the dictatorships of the 60s and 70s. During the Cardoso Presidency (1995-2003) some 
commentators suggested the state environmental agencies were largely subordinated to those 
institutions who could promote economic growth and attract foreign investment (Hochstetler, 2002). 
Scarcello (2003) suggested this had a negative effect on environmental protection as although there 
were many environmental agencies and regulations, they were largely toothless, lacking power and 
capacity. Environmentally sympathetic political elites and NGOs who did not support the ecological 
modernisation paradigm such as Marina Silva had little voice under Cardoso, but had a larger role in 
Lula’s government (Kasa, 2013). 
 
It was in the Lula government (2003-2011) Brazil won the bid to hold the 2014 FIFA World Cup. It was 
also throughout this period that the supposedly post-neoliberal governments of Latin America began to 
implement their policies. Many grass-roots movements had hoped domestic climate change policies 
would move to the political left with less focus on economic exploitation of natural resources. To some, 
what occurred was part of a new-developmentalism programme which saw the Brazilian state take a 
more active role in the economy including road building, dams, airports and anti-poverty programmes 
funded by commodity exports (Ban, 2013). The World Cup could be seen within this programme to 
develop infrastructure within Brazil and create competitive world cities; thereby, further entrenching 
neoliberal capitalism into the Brazilian economy.  With the reliance on commodity exports to fund this 
programme, the release of a Greenpeace report in 2006 had potentially devastating impacts for the 
Brazilian economy. The report exposed the links between deforestation in the Amazon for soy bean 
production and animal feed to China and Europe which helped to produce products from international 
brands such as McDonalds (GreenPeace, 2006). The report suggested in 2005 1.2 million hectares of 
soya was planted within the legal boundaries of the Brazilian Amazon. This had major public relations 
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implications for the involved Trans-National Corporations and also for the Brazilian export market. As a 
result, the Brazilian government responded quickly in order to maintain their existing relations and all 
the major soya traders operating in Brazil, and with support from the Federal Government, announced a 
moratorium on trading soya from newly deforested lands in the Amazon, effective as of July 2006 
(Kuper, 2009). This appeared to satisfy the wider media and Brazilian exports of soya are still of global 
importance, a political win for the Lula government. However, scholars have suggested the pressure to 
deforest then moved onto cattle ranchers as soya farmers bought up ranches; pushing the cattle further 
into the forest (Kasa 2013).  
 
In another response to this report and with increased attention to the environment as a result of the 
UNFCCC process the Lula government created the Committee on Climate Change in 2007. This has had 
mixed success over the last 10 years. The committee also represented a response to international 
pressure to create working groups which developed national climate change plans. The Committee on 
Climate Change included 17 ministries, some state agencies and the Brazilian Forum on Climate Change- 
an organisation comprised of NGOs, businesses and state actors. There were two factions with opposing 
ideologies within the committee and as a power struggle ensued between the two it compromised the 
effectiveness of some climate change policies.  
 
The first faction is the conservative faction and was aligned with natural resource extraction industry 
interests in Brazil. They can be characterised by their support of large infrastructure programmes and 
international funding. This group are wary of international involvement in climate change discussions 
and are particularly keen on the Amazon rainforest being managed by national interests. Members of 
this group include the Ministry of Mines and Energy, Ministry of Agriculture, Military sectors and the 
national energy company Petrobas. Also included are various individuals that form the elites of these 
groups (Viera, 2013). The second faction has a more global outlook on climate change and feels Brazil 
should be part of a global effort to tackle climate change. In theory, this group supports regions such as 
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the Amazon being protected by international effort. It is formed by the Ministry of the Environment, 
most of the scientific community, governors of some states, the ethanol lobby in the Brazilian Congress, 
renewable energy producers, some multinational corporations based in Brazil, local business 
associations, and international/domestic environmental NGOs (Vieira, 2013).  
 
In addition to the soya moratorium and setting up the climate change committee, President Lula gave 
high profile roles to the environment advocates formally isolated under Cardoso. Most notably 
appointing Marina Silva, an environmental activist from a community of rubber tappers in Manaus, as 
the Environment Minister. Although her strong environmental agenda was supported by Lula, her 
policies clashed directly with the conservative faction on the Committee on Climate Change. This group 
lobbied for large infrastructure programmes and reduced restrictions on agricultural advancement 
which Silva staunchly opposed in her campaign. The opposition was so strong in challenging Silver’s 
policies that she resigned in 2008 (Kasa, 2013).  
 
The Lula Presidency strategy on climate change was influenced by international pressure through the 
UNFCCC and the Greenpeace report. Under President Dilma (2008-2016), the commodification of nature 
as a climate change mitigation policy could best summarise the domestic environmental strategy at the 
time. This could be symbolised by the political rise of Blairo Maggi, as we will see in the next chapter. 
The resignation of Marina Silva in 2008 allowed the conservative faction to become the leading voice in 
environmental conservation. The rise of  conservative politicians acted as a re-deployment of hegemonic 
relations and under Dilma were able to deepen ecological modernisation in Brazil by achieving ‘green’ 
through market mechanisms. This in turn further entrenched neoliberal capitalism into the Brazilian 
economy as the huge infrastructure programmes were approved by the conservative elite.   
 
One such ecological modernisation mechanism which relies on markets, REDD+, changed the political 
and corporate opinion of the Amazon region greatly, as now rainforests could be seen as a financial 
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investment. Landed elites now had the opportunity to gain financially from having forested areas intact 
(Kasa, 2013) and REDD+ inspired projects were developed throughout the Amazon. Experiments with 
other Payment for Ecosystem Service mechanisms, such as biodiversity payments, were also aided by 
the development of national and state policies which aimed to create a platform for Payment for 
Ecosystem Services projects. These policies have been developed through the Committee on Climate 
Change and have had consequences for its members. Blairo Maggi and his land owning colleagues have 
been seen to change their opinion on the Amazon, but critics could perhaps argue that this is a move to 
preserve him and his colleagues as the landed elite of Mato Grosso and other agricultural areas. The 
ruralistas, as a group of elites have prospered from the neoliberal economy and have some 
representatives in prominent positions in State and Federal government. These individuals now have the 
opportunity to manipulate their stance in order to preserve their power as landed elites and potentially 
gain financially. Through the ecological modernisation paradigm, Dilma continued the neoliberal project 
and cemented ecological modernisation as the dominant conservation narrative in Brazil with help from 
the conservative faction of the Committee on Climate Change (Igoe, 2004). 
 
The differing policies of Lula and Dilma can be seen to reflect the political environment at the time. The 
Dilma government were able to further embed ecological modernisation into Brazilian environmental 
politics through the conservative faction of the climate change committee gaining the controlling voice. 
This allowed for the environmental policy of the World Cup to fit relatively easy within the domestic 
climate change policies. Brazil was already favourable to carbon offsetting and the projects selected by 
BP Neutral for the World Cup were based in Brazil. These Brazilian based projects therefore ensured 
Brazil was at the forefront of carbon offsetting, something no other World Cup had been able to achieve, 
as Germany outsourced and South Africa had numerous problems with their projects. This led to the 
environmental discourse of the 2014 World Cup to be relatively unchallenged at both the global and 
national scale. This is in stark contrast to the social programmes led by FIFA. 
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4.3: Directive Five 
 
Similarly to the environmental claims in the build-up to the tournament, the World Cup in Brazil was 
claimed to bring positive benefits to the local population through economic and social development 
programmes. As discussed in the Introduction chapter, Ricardo Teixeira suggested the World Cup would 
bring social transformation through infrastructure programmes and social development (CNN, 2007). 
Social development was claimed to be achieved through ‘Football for Hope’, FIFA’s social programme. It 
was developed in 2006 alongside the for-profit organisation ‘Street Football World’ (Levermore,2011). 
In 2016 they claimed 139 organisations in 58 countries which ran football-based development 
programmes were supported by FIFA  (FIFA, 2016). The programme for the 2014 World Cup had three 
projects which are explained below.  
 
The ‘Football for Hope’ forum was held on the 26-29th June 2013 in Belo Horizonte. The event was 
designed to expose best practice to as many organisations as possible through: presentations, panel 
discussions and workshops led representatives from: grassroots organisations, sports bodies, global 
corporations and development institutions. It covered the contribution football can make to social 
development in Brazil and abroad and had 193 registered participants from 134 organisations based in 
43 different countries (FIFA, 2015:56). 
A ‘Football for Hope’ festival was held in June 2014 in Caju, Rio de Janeiro and saw ‘192 young people in 
32 delegations from 26 countries together in Brazil to enjoy a unique intercultural experience’ (FIFA, 
2015:58). Young people involved in the project organised a football tournament which was thought to 
exchange cultural knowledge, leading to greater cohesion in the international community. 
A wider project was developed over the year 2014 to increase the ‘Football for Hope’ programme in 
Brazil. This is explained in the sustainability report document: ‘between 2007 and 2013, five Brazilian 
NGOs executing football-based community programmes for social development were supported by 
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FIFA’s Football for Hope initiative. With the 2014 FIFA World Cup taking place in Brazil, the geographical 
focus of Football for Hope was logically on Brazil, with the aim of supporting more community-based 
organisations in the country, thereby contributing to social development’ (FIFA, 2015:61). 
FIFA claimed these social development projects were enough to accomplish directive five in the 
‘Sustainability Concept’ document and were the main social programmes held in Brazil. Perhaps working 
in opposition to these social programmes was the legal document produced by FIFA which stated the 
laws Brazil had to obey in order to hold the event. These rules can be seen to be heavily in favour of FIFA 
and the ‘FIFA family’ ensuring they maximise their profit from the event and protect their brand (Fig 8).  
 
The legal requirements set out by FIFA for the Brazilian government (Krasnov, 2013:24) 
1) Unconditional entry into and exit from Brazil for all FIFA delegates, commercial and 
operational partners, ticket- holding spectators. 
2) Unconditional issue of work permits to foreigners and suspension of any legislation that 
might restrict any FIFA members from carrying out their FIFA-related activities. 
3) Guarantee that import and export of goods necessary for the event will be allowed and be 
exempt from any taxes. 
4) General exemption from taxes for FIFA and its commercial and operating partners 
5) All necessary steps will be taken to guarantee the safety of the Copa and all people 
involved with it  
6) Guarantee the uninhibited entry and exit of foreign currency along with unrestricted 
exchange of US Dollars, Euros and Swiss Francs for FIFA, its commercial and operational 
partners (Resolução do Conselho Monetário Nacional No. 3.568/2008; Decree: 
42.820/1957; Law: 9.069. 
7) Guarantee priority treatment in immigration, customs and check-in for members and 
management of FIFA, match ofﬁcials and players (Estatuto do Estrangeiro Law: 
6.815/1980) 
8) Protection and exploitation of commercial rights related to events including registration of 
brands, ambush marketing, intellectual property etc (Lei Geral da Copa). 
9) Guarantee that all national anthems of participating countries will be played before each 
of their games and ﬂags will be raised (Law 9.615/98 – “Lei Pele”) 
10) Guarantee that all necessary measures will be taken to ensure compensation to FIFA 
resulting from the organisation and realisation of the event (Lei Geral a Copa). 
11)  Guarantee availability to FIFA and other users of a telecommunications network which 
meets FIFA’s requirements and uses the most advanced technology in the ﬁeld (Lei Geral 
de Telecomunicações – Law: 9.472/1997)  
 
 
Figure 6: The legal requirements from FIFA (Krasnov, 2013) 
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In particular, number three, the removal of protectionist policies to allow unrestricted entry for 
necessary goods, in addition to the tax exemption of these products, is clearly in favour of corporate 
actors. The revenue of official merchandise is also exempt from tax and goes directly to FIFA, who as a 
NGO in Switzerland, pay minimal tax. In rural Brazil where personal bank accounts are still uncommon; 
the clause which allows Visa to have a monopoly on ticket sales as supporters can only buy a FIFA ticket 
with a Visa card, allows for entry into new markets. VISA were guaranteed new customers through this 
policy and was further entrenched through a social programme run by FIFA which gave local residents 
discount prices for tickets, in addition, VISA did not pay tax. The general rule 11, which ensures the 
latest telecommunications technology must be available for FIFA and the broadcasters determines that 
the Brazilian government must pay for the supply. This would again entail the import of services and 
products, therefore giving access to the market for technology companies in a tax free environment. 
 
The contract signed between host governments and FIFA further entrenched neoliberal economic logic 
into the host nation economy. Contracts with Trans-National Corporations  gave them competitive 
advantage and contract stipulations which allowed favourable trade, at the expense of revenue for the 
host country, can be seen to further the neoliberal agenda. The FIFA World Cup can then be seen at the 
global scale to be a mechanism which furthers the neoliberal hegemonic project through strategic 
relations between FIFA an NGO, state actors and the corporate sector. Some corporate sector actors 
have a strong relationship with FIFA and were able to assert their authority over state actors, creating 
and embedding relations in their interest. 
 
Mobilisations against the World Cup  
 
The social development programmes run by FIFA and these laws implemented by FIFA were largely 
unreported by the media in the build-up to the World Cup. However, the official version of the social 
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impact of the World Cup was challenged by a social movement which exposed divisions between the 
political elite and the general population in Brazil. In 2013 this culminated in mobilisations which 
occurred at the same time as the Confederation’s Cup, FIFA’s warm up tournament to the World Cup, 
which was held on the 15th- 30th June 2013. The mobilisations began as a student protest by Movimento 
Passe Livro (Free Transport Movement), who campaign for free transport for students, over a twenty 
centavo increase in public transport on 6th June in Sao Paulo (Saad-Filho, 2013). But it developed into 
the largest mobilization since 3 million public workers went on strike in 1979 (Neuhouser, 1998). The 
largest protest took place on June 17th 2013 when an estimated 250,000 people participated nationwide, 
with 100,000 alone in Rio de Janeiro. The protests included a wide range of grievances, the main themes 
were public spending on the World Cup, government corruption, lack of healthcare and education. In 
the eyes of the protestors, the World Cup brought into focus unnecessary public spending which they 
thought would be better spent on social schemes (Saad-Filho, 2013). 
These mobilisations capitalised on the increased international media presence and Ugra (2013) argued 
they represented a ‘huge symbolic gesture to the government’ (Ugra, 2013). He argued that football, a 
sport synonymous with Brazilian culture had been placed ‘firmly behind what eventually matters more: 
education, jobs, health services, security’ (Ugra, 2013). For the Brazilian government, winning the right 
to host the World Cup would allow Brazilian elites to showcase Brazil as a united and prosperous 
country, ready for increasing international trade. Instead, it highlighted discontent about inadequate 
public services for a growing middle class and the majority impoverished poor (de Sousa, unpublished). 
Official reports suggest the Brazilian government spent US$15 billion to hold the tournament whilst FIFA 
had spent US$2 billion and earned US$4.8 billion in revenue (FIFA, 2014a). US$1.7 billion alone of this 
profit was from the sale of TV rights (Ozanian, 2014). It is reported that US$11.3 billion was spent in 
stadiums alone when in 2011 Orlando Silva, the then Sports Minister, declared that no World Cup 
stadiums would be built using tax payers money (Reuters, 2015). 
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Throughout these mobilisations the media played an integral role in the organisation and reporting of 
the events, social media in particular played an important role in spreading grass roots experiences. 
Mainstream media in Brazil is predominantly controlled by eight media outlets, sympathetic to right-
wing and middle-class beliefs (Pelli, 2013). During the initial stages of the mobilisations in Brazil these 
outlets took an anti-protest stance. TV Globo, Brazil’s state controlled media outlet first criticised the 
mobilizations for causing congestion during rush hour. It was only after the mobilizations in Sao Paulo on 
June 13th and Rio de Janiero on the 14th, where military police fired rubber bullets at protesters and 
journalists, did the mainstream press begin to change its position (Salbuchi, 2013). These pictures of 
police violence were further spread through social media as activists shared comments, photos and 
videos. In response, and by the middle of June, Globo had blanket coverage of the protests and ‘one of 
Brazil’s best known presenters taught mothers how to help their children manufacture tasteful placards 
for their next demonstration’ (Saad-Filho, 2013:658).   
  
The mobilisations were largely organised by, and consisted of, young, middle-class adults who would 
generally have access to social media and smart phones. According to Ling and Horst (2011) in 2010, 8.6 
million Brazilians, around 23% of the population used Twitter and 9 million had Facebook accounts. 
Brazil also has the largest mobile phone industry in Latin America and sixth largest in the world, with 140 
million mobile phone users in 2008 (Horst, 2011). Ibope a Brazilian research institute reported that 
during the June 2013 mobilizations, 91% of the protesters learnt of the movement through the internet, 
77% of which used Facebook (Pelli, 2013). According to de Sousa (unpublished), these protests were 
different to historical protests in Brazil which were organised by trade unions and political organisations. 
The 2013 protests differed in that organisers were not political activists and organised groups, but 
individuals who organised through social media (Benski et al., 2013). A student from Brasilia describes 
his experience: 
‘In the beginning, I really remember it was more like a support to those protesters in Sao 
Paulo who got hurt by the Police. And then, it began to be a ‘let’s change this country’, you 
know? And people began to start to create events, like on Facebook, calling everyone to 
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attend to these protests. And people would actually go. It’s crazy, and every time you see 
people on protests on the TV, the next one was bigger’ (Interview SC9) 
Throughout the June/July period, two slogans were used on social media in relation to the protests. Vem 
pra rua and O gigante acordou were both in the top 10 worldwide trends on Twitter during June and 
July (Pearson, 2013). Vem pra rua (come to the street) was used in a Fiat commercial leading up to the 
Confederations Cup. In the TV advertisement Brazilian football fans celebrate on the street after a World 
Cup victory, ironically the song lyrics translate as ‘come to the street, because the street is the biggest 
football stand in Brazil’ (YouTube, 2013). O gigante acordou (the giant has woken) was part of a longer 
running campaign starting in 2011 for Johnnie Walker. Again, it is a TV advertisement which depicts the 
rocks at the bottom of Sugar Loaf Mountain coming to life. This symbolises Brazil’s industrial growth and 
national pride (YouTube, 2011). Costa (2013) has suggested the use of these slogans by protesters 
symbolises the Brazilian population’s wider alienation from politics. Commercial slogans have replaced 
political slogans as young Brazilians have no political allegiance, and can only express themselves 
through commercialism. Other sources have a different perspective and report that both vem pra rua 
and O gigante acordou have been used in political movements historically. A commentator at the end of 
an article by Pearson (2013) suggests that vem pra rua was used in the 1960’s as a way of calling 
observers to the streets as protesters passed them. It was further used by the teachers and students 
during their strike in the 1990’s as a call for support. O gigante acordou is said to be a combination of 
two lines of the Brazilian national anthem and a source of national pride after the State reintroduced 
singing the national anthem in schools. Whichever is more accurate is perhaps irrelevant but 
undoubtedly these slogans trending on Twitter and published on Facebook walls helped to spread the 
message of the popular movements to a younger audience in Brazil who would have otherwise perhaps 
not engaged with politics. These digital channels were more efficient than traditional methods of 
popular political movements and also by-passed the right-wing mainstream media. It allowed for official 
versions of the protests to be challenged in a similar way to the ‘Arab Spring’ movement.    
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The military police are a subject of contention within Brazilian society, they are tasked with keeping 
civilian peace, but have historically been accused of violent crimes against poorer civilians, particularly 
during the dictatorship.  The deployment of the military police divides Brazilian popular opinion and was 
once again divided during the 2013/4 protests. The coercive force of the military police is apparent in 
the following extract of a protestor from Brasilia:  
‘It was the first game of the Confederations Cup (15th June). I heard many other scary 
stories you know. On that day the ‘choque’ (military police) was in the city. There is the 
media version of what happened, that the protesters were trying to break into the stadium, 
which was not true. So I wasn’t there, but the thing is, there is a video of the moment the 
Police came, everything was calm, everyone was in their place, yelling some things. People 
were recording, and then at some point the fight began. Gas came flying in the air and 
those things falling in the crowd, people were screaming, yelling. Very, you know, I’m pretty 
sure they (Police) were just waiting for some order and someone said ‘okay, take them out 
there’ and that is what happened. All of a sudden there is a dictatorship again. You can’t 
protest in front of the stadium? That is absurd. Then people spread out, to get away. There 
is this friend of mine, she is only 17 years old she was close to the TV tower. She told me, 
she was sitting on the grass talking to her friend, and she’s a 17 years old girl, so, skinny and 
very small. They came and throwing gas, and she ran, because you know, there is a bunch 
of Policemen with gas, and what else are you going to do? Just run. And he ran after her, 
they put her on the ground. Face on the ground and took her to the car, the police car. And 
she told me they kept threatening her, saying she was going to die, and stuff like that. They 
took her to the Police department, it was more like to scare her, they didn’t mean it, but it 
was something very bad you know. And they kept accusing her of throwing a bottle at their 
car. What these people do is actually bad things, I don’t remember exactly if she had 
something. They just. They just let her go, they didn’t have anything against her. That was 
her first experience with the Police… The Police are good for the rich people. Like this friend 
of mine, she’s black. She has very curly hair, she’s not black black, but she’s more black than 
white... If it was a blonde girl with light eyes, I doubt very much they would have said these 
things to her.’(interview CS9) 
 
The stories of police intimidation during the protests were available all over social media. On the same 
day as the excerpt above, June 15th, the first day of the Confederations Cup, protests also occurred in 
Cuiabá, although these were not as intense.  An extract from an interview with Patricyia, a 22 year old 
law student from Cuiabá, highlights the characteristics of the protest in Cuiabá : 
‘I only went to one protest, the big one. I do not know why I didn’t go to others, they were 
not of interest to me. I drove to the start of the protest, I never walk anywhere, it is too hot 
and dangerous. There was not many people and it was really hot. 
The protest started at 6 and ended at 11, I think I was home by 9pm after I had dropped my 
friends off. It was not like the big ones in the big cities. We walked for a little bit with the 
crowd, but where they were going was dangerous. Once I got home I heard some people 
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had some trouble with the Police, but, this happens all the time. As far as I was aware the 
protest was not about the World Cup in Cuiabá’ (interview SC10). 
 
The demonstrations were less intense in Cuiabá  compared to other capital cities. An excerpt from an 
interview with a biology teacher who lives in Cuiabá suggests one reason why the protests may not have 
been as intense in Cuiabá: 
‘Mato Grosso is young, when my parents arrived here there was nothing. My parents were 
revolutionists and part of the protests that brought down the dictatorship, so I think 
protesting is great. Very important. But we need to be patient here, there are not so many 
people in Cuiabá, 500,000 people or something, so we cannot have it all. It takes time. We 
have the new stadium now, so we can have things we didn’t have before, concerts and 
things. Things are improving here so I didn’t protest and I actually think the World Cup is 
good. Well, I don’t like football so I will not be going to the games, but I like to see the 
tourists and the new roads, these are good, I think this is good.’ (interview CS2, July 2014). 
 
At the height of the mobilisations, the government’s method of using the military police to control the 
mobilisations was failing.  Further attempts to squash the mobilisations came from both civil society 
actors and the state. Famous footballing stars were used by elites of the hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic movements to legitimise their ideologies. This became apparent when Pele, arguably the 
most famous and greatest Brazilian footballer, spoke out against the popular movement. He aligned 
with nationalist ideologies by suggesting the Brazilian population should ‘forget all of this mayhem that’s 
happening in Brazil, all of these protests, and let’s remember that the national team is our country, our 
blood’ (Leahy, 2013). This mix of football and politics is not unusual in Brazil, Pele has had a political 
career himself, and was appointed as Sports Minister in 1995 by the then President Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso. Socrates famously stood up against the military dictatorship and Romario is a career politician 
and currently senator of Rio de Janeiro. Current footballers also offered their opinions on the protests. 
Neymar Jr is reported to have said that Brazil ‘has already lost off the pitch. Now we have to hope and 
pray we do well on it’ (Phillips, 2014).  
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The protests in the build-up to the World Cup beamed an image of civil discontent around the world (Fig 
6), not the desired imagine of a forward thinking, neoliberal country ready for international trade as the 
elites had been keen to depict. There was an uneasy truce between the government and the population 
from the Confederations Cup and the World Cup a year later. The cities of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo 
retracted their price increase in public transport and it appeared the demands of the protesters were 
beginning to be listened to. During the 2014 World Cup there were small protests in the major cities (Fig 
9 and 10). Unfortunately for Neymar Jr, and the Brazilian population, the national team did not do well 
on the pitch. They lost in an embarrassing 7-1 semi-final defeat to Germany in which Neymar Jr was 
injured early on in the game. In the days after the matches the conversations surrounding the defeat 
were focused on Brazil hosting the World Cup and the themes from the mobilisations of the year before 
were again discussed. This was reflected in smaller, but perhaps more focused, protests, such as on 
Copacabana beach (Fig. 7). Although they were not on the same scale, they continued a feeling of anger 
towards the government which continued after the impeachment of the President. 
 
Figure 7: Protests in Maracana underground station and station, author photo 12/7/14 
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Figure 8: Protest at Copacabana beach on the day of semi-final match. The banner reads ‘Governors, business men and FIFA. 
We are not blind’ author photo 8/7/14 
4.4: Conclusion 
 
This chapter aimed to explore the official version of FIFA’s environmental and social claims surrounding 
the 2014 World Cup. FIFA aligned their strategy with the Presidential commitments of the Brazilian 
government and found consensus between environmental protection and poverty alleviation. These 
two directives were explored in turn.  
 
The official version of the environmental aspects of the World Cup was portrayed in the opening 
ceremony, official documents and through the mascot. The images of a compatibility with football and 
ecological neutrality were beamed around the globe. These claims were relatively unchallenged due to 
the domestic policies on climate change. This saw the ecological modernisation become stronger as 
radicals lost their voice to conservative actors in the Climate Change Committee and mechanisms such 
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as offsetting were legitimised. Through the World Cup ecological modernisation was further entrenched 
as the dominant paradigm to environmental protection in Brazil. 
 
However, the official versions of the social benefits of the World Cup were challenged through the 
June/July protests in 2013. Protestors challenged the FIFA rhetoric and realities on the ground. The state 
reacted through the coercive methods by deploying the military police. Additionally civil society actors 
such as footballing celebrities were used to try and quash the social movements. Social media helped to 
disperse the protestors images and videos of police violence and can be attributed to the spread of the 
mobilisations. This was further aided by social media as individual organisers used social media to raise 
awareness of the next protest.  
 
Overall, this chapter aimed to illustrate the sustainability claims of the World Cup at the national level. 
These claims were contested at different stages by different groups, the most successful was the 
June/July 2013 mobilisations.  
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-Chapter V – 
Regional elites, contracts and the social 
benefit legacies of the World Cup in Mato 
Grosso 
 
FIFA stipulates that a minimum of eight host cities is required at a FIFA World Cup event. In order to 
maximise access to the potential benefits, the Brazilian Organising Committee, with the aim of 
showcasing cities outside the traditional tourist route, chose 12 cities as hosts. Cuiabá , as a peripheral 
city was one of the chosen cities set to benefit most from the extensive infrastructure modernisation 
programmes. This included a new stadium that would gain international environmental construction 
accreditation, a modernisation and extension of the existing airport and a new light railway system 
linking strategic areas of the city.  The ‘re-imagineering’ project would work to secure Cuiabá  as the 
commodity export hub of the Centre-West and put Cuiabá  on the tourist map.  
As I will show the bid was secured by political manoeuvring and the implementation of the new 
infrastructure was a disaster. With Cuiabá  as a host, elites in Mato Grosso were able to co-opt the 
sustainability discourses of the World Cup to further their own agenda. They profiteered through 
institutional corruption and impunity based on a political organisation of cronyism and clientalism. In 
order to understand how the green agenda was appropriated, it is first important to understand a little 
more about Mato Grosso elites. A brief history of Mato Grosso is given to show that the patterns of 
social relations developed during the colonisation period are still continuing today, albeit under new 
113 
 
frames and with different actors. Cronyism and clientalism were key features of Mato Grosso political 
history and are evident today in the activities of the current ruling class, the ruralistas. Additionally, the 
powerful elites are able to control civil society, one such example, of the local media is explored. 
The following section of the chapter explores the ‘re-imagineering’ projects in Mato Grosso. It shows 
instances of systematic corruption throughout the construction of infrastructure projects. The Pantanal 
Stadium is structurally unsound and not eligible for LEED accreditation. The companies responsible were 
never brought to account for unfinished work. Profiteering and impunity are evident in the contracts 
and construction of the public transport projects, including the unfinished VLT. I argue, these instances 
led to the re-distribution of wealth upwards, from tax payers to elites in Mato Grosso. 
5.1: Elites and civil society in Mato Grosso  
 
Mato Grosso for the past three decades has been ruled by conservative elites. This started with the 
election of José Fragelli in 1970 who represented the now defunct, National Democratic Union and was 
stopped by the election of José Pedro Gonçalves Taques in 2014 who represents the workers party.  
Due to the isolation of Mato Grosso, in respect to the cities on the coast, some have argued Mato 
Grosso is an extreme case in studies of political and elite family history (Frank, 2001). Mato Grosso lies 
in central Southern America, it has the Amazon rainforest to the North and the Pantanal wetlands to the 
West and South. During the early colonial period access to Mato Grosso was only possible by river, a 
journey from Rio de Janeiro took two months, passing through Paraguay and Argentina. Such was the 
isolation it reportedly took three weeks of the news of Brazil being declared a republic to reach Mato 
Grosso (Franz, 2001). This isolation has influenced the way political and social relations in Mato Grosso 
are organised and controlled, where power and politics are linked through the reciprocal relations of 
clientalism. In the early colonial period, Mato Grosso exported frontier commodities such as Paraguayan 
tea, rubber and cattle products. The state developed under a dependency of the revenue of these 
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products, an economic strategy which continues today. Power during this early colonisation period, and 
running until the second military dictatorship, was held by elite families. Political dynasties formed 
where families held power for prolonged periods of time6. For example, the Corrêa de Costa family held 
influential positions from 1822 until 1966, throughout this period the elite maintained clientalism ties 
through marriage (Arruda, 2014).  
During the military dictatorship (1964-1985) state and federal institutions began to have a greater 
influence on life in Mato Grosso. The Federal mineral programme allowed extractive industries to enter 
‘empty spaces’ within the state and begin industrial activities. Migrants were aided by subsidies and 
infrastructure was built to serve them. The success of this, and demand for agriculture and timber 
products, lead to ‘Operation Amazon’ in 1967. Large areas of the Amazon and Cerrado regions were 
cleared for industrial uses under this policy, which was an extension of ‘The Land Statute, Mining Code’. 
This provided tax incentives and complemented the basic infrastructure built by the state government 
to encourage the settlement of migrants. These state policies and laws privileged the concentration of 
land, and further alienated small land holders (Oliveira, 2010a). During the 1970s, modernisation of 
agricultural techniques, large land ownership and a favourable climate were contributing factors to 
Mato Grosso becoming a key global supplier for soya, cotton and coffee. These were further supported 
by federal and state policies of road and port construction. These policies, favouring export-led growth 
and production further restricted the contribution of small-holder farmers to the economy (Ban, 2013). 
Over time small land holders became isolated by those practices and were engulfed by larger land 
owners, the smallholders then became temporary wage labourers or moved to urban centres (Pignatti 
and Castro, 2008).  
                                                          
6
 ‘Antônio Corrêa da Costa and their sons: Antônio, Pedro Celestino, Luís and Jonas took several positions at the 
state Executive and Federal Legislative. Together, Antônio (father and son) were five times as president of the 
province during the Empire. In the Republic, Antônio (son) was state president from 1895 to 1898. Celestino Pedro 
Corrêa da Costa was president from 1908 to 1911 and again from 1922 to 1924. Luis Adolfo, his cousin, was 
senator. The third generation of politicians consisted of Mario Corrêa da Costa, who ruled from 1926 to 1930 and 
from 1935 to 1937. Fernando Corrêa da Costa, son of Pedro Celestino, ruled from 1951 to 1956 and from 1961 to 
1966’ (Arruda, 2014:9). 
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The farmers and their families who arrived in Mato Grosso in the late 60s and 70s now constitute the 
Mato Grosso elite. The economic wealth achieved through agriculture or associated industries in the 
1980s has secured their position of power today. This wealth also funded political campaigns for actors 
sympathetic to their ideology or members of their own group, and secured political positions of power 
in Mato Grosso and the Federal level. The following is the life story of Maria de Souza. She is typical of 
the migrant population from the 1970s and 1980s who now form part of the ruralistas. Her life story 
was collected over several interviews, as discussed in chapter three, and collated to form this piece: 
‘I came to Mato Grosso from Rio Grande de Sol in 1976; I was newly married at the 
time and saw the opportunity in Mato Grosso as a great adventure. My family, as I 
was growing up, worked in coffee, so I had a little experience in agriculture… But 
nothing prepared me for what there was when I arrived. There was nothing. I 
remember saying to my husband for the first weeks, ‘I want to go back’. Everywhere 
was forest and trees and shrubs and mess... In some places the forest was so thick 
we just left it. We had to do everything from scratch, buy the machinery, bring it to 
the land, clear the trees. This sounds easy, but imagine trying to bring machinery to a 
place with no roads. What do you do? Campo Grande had nothing at that time 
either. After several years, a hospital, schools and shops began to appear as well as a 
tarmacked road linking Campo Grande to Cuiabá…  That was when life became a lot 
easier. To this day I still have cattle, but I like to grow regional fruits for sale at local 
markets. My children now have children and after the death of my husband last year 
from a car accident, I am ready to relax a little... I get my joy from my grandchildren- 
Natalia, my second grandchild has just come back from California, she has been to 
high school in America to learn English. When I think about how far my family have 
come from the days when we started here in Mato Grosso, I am so proud’ (interview 
HP4). 
In terms of political power, the ruralistas are personified by Blairo Maggi. Maggi was born in 1956 to soy 
farmers in Rio Grande du Sol and he studied Agronomy at the Federal University in Parana. In 1973 he 
opened Seeds Maggi which would eventually become known as the Angre Maggi Group based in Itiquira, 
Mato Grosso (blairomaggi.com, nd). According to FORBES, the family business is now worth an 
estimated US$3 billion (Geromel, 2013). In Brazil, Blairo Maggi is a name synonymous with soya 
production and agricultural modernisation and more recently politics. He entered into the political 
arena in 2002 as the Governor of Mato Grosso, a position he held until 2010. Throughout his early 
political career Blairo Maggi staunchly opposed environmental protection, instead favouring the Mining 
Code policies to open ‘empty spaces’ to agricultural and mining production. Nonetheless, he was an 
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active member of the conservative faction of the Committee on Climate Change and was made Minister 
for the Environment in 2015. After the impeachment of President Dilma he was made the Minister for 
Agriculture.  
  
Smith (1993) discussed the notion of ‘jumping scales’, a political strategy to challenge the structure of 
scale. Actors at one scale can re-establish, entrench or challenge their position through agency at a 
different scale (Swynedouw, 2004). Contemporary examples of how the national and regional elites 
have a dialectic relationship are abundant and have given the ruralistas in Mato Grosso a strategic 
advantage. Blairo Maggi is a prominent example of an individual who has influence on the national scale 
and regional. His role as Minister of Agriculture has undoubted benefits to his ruralista colleagues in 
Mato Grosso. Another example is Deputado Nilson Leitão who represents the PSDB party in parliament. 
He is a member of the Agricultural Parliamentary Front and was able to vote in the amendment of the 
Forest Law, which resulted in policies to aid the ruralistas (ruralistas, 2016). These relations have 
enabled the ruralista class to be able to create strategic relations and nodes of influence in different 
realms in order to maintain their social relations in Mato Grosso.  
Historically, oligarchic rule based on clientalism was seen to be the basis of political power in Mato 
Grosso. This has developed in contemporary politics whereby the ruralistas have individuals who 
obtained significant positions of power in state politics. Some of these individuals were able to then gain 
positions of power at the national level. The development of the ruralistas was supported by Federal 
programmes which encouraged national export-led development logic; in Mato Grosso this resulted in 
the accumulation of individual wealth which excluded peasant smallholders from the benefits.  
Elite control of a weak civil society in Mato Grosso has been key to the ruralistas maintaining their social 
relations. One such alliance, with local media can be seen to be a key feature of their strategy. Exploring 
all elite alliances with all civil society organisations falls outside the remit of this thesis, the following 
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example is indicative of the violent and manipulative power elites have on civil society actors. The Diario 
de Cuiabá  and Folha de Estado are newspapers that cover the state of Mato Grosso.  
Domingos Savio Brandão Lima Junior was a media entrepreneur, the Brandão group bought Radio City 
Cuiabá  in 1992 and created the newspaper Folha de Estado in 1994. Brandão also owned a successful 
construction company based in Cuiabá  and was a member of the elites in Mato Grosso. Brandão was 
particularly interested in reporting organised crime in Mato Grosso and using his newspaper to increase 
public pressure on state authorities. His newspaper continually reported on a hydro-electric dam which 
was to be built on indigenous lands in the state. This dam would have been owned by João Arcanjo 
Ribeiro, who was known to Brandão as an organised crime leader operating in Mato Grosso. Domingos Savio 
Brandão Lima Júnior was shot and killed in 2002 alongside Rivelino Jacques Brunini in Cuiabá  by gunmen 
hired by João Arcanjo Ribeiro, business partner of Rivelino Jacques Brunini. In another scheme, the pair were 
planning to illegally sell slot machines in Mato Grosso . Rivelino Jacques Brunini was thought to have given 
information to Domingos Savio Brandão Lima Júnior which allowed him to publish articles on the 
activities of João Arcanjo Ribeiro. The apparent continued targeting of João Arcanjo Ribeiro led him to 
threaten both men and eventually hire Celio Alves, a former corporal in the military police, to organise the 
murders. This event led to the collapse of the newspaper as the readership and circulation reduced to under 
500 copies in Mato Grosso (Martins, 2013). The fortunes of Folha de Estado were further weakened when on 
the 8th June 2016 the newspaper was printed for the final time. The newspaper now only runs digitally through 
their website, the owner and widow, Isabela Brandão blamed increased printing costs of the failure, 
although Martins (2013) suggested readers felt they could not trust the newspaper.  
The Diario de Cuiabá  is another newspaper which covers Mato Grosso. In 2003 the newspaper was 
experiencing reduced readership and was bankrupt, Gustavo Capilé de Oliveira took over as editor in 
chief. Gustavo Capilé de Oliveira comes from a family of regional elites and was able to exploit his 
position and relationships to further the newspaper. His grandfather João Augusto Capilé Junior was 
born in 1916 and originally from Rio Brilhante in Mato Grosso do Sul and was an important political 
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figure in dividing Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul; he also founded the city of Itaporã and after he 
moved to Mato Grosso in 1961 he created two municipalities in the Cáceres region of the state. He also 
had business interests and was the CEO of Telemat, a Cuiabá based telephone company, through this 
company he introduced direct dialling to the state. He also created the Bank of the State of Mato Grosso 
and was known for his ability to play the guitar (Arruda, 2015).  
Gustavo Capilé de Oliveira was the son of João’s eldest daughter and grew up on a small farm outside 
Cuiabá , through these family ties he found allies in the politicians of Mato Grosso who financially 
supported the newspaper in return for complementary coverage. For example, Gustavo Capilé de 
Oliveira backed Blairo Maggi to be Governor of Mato Grosso in Blairo’s first venture into politics and 
supported him throughout his two terms. These relationships were exposed by a telephone interception 
from the Federal Police between Gustavo Capilé and businessman Fernando Mendonça, who was 
funding the campaign of Pedro Taques to become State Governor in 2016 (Cavalcanti, 2014). The legal 
proceedings are still currently being organised by the state prosecutors, although it appears there is a 
long history of financial help from state and corporate actors.  
Some actors in civil society are controlled by powerful elites. The examples of the local media show how 
opposition has been violently removed or coercively controlled through financial reliance. These 
established methods are used by the elite used to maintain dominant relations in Mato Grosso. These 
methods were exploited by elites during the World Cup and eventually led them to profiteer through 
redistribution of wealth upwards.  Some of these are documented in the following section and illustrate 
how the World Cup in Mato Grosso contributed to the maintenance of elite dominance. 
5.2: Securing Cuiabá as host to the World Cup 
 
Cuiabá faced considerable competition in securing the right to host the World Cup. Altogether 18 cities 
bid to be hosts: Belo Horizonte, Florianopolis, Campo Grande, Goiania, Rio Branco, Belem, Maceio, 
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Brasilia, Cuiabá , Curitiba, Fortaleza, Manaus, Natal, Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador and 
Sao Paulo. FIFA released a bid inspection report on 20th October 2007 (FIFA, 2007) which evaluated 
current infrastructure and amenities in the country and stipulated that Campo Grande, Cuiabá , 
Florianopolis, Maceio, Natal and Rio Branco did not have sufficient infrastructure to become host cities. 
Nevertheless after a confidential process between Secopa and FIFA, the host cities were announced on 
the 31st May 2009 during FIFA’s annual congress in Nassau, Bahamas.   
 
Figure 9: Brazilian states. Mato Grosso do Sul was seen as too close to Sao Paulo to be a World Cup host. Source: (Brazil-
help.com, 2012)  
 
Cuiabá  is the capital of Mato grosso and it is the power base of the ruralisats. It was selected as a host 
city and although a relatively small capital city with a population of 500,000, it is of central importance 
to the agricultural sector of mid-West Brazil. My personal experiences with tourists and residents in Rio 
de Janeiro, when learning of my residence in Mato Grosso, were always derogatory. One football fan 
from Argentina said that Mato Grosso was cowboy country and no one cared about football, he also 
thought the people there were backward. Arguably, Cuiabá’s main rival was Campo Grande, the state 
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capital of Mato Grosso do Sul which has a population of over a million. On the Pantanal tourist route, 
Cuiabá is the gateway to the Northern Pantanal, whilst Campo Grande is seen as the entrance to the 
Southern Pantanal. With Mato Grosso du Sol’s close proximity to Sao Paulo (Fig 12), established 
transport infrastructure to the coastal cities and professional top flight football team and Campo Grande 
was perhaps a more likely candidate for a World Cup host city. Despite the feasibility report, Cuiabá  was 
chosen as the host city, mainly due to political manoeuvring. In 2009 Blairo Maggi was the Governor of 
Mato Grosso, and also a large fundraiser for President Dilma’s Workers Party (PT), commentators 
accused him of playing political games and have questioned the legitimacy of the bidding process 
(WIlson, 2014, Savarese, 2013). An interview with Blairo Maggi from Luiz Acosta Da Redação, on behalf 
of MidiaNews, reveals how he secured host city status through personal networks. Clientalism is 
exemplified in the following excerpt: 
Maggi-In 2007 I went to Zurich, Switzerland, [as part of Brazil’s bid to host the World Cup], 
after Brazil was chosen as the World Cup host country for 2014, we held a meeting 
between the 10 or 11 governors who were there. After we had another meeting with the 
president, the president of the CBF, Ricardo Teixeira, and FIFA president Joseph Blatter 
and told them we wanted the World Cup to show a little more than people are used to 
seeing, not just Rio-São Paulo-Minas Gerais, carnaval and football. MidiaNews - and that 
was the decision to decentralize the biggest event in world football? Maggi - Yes. We said 
we should use football to show that we have the Amazon, the Pantanal, the Northeast, 
which has good cities and who want to show their potential. This was the winning thesis of 
the time and, therefore, FIFA chose 12 cities and established that the North, the Midwest 
and the Northeast, South and Southeast would be represented in this Cup. Well this was 
the decision and practically it was decided that one of the venues of the World Cup would 
be in Cuiabá or Campo Grande so we could show the Pantanal. I called Yuri [Bastos Jorge] 
at the Department of Tourism, and Yuri began working professionally around this 
project. We knew Cuiabá  was a weaker city and we had little chance to convince the 
Brazilian Organising Committee to select Cuiabá .  Anyway, we knew there was someone 
who could positively influence the decision makers and we planned to go 
back. MidiaNews - it was then that entered the figure of Agripino Bonilha Filho, the 
connection he has with former FIFA president Joao Havelange? Maggi - Exactly. For those 
who still do not know, Bonilha, lived in Cuiabá for many years and has provided numerous 
services to the state and Cuiabá, and is a childhood friend of João Havelange, who in turn 
is the father-in-law of the president of the CBF (Brazilian Football Federation), Ricardo 
Teixeira. So we went there personally, I, Yuri and Bonilha, to talk to Ricardo Teixeira and 
asked for his support for this endeavour. This is just one example. We did this with several 
people who had some kind of relationship or knew someone connected to the CBF and 
FIFA. We were doing a siege, a political job very well done, well-articulated and which 
culminated in Cuiabá  chosen as one of the venues of the World Cup in 2014. Mato Grosso 
do Sul only woke up to the situation on the day that the FIFA announced the cities. 
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it was not only the politics of the decision making which was the subject of criticism. One blogger for a 
Russian travel site wrote ‘there is virtually nothing to see in Cuiabá. Today, the city is one big 
construction site’ (Krasnov, 2013). The public spending needed to build the infrastructure led a doctor 
from Cuiabá  to suggest: 
‘It is sad because Cuiabá will gain immensely from the World Cup, however, this is at the 
detriment of the surrounding rural communities. The money for the communities has been 
taken from them and given to the city, or worse, given to the greedy companies’ (interview 
HP2).  
Blogger and journalist Mauricio Savarese said:  
‘Of course people worry about stadia, but the stadium is going to be there anyway. But if 
you think about the surroundings and how the structure was prepared Cuiabá is by far the 
least prepared out of all of them’ (interview CS8).  
However, the stadium was not seen as a bad thing by all:  
‘it is better to have the stadium than not have it. At least we now have the potential for big 
games and concerts here, before we had no chance. We would never have anything here, 
but now, maybe, we could have more events in Cuiabá ’ (interview C4).  
The host bid package was prepared by Mato Grosso based architectural firm Castro Mello who were 
also contracted by the Mato Grosso government to produce architectural drawings for the new stadium. 
The three main infrastructure projects which formed part of the bid package was characterised by 
impunity from the start and will now be explored. The bid package is not publically available; the data 
gathered in this section is from secondary media outlets and interviews with local residents. 
 
5.3: The Pantanal Stadium  
 
The story of the construction of the Pantanal Stadium shows systematic corruption to Cuiabá based 
organisations. It first began with the drawings of the stadium and continued into paying construction 
workers, delivery of the seats and the accreditation of the stadium as environmentally friendly. 
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The architectural drawings of the stadium by Castro Mello were never produced and pressure from civil 
society including a local newspaper for the company to repay the state government R$500,000 
(£117,361) developed. Castro Mello is reported to have released a statement reporting the money had 
been spent, and they could not return it even if they wanted to (Bess, 2013). Despite this, the state 
government did not pursue them and the Pantanal Stadium was eventually designed by GCP architects 
based in Sao Paulo who specialise in urban design. It was built by Santa Barbara and Mendes Junior, a 
Cuiabá  based Construction Company. This was not the end of contractual problems.   
The Pantanal Stadium was built on the same site as the replaced Estádio José Fragelli stadium, which 
had neither the facilities nor capacity to meet FIFA regulations. Construction started in 2010 by Santa 
Barbara and Mendes Junior Architects who won the bid to construct the stadium for R$342million 
(£80,274,961). The project was funded entirely through public funds: R$330 million (£77,458,296) by the 
Brazilian National Development Bank and R$12 million (£2,816,665) from the State Government. In 
November 2010 the construction of the stadium was temporarily suspended after Mato Grosso state 
auditors prevented funding from the state Government. They found irregularities in the project 
timetable and assessment of the foundations (Tavares, 2011). Construction recommenced in 2012 but 
was beset with problems. One worker, 32 year old Muhammad ‘Ali Maciel Afonso, died after he was 
electrocuted and fell from the upper tier. There was also a fire in the outer casing of the stadium which 
threatened the success of a safety inspection by FIFA. Nonetheless, the stadium was cleared to be used 
in the FIFA World Cup. 
In line with global, FIFA and national environmental norms, the stadium was built to Leadership in 
Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) standard. Gaining LEED accreditation was also part of the 
contract with the Brazilian National Development Bank which  stipulated the State government would 
have to pay an annual fine of 1% of the total R$330 million (£77,458,296) if the LEED accreditation was 
not achieved (Globo, 2016a). LEED is an internationally recognised certificate for ‘green’ construction 
(Botta et al., 2011). These standards are based on technology and innovation and operate within the 
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ecological modernisation paradigm. The key elements included using materials from the previous 
stadium for the foundations, using recycled rainwater throughout the stadium and solar panel 
photovoltaics.  
The seats at the Pantanal Stadium are another example of how the World Cup provided another 
opportunity for local elites to benefit financially from contracts. The contract to supply the seats was 
won in July 2013 by a Cuiabá  based company, Kango. They were to supply 44,500 seats at a cost of 
R$19.4 million (£4,553,608) or R$436.50 (£102.46) each. An investigation by the civil prosecution 
service, advised Secopa to cancel the contract as they found Kango supplied the National Stadium in 
Brasilia at R$175 (£39.14) each. The contract with the Mato Grosso government meant they had to pay 
an extra R$700,000 (£164,305) for their seats. As a result of this investigation Kango lost the contract to 
another company, Desk, who quoted the state government R$150 (£35.21) per seat. On the 20th 
October 2013, Desk officially expressed interest in supplying the Pantanal Stadium seats. But due to 
irregularities related to another contract in Sao Paulo, the company were not permitted to hold a 
contract with a government based enterprise for five years. At this point, the original company, Kango, 
had their contract reinstated after they offered their original contract at a 6% discount. A new contract 
was then drawn between Secopa and Kango which stated the seats would be installed by 2015. If 
Secopa wanted the seats delivered before this date they would have to pay a premium (Segalla, 2013).  
By the end of May 2014, the Pantanal Stadium was open to the public for the first time and held its first, 
and only, test match between Cuiabá based Mixto and Santos from Sao Paulo state. But, on match day 
only 20,000 tickets were available due to a failure in the delivery of seats. During the match, several of 
the installed seats became loose and broke off. The car park was also unfinished and spectators arriving 
by car had to park over 2km away, without a bus service transporting them to the arena (Birth, 2014). 
Despite these initial problems, the stadium was ready in time for the World Cup and was decorated with 
plants and posters for the four matches at the Pantanal Stadium. 
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During the duration of the World Cup the only reported problem was the leaking roof in the VIP section 
due to unfinished tiling (Fig. 14). On September 1st 2014, the Pantanal Stadium played host to Sao Paulo 
based team, Corinthians. The Pantanal Stadium was at full capacity for this match, with over 44,000 live 
spectators, more than ever achieved in the four World Cup matches. 
 
Figure 10: VIP area at the Arena Pantanal during the World Cup. Unfinished roof led to leaking during match days, author photo 
16/6/14  
 
In addition to under use, problems with the construction have continued in the two years since the 
World Cup. The stadium was closed in January 2015 due to flooding caused by wet season rain. By 
October 2015 access to one upper tier stand was prohibited due to safety fears resulting from the 2014 
fire and by 2016 the official capacity of the stadium was reduced to 10,000 (Pablo, 2016). On the 15th 
July 2016 the Mato Grosso government blocked R$28 million (£6,572,219) to the construction company 
Santa Barbara and Mendes Junior after they had not completed the agreed works and the stadium could 
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not be accredited the LEED certification (Pablo, 2016). The condition of the plants surrounding the pitch 
are symbolic of the environmental considerations for the stadium. They were full, green and healthy 
when the cameras were on during the World Cup, but brown and wilting just one year after (Fig 15). 
 
  
Figure 11: Planted trees in the corners of the stadium. This was part of the theme of sustainability in the stadium, author photo 
16/6/14 and 7/9/15 
After the World Cup there was a fear that the stadium would become a ‘white elephant’ a term used to 
describe sporting stadiums that have little use after the event (Downie, 2010) and would become a 
burden on the state tax payer. The monthly cost to the state government for maintaining the stadium is 
reported at R$500,000 (£117,361), although this has increased as the state government paid for minor 
repairs (Pablo, 2016). The manager of the stadium described how ‘one year after the World Cup it is 
difficult to fill the stadium. We have been half full three times this year’ (interview C9). After the initial 
full stadium it appears that usage of the Pantanal Stadium has decreased. 
In Salvador and Recife civil society pressure forced a FIFA law to change but the elites in Mato Grosso 
did nothing to help small-scale local traders. A FIFA commitment introduced at the state level gave FIFA 
control over the movement of people and goods within a 2km radius of each host venue. This particular 
commitment inspired a grass-roots movement led by local, and eventually, national media. One 
ramification of the commitment was only FIFA endorsed products could be sold within this zone. 
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Independent street vendors and local traders who usually trade within the zone would be prohibited 
from trading, during the tournament, resulting in the local economy losing custom to global brands 
(Fairclough, 2003, v-brazil.com, 2012). The movement gained significantly as the local organising 
committees in Salvador and Recife to allowed selected local vendors within the stadium. International 
football spectators in these cities were able to purchase the local dishes of Acarajé in Salvador and 
Tapioca in Recife (Sandy, 2014). Elites in Mato Grosso did not lobby for this change and no local vendors 
were available in Cuiabá .  
 
Another commitment which changed some state laws, including Mato Grosso, was the sale of alcohol 
within the stadium. Alcohol within sporting arenas is banned in some states but this was relaxed to 
allow Budweiser and Brahma beer to be sold (Lopes and Verloni, 2012). It is important to note, that 
under these amendments the Federal Government would have been held accountable and assume civil 
liability over any safety related incident or accident at the tournament resulting from alcohol (Amaral 
and Viana, 2013). This commitment has many implications. FIFA have forced the Brazilian government 
to change laws which are designed to protect the Brazilian population. Yet, in the event that a change in 
these laws would cause an accident or incident, FIFA would not take responsibility. FIFA and their 
corporate partners colluded in their relations of dominance to lobby the Brazilian government. These 
relationships were able to ensure elite actors found preferable circumstances in which to conduct their 
business.  
 
It was also claimed that the construction of the Pantanal Stadium would bring additional trading and 
recreational opportunities for the local community after the World Cup. Therefore delivering further 
social benefits. In the months following the World Cup small businesses had begun to operate within the 
Pantanal Stadium grounds. At dusk, residents could be seen to walk, skateboard and cycle around the 
stadium; businesses renting bikes and stakes as well as those selling refreshments had been created. 
However, the concrete surface surrounding the stadium had developed several dangerous sections 
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where it had disintegrated (Fig 16). This example illustrates that the Pantanal Stadium cannot be seen as 
a social benefit for the community.  
 
Figure 12: The Arena Pantanal in 2016, businesses rent out skateboards, bikes and roller skates but the surface is beginning to 
disintegrate, author photo 17/9/15 
The Pantanal Stadium was only one element of the programme to improve the infrastructure in Cuiabá.  
5.4: Transport infrastructure 
 
In direct correlation to Directive 12 from the ‘Sustainability Concept’ document, the World Cup in 
Cuiabá aimed to speed up planned infrastructure works. The cities of Cuiabá and Verzae Grande are 
128 
 
separated by the river Cuiabá and the Marechal Rondon airport which is located in Verzae Grande was 
refurbished at a cost of R$88 million (£20,660,000). The runway was lengthened to allow larger planes 
to land, the passenger terminal was upgraded, and access routes and parking were expanded to meet 
the expected increase in demand. Works started on the refurbishment in 2012 and were due to be 
complete in early 2014 (Tavares, 2011). However, by May 2014 the works were still not finished a 
baggage handler working at the airport described ‘chaos’: 
 ‘Nothing is going to be ready, there is building work everywhere, it is a mess, no one 
knows what is going on. Some days there are people everywhere, other days there is no 
one.’ (interview HP3).  
When I visited the airport during the world cup, there was a beautiful marble atrium. However, behind 
the posters of Jaguars and flooded plains, was the noisy and dusty construction works .By the time the 
World Cup was held in June 2014, the airport was not fully functioning and metal barriers with posters 
of the Pantanal and Cuiabá were erected to hide the construction site from tourists. The then Governor 
of Mato Grosso, Silval Barbosa, visited the airport in June 2014 and described his frustration at the 
airport not being ready for incoming tourists (Milliken, 2014). 
Another feature of the Cuiabá bid package that failed to meet its claims was the light railway system 
(VLT). Blairo Maggi’s state government discussed installing the VLT in the city, but instead he eventually 
decided it was too expensive planned an express bus route linking the airport, city centre and stadium 
and an extension of the main artery road, Mario Andrezza, at a cost of R$488.8million (£114,732,167) 
(interview S1). The funds for this project were secured in 2011 and were to be financed by the Federal 
Government in an agreement which saw the State government pay R$34.1 million (£8,004,023) for the 
design process. However, disregarding the money already spent on researching options, the change of 
the Mato Grosso State government in 2011 changed these plans. Members of the newly elected 
government visited Porto, Portugal, in May 2011, which has a VLT system and they decided to return to 
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the initial VLT plans.  It was thought the VLT would promote Cuiabá  as a modern city, similarly to the 
train in Johannesburg for the 2010 World Cup (Farinha, 2011). 
By the start of the World Cup in June 2014 however, the VLT system was not in place. The VLT station at 
the airport had undergone a ‘make-over’ to make it more attractive for arriving tourists. But with no 
track or trains, the station became a standing joke among local people and various news outlets, 
including the local TV news and Reuters UK, who produced features revealing the issue. The widened 
roads, ready for the VLT installation were also unfinished and large stretches of road with high fencing 
were still in place throughout the tournament (Fig. 7).  
 
Figure 13: The VLT railway in Cuiabá, an unfinished infrastructure programme associated with the World Cup, author photo 
20/6/14 and 21/8/15 
 
Work stopped on the VLT in December 2014 around the same time as elections for the new mayor of 
Cuiabá. All the candidates expressed their disapproval of the VLT system and stated that they were 
reluctant to invest more money into the project. The elected governor Mauro Mendes Ferreira, has 
since stood by this stance. By the summer of 2015 it seemed that work had almost permanently stopped 
on the VLT. In some places track had been laid, but the vast majority of land was derelict.  
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The VLT project came under review in June 2016 when the state government were able to secure a 
further R$200 million (£46,944,421) from the Brazilian bank Caixa to finish the works. The work was 
initially set to cost R$1.477 billion (£346,684,555), and had already cost R$1.06 billion. A company 
contracted by the state government to assess the cost of finishing the project suggested R$602 million 
(£141,302,709) would be needed. In contrast the  consortium, responsible for the construction of the 
train line requested R$1.3 billion (£305,138,742) (Globo, 2016b). A college teacher from Verzae Grande 
who works in Cuiabá described the impact of these delays for residents in the following terms: 
‘what has happened is not good for the environment. There are many road closures and 
diversions, and these are not environmentally friendly. Whilst the works are going on, they 
have not made diversions which work well, traffic is terrible, increasing pollution and more 
cars on the road increasing heat. The drainage of the roads is also terrible, roads get 
blocked because too much rain is on the roads. What the international community see and 
hear about is good, however, what we as locals see and experience is not good. They do not 
care about us, what we have to do, what we have to see every day. They only care about 
the international community’ (interview CS2).  
The World Cup presented numerous opportunities for Cuiabá based companies to profit from contracts. 
These works were often unfinished or poorly executed and resulted in tax payers losing the social 
benefits promised to them. 
 
5.5: Conclusion 
 
This chapter illustrated how elites appropriated the social benefits of the World Cup in Mato Grosso. 
Major roads, the airport and VLT were all unfinished when the World Cup commenced. Those 
responsible were not held accountable and were able to profiteer from the large contracts available. 
In September 2016 the only actor bought to account for these actions has been the then Governor, 
Silval Barbosa. It may be other actors will be prosecuted at a later date, or that Silval Barbosa is used as 
a scapegoat. Silval Barbosa signed off different companies responsible for the unfinished projects and 
released funds to them. He was at the centre of a corruption investigation in June 2014 where he was 
initially arrested but released on bail. He was arrested again in September 2015 and put in prison where 
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he is to date along with some of his business partners. He was arrested as part of the police 
investigation ‘Sodom’ which sought to uncover the claims by a whistle-blower which saw three 
government departments- finance, civil house and trade and industry involved in a programme to 
defraud the state government by falsely claiming federal grants. The kickbacks and funds were then split 
between Silval Barbosa and his allies. Other claims under investigation involve contracts won for the 
World Cup and the laundering of ‘bolsa de familia’ funds. Barbosa is said to have endorsed 34 contracts 
as Governor of Mato Grosso whilst Secopa functioned, including RS1.4 billion (£328,610,953) for the 
VLT, of which, R$500 million (£117,361,054) was said to be distributed to his PSDB party and its 
members (Dioz, 2016a).  
 
This network of elite actors operating in Mato Grosso had developed over a long period of time and is 
entrenched in Mato Grosso politics and economics. The World Cup provided an opportunity to further 
entrench these relations.  The result was profiteering and impunity for the elites whilst the population 
were left with unfinished infrastructure projects and debts.   
Through historical analysis this was seen to be manifested through a political history of clientalism and 
cronyism in the state.  Federal programmes to advance commodity export led to the accumulation of 
individual wealth by the ruralistas. They secured their dominance through strategic alliances, one such 
example of the local media was then explored. Those in the local media who were in opposition to the 
elites were stopped. In the case of the editor of one newspaper, he was killed. The other newspaper had 
to be financialy supported by elite investments to remain viable. In order to ensure the longevity of 
these investments the newspaper had to be supportive of the elites in their coverage. The agency of 
these elites also enabled Cuiabá  to initially host the World Cup as documented in the interview with 
Blairo Maggi. He described how his political manoeuvring and personal connections helped to secure 
Cuiabá  as a host city.  
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The construction of the Pantanal Stadium, VLT and airport are key examples of how undelivered 
promises were made and companies were not brought to account. The state has started to challenge 
these contracts and the former Governor has been incarcerated for his involvement with illegal 
contracts and kickbacks.   
Overall, this chapter demonstrated how powerful elite agency and alliances were central to the 
appropriation of the sustainability discourse of the World Cup in Mato Grosso.  
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-Chapter VI - 
The Green Action Institute and carbon 
offsetting 
 
 
In contrast to the claims that the World Cup would bring social benefits to the people of Mato Grosso, 
the previous chapter showed how elites were able to profiteer with impunity. This chapter focuses on 
the carbon offsetting aspect of the Pantanal Stadium and how it was implemented. It shows how local 
corporate and agricultural elites were able to take advantage of a Federal programme to give 
progressive NGOs more voice, and create an NGO which claimed to offset the Pantanal Stadium.  
A network of elite alliances appears to have controlled this project from the beginning, ensuring 
financial benefit for themselves and failing to deliver social or environmental benefit. The NGO was 
created to contribute to the deflection of international commentators claims over poor environmental 
practices in the state. The result was an NGO which works for elite interest, rather than environmental 
and social benefit. 
In order to unpack the nuances of this organisation the first section if this chapter outlines the history 
and organisational structure of the Green Action Institute and the Green River Project. I look in further 
detail at the selection of location for the project. It is argued that the project was not necessary in the 
villages and was used to divert action from the landed elites in the north of the state to where land is 
less economically valuable in the Pantanal region. The Green Action Institute also made public 
participation claims which is challenged by resident accounts and documents which suggest the project 
was imposed on local people through coercion. 
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The following section focuses on the carbon offsetting aspect of the project and uncovers how the 
methodology was changed to reduce the amount of trees needed to planted from 1.4 million to 70,000. 
The certification of these offsets is then questioned as cronyism is exposed between the organisation 
certifying the offsets and the Green Action Institute. The final section of this chapter then explores the 
future plans of the Green Action Institute and the Green River Project. 
6.1: The Green Action Institute and Green River Project 
 
The Green Action Institute describes itself as ‘combining the pillars [of] education and action’ with an 
aim to promote ‘the recovery and preservation of degraded areas on the banks of Mato Grosso rivers, 
contributing to the strengthening of environmental education process and its consolidation as a state 
policy’ (PNBSAE/MT, 2012, Verde, 2014).  
 
The Green Action Institute is an environmental NGO based in Cuiabá , it was founded in 2007 as an 
OSCIP, the policy created by Lula to deepen democracy. As I discussed in chapter two the OSCIP 
mechanism was used to deepen civil society participation and therefore democracy in Brazil. There was 
a need for environmental NGOs in the region as policies such as the ‘Mining Code’ were linked to 
deforestation, a particularly important issue in the years preceding 2007 as Mato Grosso experienced 
the highest deforestation rates of all Brazilian Amazonian states (Ioris, 2013, Fearnside and Barbosa, 
2003, Fearnside et al., 2009, Morton et al., 2006). In 2005 Blairo Maggi received Greenpeace’s ‘Golden 
Chainsaw’ in recognition of the damaging impacts of his company’s actions on deforestation and his 
subsequent activities as Governor of Mato Grosso. This apparently had led him to change his ways. He 
was reported to have said ‘Mato Grosso was the State with the largest deforestation rate of the country 
when I came into power… therefore the governor of this state received the prize Golden Chainsaw 
Award. Such a symbolism made me realize I should focus on showing that we would do things 
differently’ (Geromel, 2013).  For Blairo Maggi and President Dilma, ‘showing we could do things 
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differently’ was encouraged by the development of market mechanisms to conserve the environment 
through the UNFCCC process, and the increased international attention on the Amazon region as 
globally important in the fight against climate change.  
 
The director of the Green Action Institute Paul Borges is reported as saying in 2008, ‘since NGO’s are 
coming here to talk about what we are doing wrong, we will create an NGO to show what we are doing 
well’ (Galvão and El-Jaick, 2010). The Green Action Institute was developed by the following actors: the 
Association of Soy Producers of Mato Grosso, the Breeders Association of Mato Grosso, the Union of 
Sugar and Alcohol Industries of Mato Grosso, the Center of Producers and Exporters of Wood and the 
Union of Construction, Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electricity and Gas in the State of 
Mato Grosso. These groups were all prominent industrial groups which had contributed to the 
deforestation and environmental damage of the state  
 
The influence the founding organisations have over the NGO can be seen through the organisational 
structure. The CEO of the OSCIP is Carlos Avalone Junior, he ran for deputy Governor of Mato Grosso in 
the 2014 elections. This bid failed and he now is the President of the PSBD party in Mato Grosso. Mauro 
Mendes Ferreira a director of the Green Action Institute has a number of other roles. He is former 
director of the Association of Industry in Mato Grosso, currently the Mayor of Cuiabá and additionally, 
owner of a Cuiabá based steel company, BiMetal.. The second Vice President of the Green Action 
Institute is the financial director of the Centro das Industrias Produtoras e Exportadores de Madeira do 
Estado de Mato Grosso (Center for Producing and Exporting Industry of Timber in Mato Grosso). These 
directors with little or no experience of conservation, forestry or education are now controlling an 
organisation and projects that have a formal remit to do just that. The hierarchy of the organisation is 
then based on industrial, not conservation, elites. All of these actors also have prominent positions 
within the founding organisations. The only trained environmental technicians in the NGO are at the 
project level. The Green Action Institute currently employs one project manager and three technicians, 
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they are all environmental engineers and received degrees from the Mato Grosso State University in 
Cuiabá. Moreover, the strategic decisions from the Green Action Institute can then be said to be heavily 
influenced and driven by the founding members, rather than those working at the project level. 
The organisation of the Green Action Institute is questionable in itself. This is further deepened when 
one looks into how the carbon offsets the Green Action Institute are verified. As part of international 
guidelines on carbon offsetting, in order for carbon credits to be verified they need to be assessed by an 
independent body. In the case of the Green Action Institute it appears the verification happened within 
the organisation by a platform managed by the Green Action Institute. In July, 2010, the Mato Grosso 
Unit of Environmental and Ecosystem Goods and Services (UBSAE/MT) was created by the Federation of 
Industries of the State of Mato Grosso and the Federation of Agriculture and Livestock of Mato Grosso, 
the same industrial organisations who created the Green Action Institute. The aim of UBSAE/MT is to 
‘promote issues regarding payment for ecosystem services (PES), and positioning the industry, 
agriculture, farming and forestry sectors with the state regarding the theme’ (PNBSAE/MT, 2012).  
The UBSAE/MT subsequently saw the need to install a platform in Mato Grosso which would allow for 
the trading of ecosystem services credits and certification of these credits. The Business Platform in 
Environmental Goods and Services and Ecosystem Mato Grosso (PNBSAE) was then established to fulfil 
this role. In effect, PNBSAE is the operational branch of the UBSAE. Their aim is ‘to promote the balance 
between the environment, social welfare and primary productive activity in Mato Grosso, acting in 
fostering, implementation and certification’ (PNBSAE, 2012:1). The long-term goal of this organisation is 
to incorporate water and biodiversity credits into the already existing carbon offsetting programme. 
According to them: 
It is expected that the green infrastructure of the Green River Project will provide 
for a more resilient and adapted ecosystem, able to face climate change and the 
threats posed by a loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services (PNBSAE/MT, 
2012). 
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Although it appears to be a separate organisation, it is actually run by the Green Action Institute. At the 
time the PNBSAE needed to be housed and run by an organisation, the Green Action Institute took up 
this role and were then responsible for the development, implementation, verification, certification and 
monitoring of the carbon credits (PNBSAE/MT, 2012, PNBSAE/MT, 2008). The Federation of Industries of 
the State of Mato Grosso and the Federation of Agriculture and Livestock of Mato Grosso have used 
legitimate state and federal policies to create an environmental NGO. This NGO then produced carbon 
credits which an organisation developed by them verified which was then bought by the organisations.  
 
The ability of the corporate sector actors to legitimately establish, own and control civil society actors 
was influential in the Green River Project becoming a reality. How this project was implemented was 
also influenced by these actors as we shall now see. 
Project history and selection of the site  
The Green River Project became the Green Action Institute’s flagship project and offset the emissions 
from the Pantanal Stadium. However, this project was not created by them. It was developed in 2006 as 
a conservation programme organised by the state ministry for the environment (SEMA). A SEMA 
representative explains the initial period of the project: 
 ‘This project really began a long time ago. There was a study by the Federal State 
University of Mato Grosso in Cuiabá which found that about 70% of sediment in the River 
Cuiabá finished in the Pantanal. Because of this the Pantanal is getting clogged up with 
sediment. Although this is a natural process, they argued that this process is occurring 
increasingly rapidly by the cutting of trees and use of land up to the river banks. Because 
there are no trees of the river banks, there are no trees to catch the sediment as it moves 
past, so it all goes straight into the Pantanal’ (interview S8) 
SEMA began working on the Green River Project in 2006 to evaluate the compliance with land owners 
along the banks of the River Cuiabá to the 1996 Federal Environmental Law. This law states it is illegal to 
build within a boundary of the river margins7. It states all rivers are to be protected by a forested river 
                                                          
7
 The law is an element of the ‘Forest Code’ passed during the Vargas dictatorship of 1934 and revised during the 
military rule of 1965. 
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margin, the size of which was in direct relation to the width of the river. In the case of the River Cuiabá  
‘the river, is 150 feet width on average and so the permanent preservation area is 100 meters from each 
edge, right and left’ (Galvão and El-Jaick, 2010). 
SEMA’s first actions were to conduct a preliminary survey between Santo Antonio do Leverger and 
Barão de Melgaço to document degraded land. Using satellite images in conjunction with field work 
they suggest that 2,500 hectares designated as an Area of Permanent Preservation were degraded or 
built on. An ecologist from SEMA describes their initial strategy as follows: 
It is SEMA’s responsibility to preserve the environment and this is what we do. In 2006 we 
did a big survey, not those ones of the houses you have already seen, but we did a general 
survey. We noted there was degradation of the river banks and they needed to be 
conserved. After the initial survey the project was born and from there we began a bigger 
survey to document all land ownership on the river margins between Santo Antonio de 
Leverger and Barra do Aricá.…There were five of us working on the project, one biologist, 
three forest engineers and me, I am an ecologist. SEMA worked on this survey, myself and 
my colleagues, we spent six months along this stretch of river documenting everything.…So 
the documents you have seen, about each house, well we have made about 500 of them. 
This document measures the house, any other buildings and if there are any signs of river 
bank erosion’ (Interview S8). 
Although SEMA carried out and paid for the survey, press reports that covered the project never 
mentioned this fact. The project was always attributed to the Green Action Institute.  
All the evidence shows that the Green Action Institute only became involved in the Green River 
project in 2009. This is when decisions were taken that they would use the project to sell carbon 
credits to local businesses. From the start there seem to have been irregularities around its 
involvement. Press reports at this time always referred to it as a Green Action Institute project 
and suggested it was the Green Action Institute who carried out the survey. Not only this, it 
seemed that the Green Action Institute received money for a survey they did not complete. 
Olhardireto (2009) declared that a Mato Grosso based supermarket chain, Modelo, had begun a 
partnership with the Green Action Institute. Modelo donated funds to the Green Action Institute 
to allow them to conduct a survey on the environmental and economic conditions of the River 
Cuiabá. It was not in the public domain how much was invested. However, as we have already 
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seen, SEMA have also claimed to have undertaken this study. Additionally, Olhardireto (2009) 
claimed the Green Action Institute would conduct the survey in the municipalities of Santo 
Antonio do Leverger, Cuiabá , Barrao de Malgaco and Pocone. Whilst visiting the Green Action 
Institute’s office, I was given access to these survey reports. I only saw properties from the 
communities between Santo Antonio do Leverger and Barra do Aricá. This reflects the statement 
of the SEMA employee, that the survey was only conducted on this stretch of river. Whatever the 
case, the reforestation project began in 2010 in Barranco Alto I. 
The location of the project is also a contested issue, the choice of site was supposedly based on the 
preliminary survey but may have also been influenced by other factors. According to the Green Action 
Institute the project began in Barranco Alto because this area was seen as having high levels of 
degraded land (interview CS3). An alternative argument could be given in response to my interview with 
the former Mato Grosso State Governor, Blairo Maggi. The MT 040 highway, linking Cuiabá to Barão de 
Melgaço was tarmacked under the leadership of Maggi. When asked why this road was chosen his 
response was: 
 ‘We decided to put asphalt on the 040 for a number of reasons. But most important was 
the potential this area has for tourism. The road connects Cuiabá to the tourist areas here 
[Santo Antonio] and further down to Barão de Melgaço, where there is the Pantanal. This 
connection has the potential to greatly increase the tourism here. So when we did the 
asphalting people always say we did the farming roads first. Yes this is true, because the 
farmers pay for some of the work. It is very difficult and very expensive to asphalt the 
roads, so to do the roads that will be all publically funded is difficult. We need to choose 
roads which are strategically good. For us, the 040 was best because it has a great deal of 
tourism potential.’ (interview S5) 
 
The MT-040 was already recognised by elites for its tourism potential. Reforesting this area would 
undeniably increase the aesthetic appeal of the area and would ultimately contribute to the growing 
tourist economy. Within the communities along the river bank, tourism is seen as an elite industry, 
mainly due to the large initial start-up costs, and favourable locations on the outskirts of the village 
away from their homes (interview PP 11, 12, 13, 14). If tourism potential was an influencing factor in the 
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decision to locate the Green River Project in Barranco Alto, it is not part of the official documents. 
Another potential influence on the location of the project not discussed by SEMA or the Green Action 
Institute is the communities affected by this project are peasant smallholders. The Greenpeace report 
criticised deforestation by large farm owners in the Amazon and Cerrado region. The project took place 
in the Pantanal region of Mato Grosso (Fig 18) an area with much less economic worth, mainly due to 
the flooding cycle. The founding associations of the Green Action Institute all have their activities 
outside the Pantanal region, therefore their interests would be protected by the project location being 
located away from their lands. 
 
Figure 14: Mato Grosso (MT) and other states in Brazil’s Centre-West. The Green River Project occurred in the less economically 
valuable region of the Pantanal. 
 
By 2010 the Green Action Institute had begun to sell carbon credits. It was only in 2011 they formally 
developed a relationship with Secopa and became involved in the offsetting of the Pantanal Stadium. In 
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the original agreement with Secopa 177,000t of CO2 was calculated to be released into the atmosphere 
and 1.4 million trees would be planted to offset the stadium. In addition to the carbon offsetting, the 
Green Action Institute also made social benefit claims and suggested the local population would receive 
Payment for Ecosystem Services. To deliver this, the Green Action Institute would receive an extra 
R$4,000,000 (£938,888) from the state government in 2012. 
 
Ensuring compliance in the villages  
The ability of the Green Action Institute to sell carbon credits (and the subsequently offset the Pantanal 
stadium) hinged on the compliance of villagers living within the project boundaries. In order to convince 
villagers to plant the trees SEMA and the Green Action Institute entered the villages of Barranco Alto I, II 
and Pesqueiro Florida in 2009. However, according to all accounts the villagers showed little interest in 
getting involved in the project. This lack of interest is hardly surprising because it would mean planting 
trees on the land where they currently gained their livelihood, as we will see in the next chapter. This 
lack of interest was despite the fact there were five public meetings (interview S1). By 2010 the urgency 
of compliance to the project was further felt by the Green Action Institute as by this time they were 
liaising with Secopa. It was at this point the Green Action Institute resorted to legal action to force 
compliance.       
In early 2010 the Green Action Institute took SEMA’s original socio-economic surveys to the Public 
Prosecutors to show the population’s non-compliance with the Federal law (interview S9) (Institute, 
2012). In response, the public prosecutors signed the technical cooperation agreement for river 
reforestation, or Terms of Adjusted Conduct (TAC) (Green Action Institute, 2011). This coercive device 
ensured legal compliance to the Green River Project. This fact was sidestepped by the manager of the 
Green Action Institute during my interview. She was keen for observers to think the project was based 
on a public consultation project:  
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 ‘The length of the river we wanted to recover is 40km, with this objective we started to 
sensitise the people who lived in the region. This started with a few people, other people 
who saw the work became interested and asked about entering in the project. It was also in 
this moment when other groups became interested, like SEMA, Secopa …the project is in an 
isolated place, because of this we need the local community on our side. To do this we 
donated trees, labour and infrastructure. We have visited the communities many times to 
convince the people how good this project is’ (Interview CS4, manager of Green Action 
Institute). 
At a different time in the same interview and when the manager was not present, a technician 
from the Green Action Institute explained why the TAC was needed: 
‘This was not a process of agreement, the pubic ministry became involved because the 
villagers did not accept the project. SEMA tried to punish people because they did not stick 
to the project properly, but this did not work. The public ministry entered and forced the 
participants with the TAC, the villagers were afraid of them. The village received many 
TACs, they either had to pay a fine or sign the TAC about reforestation.’ (interview S8) 
The villagers, SEMA and the public prosecutor all agreed with the technician in that land owners were 
legally coerced into planting trees on their land. When I interviewed him, one of the two public 
prosecutors, Domingo Savio, defended the use of the TAC in the following terms: 
 ‘The public prosecution became involved because basically no one in the community 
wanted to participate. And they have to, they should, because it is the law. But you see, 
SEMA does not have any authority, they cannot make people comply. But we can, so we 
did. We decided to issue TACs, we can fine the population and SEMA cant. So we thought 
this would work well, and it has. As you can see in these photos, the villagers came here 
and signed the TAC. It was no problem’ (Interview S9) 
Far from complying with established norms of carbon offsetting and informed consent, the elite 
alliances between SEMA, the Green Action Institute and the public prosecutors was essential in 
imposing the carbon offsetting project in the effected villages. 
6.2: Carbon offsetting  
 
After the TAC was issued villagers began to plant the required trees and although the numbers of trees 
that were planted were vague, the verification body manged by the Green Action Institute, issued 
certificates. 18 certificates were awarded to companies at a ceremony on the 15th December 2010. The 
companies certified included: Unimed Cuiabá , Graphic Watchtower, Plastibrás , Federation of 
143 
 
Agriculture and Livestock Federation of Mato Grosso, Federation of Industries of the State of Mato 
Grosso, National Industrial Apprenticeship Service and the Association of Soy Producers state and were 
all certified as carbon neutral. It is interesting to note here that the Federation of Agriculture and 
Livestock Federation of Mato Grosso, Federation of Industries of the State of Mato Grosso and the 
Association of Soy Producers are all founding associations of the Green Action Institute. Also at this 
event four representatives of the communities of Barranco Alto I and II, Santa Clara and San Jose 
received a symbolic cheque for R$25,925.46 (£6,085) in relation the their Payment for Ecosystem 
Services (FIEMT, 2010). 
There is no public record of how many carbon credits were bought by each company or how much a 
carbon credit cost; and even the information regarding how many trees were planted in this period is 
misleading. Olhardireto (2009) suggested planting began in Barranco Alto in March 2009. This is in direct 
contrast to a newspaper report from the Cuiabá regional newspaper, Diario de Cuiabá. They suggested 
that 38,000 seedlings had been planted in January and February of 2009, with 80,000 planted by March. 
By the end of the year it was expected that 200,000 would be planted (Diario de Cuiabá, 2009)  .  
Unimed Cuiabá, one of the buyers of carbon credits claimed in their News Bulletin that in 2009 185,000 
trees were planted (Comunicação, 2010). Already in 2009 it is clear to see misinformation and mixed 
reporting of this project.   
Carbon offsetting the Pantanal Stadium 
Secopa began their involvement with the Green River Project in June 2011, two years after Cuiabá was 
chosen as a World Cup host city. FIFA (2011a) and Agecopa (2011), the initial name of Secopa, 
announced the project through press releases on their website. FIFA reported that this agreement 
meant 3,000 ‘river-dwelling’ families would benefit from R$710,000 (£166,652) which would be 
‘allocated in the form of payments for ecosystem services to bankside municipalities’. In order to receive 
this benefit, the communities had to plant 1.4 million native trees. Secopa suggested the 88 households 
had already planted 50,000 trees (Ascom, 2011, de Cassia, 2011). The project would be paid for by the 
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State government as part of the LEED accreditation application for the Pantanal Stadium. The former 
head of Secopa in Mato Grosso, Adilton Satchetti, explained in an interview with me why Secopa 
became involved in the carbon offsetting scheme: 
‘The Green River Project looked like a good project for us. We were 
thinking of buying carbon credits from the international market, but 
hoped for something from Brazil. Then we came across this project and 
it fitted perfectly, we could keep everything in Mato Grosso. This was 
fantastic, to keep everything in Mato Grosso really sold the idea that 
Mato Grosso has everything. And it does’ (interview S1) 
It is possible to see how the Green River Project contributed to the ‘re-imaginnering’ of Mato Grosso 
being a forward thinking, environmentally friendly state. Purchasing the carbon credits within Mato 
Grosso gave a message that the state was prepared, able and willing to be environmentally friendly and 
did not need to look outside of the state to offset its activities.  
On the 20th December 2011 the Green Action Institute held another event where companies were 
presented with their carbon neutrality certificates. At this event, Secopa were presented with a 
certificate, verified by the organisation managed by the Green Action Institute, that 24,000 tons of 
carbon were neutralised by the planting of 171,500 trees in Santo Antonio de Leverger after 19 months 
of work (Globesport, 2011). In TopNews (2011) this figure was reported as 23,819.92 tonnes of carbon 
sequestered by planting 171,504 trees. During the ceremony, representatives from the affected villages 
also received a symbolic cheque for R$86,800 (£20,373) (Fig  15).  
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With the offsetting of 24,000 tonnes, the Green Action Institute were well on the way to offsetting the 
required 44,000 tonnes. However, in 2012 they approached the state government and received an extra 
R$3,400,000 (£798,055) (Rodrigues Stocco et al., 2012:263). Carlos Avalone, director of the Green Action 
Institute said at the time ‘the program originally encompassed only the Pantanal stadium but now 
Figure 15: Presentation ceremony of Green Action 20/12/11. A- Registrar of Secopa, Eder Moraes 
receives certificate from Carlos Avalone, President of Green Action. B- Residents of Barranco Alto I 
and II receive a cheque for R$86,800 Source: (Lopes, 2011b) 
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includes compensation for all works agreed with FIFA in Cuiabá’ (Vargas, 2013). This is in direct contrast 
to my interview with the manager of the Green Action Institute: 
‘LC: The offsetting programme is just for the Pantanal stadium? 
Manager: Yes, just the stadium 
LC: And only the trees in Barranco Alto I and II are planted to offset the Pantanal 
stadium? 
Manager: Yes, all the trees in Barranco Alto I and II are for the Pantanal stadium 
and nothing else’ (Interview CS4). 
 
Tracing transactions, payments and costs of all aspects of this project is difficult as project documents 
are not in the public domain and undoubtedly as the former head of Secopa explained there are costs 
involved: 
‘Academics always criticise these types of projects, but they do not understand 
how it works. You have to buy the signs, pay for the petrol of the people going 
back and forth to the villages. You need the meeting spaces, you need to buy the 
wood. This all costs money and academics do not understand this’ (interview S4). 
But it could be argued that the Green Action Institute received an extra R$3,400,000 (£798,055) of State 
money to do nothing, the original amount of R$1,000,000 paid to the Green Action Institute included 
offsetting the agreeed 117,000t.  
Double counting? 
In 2012, the same year as the Green Action Institute received R$3,400,000 (£798,055) from the State 
Government of Mato Grosso, TecnoMapas was hired. They supplied a ‘monitoring system where 
satellite imagery is used to access to information such as registered houses and visualization of rural 
properties’ (Technomapas, 2014). This system (Fig 16) was used by the Green Action Institute to 
highlight the boundaries of properties in Barranco Alto I and II. Interestingly, during the interview the 
Green Action Institute representative (CS4) they did not know how many families were in Barranco Alto I 
and II, but had instant access to the information via this technology. 
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Figure 16:  Software used by Green Action as supplied by Tecnomapas. A- Barranco Alto I, B- Barranco Alto II, author photo 
17/5/14 
 
 
The services of TecnoMapas is also used by another company Unimed; they claim to be carbon neutral 
through buying carbon credits from the Green Action Institute. Their website has a link to a database 
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which shows seven properties in the communities of Barranco Alto I and II, Sao Sebestian and Santa 
Clara which have planted trees and offset Unimed’s emissions. Their website explains ‘in 2012 through 
the Green Action Institute, 1,933 acres were reclaimed and 718.5 tons of co2 offset were recorded. In a 
summation of the years 2010 and 2011 there was 6,300 seedlings planted and 875 tonnes of carbon 
dioxide neutralized’ (Unimed, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 17: Screenshot from the Unimed carbon neutral webpage. Location of trees are in Barranco Alto 1, 355t co2 eq said to 
be offset 6002 m in this database. This information is different to the information on their webpage. 
 
One of the properties (Fig 17) belongs to Senhor Jacinto. His house and grounds is the subject of the TAC 
and monitoring report used in the following chapter. Unimed claim that the trees planted on his land 
offset their emissions. The database here describes 65 trees planted on 12th February 2009 and 54 trees 
planted on his property on 28th June 2011. There were a total of 17 different species of tree planted on 
the property. The previous section showed how the manager of the Green Action Institute claimed only 
the Pantanal Stadium was offset from trees planted in Barranco Alto I and II. 
Changes in methodology 
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In spite of the potential double counting, the Pantanal Stadium still needed more trees planted in order 
to be certified as carbon neutral. In 2013, two years after the commencement of the project, Vargas 
(2013) reported 270,000 seedlings had been planted, only 19% of the 1.4 million needed by 2014. With 
the World Cup looming this could have been a problem for the Green Action Institute. As it turned out, 
the Green Action Institute were able to dodge this problem by changing the methodology for calculating 
CO2 offsetting and substantially reducing the number of trees that needed to be planted. As the 
manager of the Green Action Institute explained: 
 
‘It was like when we first did the study to see if compensating was feasible. In the beginning 
we talked about 117,000 tonnes of carbon would be released into the atmosphere due to 
the Pantanal Stadium. There existed this initial 177,000t because there existed a calculation 
basis…There are several mathematics they used to make the compensation calculation. For 
us 177,000 fell to 45,000tonnes because nowadays we here in Brazil, we have a base 
calculation and before we were using international bases to do this. There are a lot of 
things that they put here to give 117,000 which are not necessary because the 
compensation is only for direct [emissions]. So what is direct and indirect? Workers, the 
trucks that carry the materials, the folks that clean up are all direct. The formation of 
concrete, lights of the building at night (when people are working) those are bright lights 
right? Well this is indirect. So 117,000t dropped to 45,000. Sorry this is called methodology, 
I forgot the word- but this is called methodology- we changed this, we restructured this to 
know the base- how much we needed to offset to reach the target’ (Interview CS3). 
The change in methodology enabled the Green Action Institute to plant fewer trees and still get the 
Pantanal Stadium certified as carbon neutral. The shift from one methodology to the other was possible 
due to the ‘interlocking’ between the Green Action Institute and the verification body.  
There was only one press report which challenged the claims of the Green Action Institute. Assunção 
(2013), on behalf of the Centro-Oeste Popular newspaper, conducted an investigation into the nursery 
which produced the seedlings. The results found the seedlings were paid for by Empaer, an action unit 
of the State Ministry for Rural Development and Family Agriculture. The news report then suggested 
that the state government paid the Green Action Institute for reforestation with seedlings produced by 
the state itself. The actual planting of the seedlings was carried out by the property owners. So, the 
Green Action Institute, in effect, were only paying for the three staff members in the nursery- and 
according to Assunção (2013) this was also part funded by Empaer. 
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Perhaps the most alarming press report is the most recent, which was published the day before the start 
of the World Cup. Globo, Brazil’s biggest news outlet, suggested that 41,000 tons of CO2 had been 
released due to the construction of the Arena Pantanal, and 75,000 native trees had been planted over 
6 years (Globo, 2014). This report ties in with the interview with Green Action Institute. However, it puts 
into doubt all the other press reports which have gone before this. No mention was given to the other 
companies who have also offset their emissions through this project. 
6.4: The future 
 
For SEMA, the Green River Project was deemed a success. The pamphlet (2014) (appendix 2) which is 
available in SEMA’s building shows how the reforestation project worked alongside other smaller 
projects such as the organisation of fishing platforms and distribution of litter bins. These outcomes are 
said to have made a contribution to the conservation of the river Cuiabá. Properties are now only 
allowed one fishing platform and commercial properties have to apply for a license to have more. 
Previously platforms contributed to over-fishing on the river, whereas now, the monitoring of platforms 
and fisheries contributes to the stabilisation of fish stocks in the River Cuiabá. In interview S8 the SEMA 
representative described the future of the project for SEMA: 
‘For SEMA the project here is over. We are responsible for the initial reports and 
construction of the wooden platforms and the supply of the wood. The Green 
Action Institute are responsible for the monitoring of the project, and I guess the 
carbon offsetting, but I know nothing about that. The future for us, I think is to 
continue this project in other areas.  
The new state secretary for the environment is Dr Ana Luiza Peterlini de Souza, so 
as you know she was the public prosecutor before. She supports this project a lot 
as she was involved with this from the start. So I think, we will continue to be 
funded, but we will move our project to another area. 
I think if anywhere, it will be further upstream, further North of Cuiabá. In this 
area there is a lot of farmers and the land is less segmented. I think it will be 
easier to implement there, and you know, the farmers are educated. They know 
they need to do some things for the environment. The future for Green Action 
Institute? I do not know, as far as I am aware, I do not know if we will continue to 
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work together. But I don’t think so. They are meant to be monitoring the project 
in the villages, but we have done 49 monitoring, they have done 5. This is not fair. 
When we started this they agreed to monitor the planting afterwards. They then 
became interested in the carbon offsetting. For us, we did what we wanted and 
now the project is over’ (Interview S8). 
The Green Action Institute were less confident of their involvement in the future of this project. The 
manager of the Green Action Institute explained they were due to have a meeting at the end of the 
World Cup in 2014 to discuss the future of the NGO. It was not apparent if they could continue 
functioning as an OSCIP if they did not have the project which linked the NGO to the state. My field visits 
in 2014 suggested the nursery was closed, although one man remains employed on a part-time basis. 
Returning in August 2015 the nursery was derelict (Fig 18).  
 
 
Figure 18: The abandoned nursery, author photo 18/8/15 
Although the project is over and the future of the Green Action Institute is in doubt, the project can be 
seen from their perspective as a success. The involvement of Secopa ensured further investment and 
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made the national press. This project was also used by FIFA in their 2015 sustainability report, and on 
their website as an example of how Brazil was ensuring a ‘green’ World Cup (FIFA, 2014b). In terms of 
negative press about the carbon offsetting aspect of this project, there has been only one media report. 
This report failed to make any inroads into the project discourse. The Green Action Institute were able 
to use this project to push the image of Mato Grosso being ‘green’. By co-opting the conservation aspect 
of this project and turning it into a carbon offsetting project they were able to secure funds from a 
variety of corporate sectors in the state. They were able to conduct the carbon offsetting as they 
created the organisation to validate the offsets and certify the Pantanal stadium as carbon neutral. Due 
to their hegemonic positions the elite were able to co-opt a conservation project and re-engineer it 
through the ecological modernisation logic where the environment was quantified and given an 
economic role in the local economy. For both SEMA and the Green Action Institute the reforestation 
project, in this area at least, appears to have finished, but both organisations have different opinions of 
the outcomes. 
6.5: Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown how the elite who hold positions of power in politics and economics in Mato 
Grosso have been able to create a NGO to control an important part of civil society. This worked to 
ensure the ‘green’ narrative in Mato Grosso was implemented without it adversely affecting their elite 
economic activities. Instead, the subordinate class had to surrender their land and livelihood in the 
name of environmental sustainability. The Green River Project then reinforced social relations as the 
decision makers formed an alliance which resulted in difficulty challenging the project.  
The Green Action Institute was created by elite corporate associations in Mato Grosso. They have been 
seen to work in the interests of their founders, rather than their stated aims. The organisational 
structure of the NGO favours decision makers with corporate, not environmental backgrounds and 
resulted in a corporate facing NGO.  
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The organisation of the Green River Project can also be seen to favour the corporate elite. The project 
fulfilled the aims of the elites in Mato Grosso, to show through ecological modernisation that the World 
Cup in Mato Grosso could be environmentally sustainable.  In addition, they were able to develop the 
infrastructure of the carbon credit issuing body to enhance the potential for ecological modernisation 
practices in the future.  
In short, the Green Action Institute was legitimately created by actors at the regional level to gain new 
and legitimate ways to control the population at the local scale. This has occurred within a historical 
context of social relations and projects which serve the interest of the elite. 
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-Chapter VII- 
The local impacts of the Green River 
Project 
 
 
The previous chapters illustrated the agency of elite actors. In contrast, this chapter charts the Green 
River Project through the experiences of the local population. First a brief history of the studied villages 
is given to understand the socio-economic characteristics of the region. Similarly to the previous 
chapter, it illustrates that political alliances are built on clientialism. This section also describes how the 
villages that are part of the Green River Project were formed. In more recent years, these villages, 
Barranco Alto I and II and Barra do Arica were the subject of an anti-poverty project designed to 
enhance agricultural processing. This project was never completed and illustrates how the social benefit 
project did not deliver on its claims. 
These sections lay the context for the following sections which focus on the Green River Project 
specifically. The Green River Project was initially designed to prevent erosion of the river banks. The 
placement of this project in the villages of Barranco Alto I and II can be questioned by accounts from the 
villages who suggest erosion is not an issue in their villages. Erosion is a bigger issue in the village of 
Pesquiero Florida which has different socio-economic characteristics, the placement of the project in 
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these villages can perhaps be seen to favour the elite who use this stretch of river recreationally. It is the 
elites who have motorised boats and have built on the river bank who were responsible for the erosion.  
The following section argues the Green River Project was imposed on the local population through a 
TAC. This was a legally binding behavioural order which eradicated instances of passive resistance from 
the villages. The way in which the TAC was enforced also changed between the villages of Barranco Alto 
I and II and Pesquiero Florida. It was found that alliances between the state prosecutors and land 
owners allowed for compromises to be made in Pesquiero Florida, whilst there were no opportunities 
for this in the peasant villages.  
The final section explores the Payment for Ecosystem Services claim of the project organisers. Again 
wealth redistribution upwards can be seen as the benefits for the villages were incomplete or not 
functioning. This even occurred after an increase in investment from the state tax payer. The Green 
River Project can then be seen as a project which speaks to the global north making unsubstantiated 
claims in order for the World Cup to be seen as environmentally sustainable with social benefits for the 
local, impoverished population (Fig 19). 
 
Figure 19: A young girl in traditional dress planting trees as part of the Green River Project, Source: FIFA, 2011. 
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7.1: The socio-economic characteristics of the villages affected by the Green River 
Project 
 
In the official documents of the Green River Project the people living in the villages affected by the 
project are all described as a ‘traditional riverine population’.  This replicates how local elites and 
scholars alike have described the population (Silva, 2010, de Mello Amorozo, 2002, dos Santos Guarim, 
2002, Lachowisk et al., 2014, Valentini et al., 2011) who have variously characterised them as having 
their own dialect (Dettoni, 2003), their own regional dances (Almeida, 2004 and Jesus, 2006) and 
engaged in subsistence livelihoods (Ferreira, 2010 and Silva, 2002). As scholars such as Sachs (1997) and 
Ferguson (1994) argue, labelling the communities this way has influenced the way in which elite 
decision-makers rationalise their choices. The following statement by a SEMA ecologist exemplifies this 
attitude:  
‘These people, they are different from us, you know? They do not want new cars or nice 
clothes. Their life is slow and backwards, very simples. It is sad because now the young do 
not want this life. The younger people do not see the attraction in farm work, the girls want 
to live in the city- they do not want husbands who are fishermen- this is not chique 
(fashionable)’ (Interview S8). 
In fact, the three villages affected by the Green River Project, Barranco Alto I and II and Pesqueiro 
Florida, have very different histories and socio-economic characteristics. The majority of the population 
in Barranco Alto I and II are subsistence farmers and fishermen. They are descendants of migrant 
workers who moved to the area in the 19th century to work on the sugar plantations which thrived 
between the late 1880 and the 1950s (Novaczyk, 2005, Marchetti et al., 2013, Siqueira, 2002, Oliveira, 
2010b). The current social relations in the area are born a history of clientalism which dominated the 
sugar plantations during this time (appendix 3). When the plantations closed, the workers stayed in the 
area and became subsistence farmers and fishermen in the villages now known as Barranco Alto I and II 
and Barra do Arica. Senor João, an 83 year old man living in Barra do Aricá recalls his experience of 
working on the plantations: 
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‘I was there when the Usina (sugar mill) closed in 1957. My parents worked there and their 
parents before that, the Usina Itaici was famous because of the history, but when I was 
there it was not good. Those days were different, you know? It was hard work- the earnings 
were not enough to buy what we needed. They gave us money, I suppose money, but we 
could only use it there [at the Usina Itaci]. I think it was good that it went. Now I think my 
grandchildren can do many different things’ (interview PP15).   
Pesqueiro Florida is the third village affected by the project and is primarily a tourist village. It was 
created in the 1980s when a farmer sold his land. He portioned 18 plots running adjacent to the river 
which were bought by wealthy people for recreational purposes. These plots have been bought and sold 
by various people during this time. In 2015 there was a marina which housed 40 motor boats owned by 
residents of Cuiabá . There were also two hotels, including the Pousada Itaicy were I stayed and about 
10 holiday homes owned by residents in Cuiabá  and other cities. In addition to the owners, today, the 
village is also inhabited by caretakers and servants who look after these holiday houses. The official 
documentation of the Green River Project names this village as Barra do Arica. Barra do Arica, in fact lies 
on the River Barra do Arica de Mim and is on the opposing side of the MT-040 highway to Pesqueiro 
Florida. Barra do Arica is comprised of descendants of sugar workers and has similar socio-economic 
characteristics to that of Barranco Alto. Labelling Pequeiro Florida as Barra do Arica allowed the project 
organisers to claim social benefit for a larger population.  
 
7.2: Small scale agricultural processing projects in Barranco Alto  
 
Because of the very different characteristics of Barranco Alto I and II on the one hand, and Pesqueiro 
Florida on the other, the Green River Project was experienced in very different ways. In the case of 
Barranco Alto I and II and according to accounts of the villagers, the Green River Project arrived out of 
the blue when they were already engaged in another state project, designed to encourage economic 
diversification through sugar based products.  
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This project formed part of the Lula governments attempt to redistribute wealth and was part of the 
wider ‘zero fome’ (zero hunger) programme, a Federal programme to eradicate hunger in rural Brazil. 
Baixada Cuiabá na was identified as the location of a pilot project due to the 2000 census illustrating 
they had high levels of rural deprivation (Jesus, 2006). These projects were run by the Profeitura 
(mayor’s office) in Santo Antonio do Leverger, funded by the Mato Grosso state department trabalho, 
emprego, cidadania e assistencia social (labor, employment , citizenship and social assistance), and 
managed by Blairo Maggi’s wife. The project, projeto agregação de valor a produção através da agro 
industrialização (added value production through processing agricultural project). It aimed to improve 
the socio-economic conditions of families in Baixada Cuiabána by increasing the output value of 
activities already undertaken in rural villages (Fig 20) (Schimanoski, 2007). 
 
The project in Barranco Alto I and II was to develop sugar processing and secondary products. The 
project organisers supplied a building to house a presser and an adjoining facility for the processing of 
sugar cane were installed in 2007. According to Alves (2012) over R$700,000 (£164,305) of public funds 
was used to construct these buildings. Products that could be made in the facility and sold from this 
venture included: alcohol, cachaça (an alcoholic spirit), sugar, rapadura (a dessert product), melado, 
garaba and bagaça de cana- two types of sweet, watery drink. Additionally the population had to 
contribute to the cost of the machinery, the President of Barranco Alto II informed me this figure was 
R$108,000 (£25,349) which would be paid by the community in instalments after they began to earn an 
income.  
 
This project was effectively stopped by the Green River Project. Although this project was underway 
when SEMA started the survey of the river banks, there appears to be no coordination between 
different state agencies. As part of the sugar project, villagers were encouraged to plant sugarcane on 
the river bank, the most fertile land. This project was well underway when villagers learnt about the 
Green River Project. Infrastructure was built and some village participants had begun to produce 
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products from this venture. However, once these villages were identified as part of the Green River 
Project, they were forced to abandon the sugar project as the river bank became an Area of Permanent 
Preservation (APP). Some informants have suggested the community could move the plantations to 
behind their houses and continue to grow cane. However, this land is swamp for eight months of the 
year and would require drainage at further expense to the community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: The factory in Barranco Alto which was made as the industrialisation programme in Cuiabána Baixada. The engine in 
the top right was purchased by the community, the presser in the bottom left crushes the sugar cane, author photo 20/9 
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From the perspective of the villagers, the Green River Project was an illogical imposition which disrupted 
a valuable income generating project. The following quote from the President of Barranco Alto II 
exemplifies this view:  
 
 ‘We had the sugar industry, we had to pay R$108,000 (£25,349) for the engine. Empear 
paid for the building, that was good, but the community had to raise the funds for the 
engine. As you can imagine this took a lot of time. But we wanted this to work. Many of our 
young people are leaving. The primary school shut here because there are not enough 
children, so we needed this industry to make people stay. And now they say we can’t plant 
sugar cane. All that time wasted, and we will not get our money back. It is a waste. We now 
have the tree planting, but I cannot see the benefits for us. Two projects and what? 
Nothing’ (interview CS5). 
7.3: Causes of Erosion on the River Cuiabá 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the Green River Project was first developed as a SEMA conservation 
project to prevent erosion and silting up of the Pantanal. It was subsequently used as a carbon offsetting 
project by the Green Action Institute. The Green Action Institute suggested the Green River Project 
would restore and preserve the riparian areas of the major rivers and would ‘bring benefits not only to 
the local ecosystem, but also the state’s population’ (Institute, 2012). As we saw in the previous chapter, 
the villages seemed to be chosen for political reasons. Nonetheless, effectively in the implementation of 
the project, the villagers were effectively treated as if they were the cause of the erosion and were 
required to change their practices accordingly. In Barranco Alto I and II everyone who was interviewed 
disagreed that they had caused the erosion. As the President of the village assembly in Barranco Alto II 
stated: 
‘we have lived with erosion for over 100 years, it is not more of a problem now than it was 
100 years ago. We know not to build on the river bank. We plant on the river bank and 
graize our animals. Erosion in Barranco Alto is not a problem, we know how to deal with it’ 
(Interview S3). 
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This view from the villagers in Barranco Alto I and II is supported by a scientific paper produced by 
academics from Mato Grosso’s state University (de Lucena Madruga et al., unpublished). They 
suggested that although erosion of the river bank is a natural process, it has been accelerated by 
tourism, motorised boat use, and the construction of holiday homes.  
These all seem to have been accelerated since the MT-040 highway linking Cuiabá to Barão de Melgaço 
was asphalted in 2002. This road runs parallel to the River Cuiabá  all the way from Cuiabá , past Santo 
Antonio de Leverger, Barranco Alto I and II before reaching and  the main tourist centres of Pesqueiro 
Florida to Barão de Melgaço. As a result the road is heavily used, especially by day tourists from Cuiabá, 
who can now travel by car. 
 These tourists commonly use the studied stretch of river for recreational fishing purposes. The increase 
of wealth in the state has also increased the use of motor boats. As noted earlier, the marina in 
Pesqueiro Florida has berths 40 private boats and also offers boats for day rental. The expansion of the 
hotel industry, particularly for fishing tourists has also increased motorised boat activity. Another factor 
is the increased construction of holiday homes built along the river bank, in Pesqueiro Florida and 
Barranco Alto. They are typically owned by residents of Cuiabá, who usually own their a speed boat (Fig 
21) (de Lucena Madruga et al., unpublished).  
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Figure 21: River erosion causing danger to buildings on the river edge, author photo 6/5/14 
According to  de Lucena Madruga et al. (unpublished) the continual wave action on the banks produced 
by the motorised boats causes bank erosion. This causes more damage on deforested river banks as 
there are no trees to absorb the waves. The deforested banks are weakened and ultimately collapse, 
sending sediment further downstream. This is accepted by some boat owners. For example, Robson, the 
hotel owner in Pesqueiro Florida commented:  
‘Yes, the boats increase the erosion, but it is only a small part of the problem. It is not the 
only thing that erodes the river bank. But what am I supposed to do? The fish in this part of 
the river are small, we are too close to the city (Santo Antonio), if I want my clients to be 
happy and return here they want to catch big fish. The bigger fish are further down the 
river, I have no choice but to use speed boats’ (Interview C5). 
The third factor identified by de Lucena Madruga et al., was the construction of holiday homes. 
The homes I observed in Barranco Alto I and II were all over 50 metres from the river bank, 
corroborating the President’s assertion that people in the these two villages know how to avoid 
causing erosion. In contrast, the holiday homes I observed in Pesqueiro Florida, and other tourist 
areas, were typically built very close (2 or 3 metres) to the river bank. This includes the two hotels 
whose restaurants overlooked the river. Further, according to de Lucena Madruga et al., these 
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constructions cause stress on the river bank which can lead to collapse. They observed how some 
residents in Pesqueiro Florida had made efforts to protect against river bank erosion by using 
concrete, wood, straw and tyres (de Lucena Madruga et al., unpublished).  
 The increased tourism and the associated increase in the use of motorised boats were not addressed as 
causes of erosion by the Green River Project. As part of their conservation project SEMA did address the 
direct erosion caused by building close to the bank in Pesqueiro Florida (Interview S8)—following a 
report by Taveres Slamao et al (2012) which emphasised that erosion was most acute on this section of 
the river. They built and paid for a large gabion to secure the bank- effectively subsidising the property 
owners for their disregard for ecological processes and the damage caused (Fig 22). Additionally, SEMA 
also paid for the relocation of a road in Pesqueiro Florida which was in danger of collapse, thereby 
ensuring access for the MPVs and lorries that supply the two hotels.  As the bottom photos in figure 30 
show, the gabion was already collapsing in 2015. 
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Figure 22: From top to bottom: Diagram from Ximenes de Tavares Salmao et al. (2011) showing erosion in Pesquisa Florida at 
the confluence of the River Arica and River Cuiabá. Photo of Gabion in eroded area in 2014. Two bottom photos show the 
collapsed Gabion in 2015. 
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From these accounts it is possible to determine that the residents in Barranco Alto I and II did not feel 
their river banks needed protection. Those in Pesqueiro Florida had a very real need for the erosion 
prevention mechanism and also received gabion and road relocation, much more capital intensive 
programmes than the tree planting.  
7.4: Questioning the need for trees 
 
As the previous section showed, the villagers in Barranco Alto I and II felt they did not contribute to the 
erosion of the river. They also could not see the benefit of planting trees for addressing the problem of 
erosion. For the households in these villages, the Green River Project meant abandoning planting 
sugarcane in the fertile strip between their houses and the river, and complying with the requirement 
that they plant trees instead. These trees were to be planted no more than 2m apart, within the 
stipulated 50m strip along the river bank. As the following quote from the president of Barranco Alto II 
shows, most people thought the tree planting was for political and economic reasons, rather than 
environmental.  
They [Green Action Institute and SEMA] came to the village one day and we had a meeting. 
They told us what they were going to do. They were going to plant trees to stop erosion of 
the river bank and to provide carbon offsetting for FIFA. Well, we do not have a problem 
with river bank erosion here. But, they just plant trees for FIFA, not for us or for the river. 
They come here just for one day. One day, they come here and tell us what to do. They do 
not know what is best, we have lived here for 100 years. We know what to do, for one day 
they think they know better than us?’ (interview CS5) 
In addition to the thoughts of the population of Barranco Alto II, de Lucena Madruga et al’s publication 
suggests planting trees may not be the most effective way of controlling erosion. They experimented 
with the suitability of using Vetiver Grass Technolog and planted grass on a bank in Barranco Alto II in 
2011 and continuing observations until 2013. This technology has been successful in controlling erosion 
in African and Asian contexts. Their conclusions suggest that this is a low cost strategy and is more 
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effective at stabilising the river bank than planting trees. In our interview the lead author of this paper 
Elder de Lucena Madruga discussed why the grass technology was not chosen by the Green Action 
Institute or SEMA:  
‘We conducted an experiment on the river Cuiabá using a new grass technology. This grass 
does not germinate so does not spread and when it is inundated with water, it still lives. So 
for us, it was a success when we planted it near Barranco Alto. We think this approach is 
good because it is cheap and it works, if you go to the place where we did the 
experiment[…] you will see the grass […] above and below the grass it has clearly eroded, 
when you see where our grass is, it has not eroded. 
This is a good option, but the question to ask is what actually do the people want? It is true 
that it is a natural process for the river to move, but now people want the river to stay 
where it is. If this is all people want I think the grass is a suitable option. A gabion [stone 
embankment] is another option, they have this downstream, but this is expensive and you 
could never have gabion going all along the river.  
In our interview he went on to state they carried out their work at the same time as the Green 
Action Institute. In fact, the Green Action Institute even allowed them to grow the grass at the 
nursery. He was therefore very familiar with the Green River Project and argued strongly that 
planting trees would not prevent erosion of the river because even when there was trees, the 
river changed course all the time. He also went on to add that local people had told him that trees 
close to the river bank contribute to this process.   
‘When a tree grows the branches grow up and then fall into the water, growing outwards 
into the river. Well this slows the velocity of the river a little. The sediment then gets caught 
on these branches and seeds grow within the branches. The bank grows into the river- as 
the new trees grow further into the river channel. Well, then, the river is thinner and has 
more energy and goes and erodes on the other side of the bank or further downstream, so 
not preserving the river bank at all. For this reason, I don’t think trees will help preserve the 
bank. 
If you ask my personal opinion, and this is just mine- the objective of Green Action Institute, 
I think, is to do this project to collect money and keep for themselves. I do not know a lot 
about them, but in my opinion, this is what they do. For some reason they want to plant 
trees. OK, there is law- you can’t cut trees within 100m of the river- so if you do, you need 
to replant. I understand this, it keeps the birds here, have lots of animals, fine, this is good. 
But to prevent erosion on the river bank, I don’t think so’ (Interview CS6) 
This expert informant had clearly spoken to the villagers and had a deep understanding of river ecology, 
in contrast to the engineers at Green Action Institute.  
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7.5: Coercing participation through the TAC 
 
Due to the sugarcane project being taken from them, and their thoughts that they were not to blame for 
the erosion, it is unsurprising that the residents were initially reluctant to participate in the project.  
As was established in the previous chapter, the Green Action Institute claimed that participation of the 
local community was important to them interview (CS4, full quote page 103). They claim they went to 
each individual property and performed a socio-economic evaluation in the hope they could convince 
people to participate disseminating information through social media. In fact, as shown in chapter 6, this 
claim was contradicted by SEMA: 
‘We had meetings with the communities, there were 5 in total. But these meetings were 
not to ask the community what they wanted, we had already decided on the project before 
we entered the village. We only had the meetings to tell them what was going to happen 
and what they had to do’ (Interview S8) 
Then in an interview in 2010, the director of the Green Action Institute, Paul Borges, attributed the 
initial poor participation by residents to their lack of education, moreover he stated ‘their levels of 
environmental consciousness is very low’  (Galvão and El-Jaick, 2010). In the same interview he says the 
Green Action Institute do not want to enforce the environmental law and use fines as this ‘would not 
conserve the environment and would do nothing to help sustainability’. Nonetheless, this is exactly what 
they proceeded to do. In order to overcome villager’s passive resistance the Green Action Institute took 
the socio-environmental assessments to the Public Prosecutors in 2010 and asked them to issue a Terms 
of Adjusted Conducted (TAC) to ensure compliance. 
Subsequently, in my interview, the Green Action Institute claimed this benefitted many people in 
Barranco Alto I and II as most did not have documentation of their land ownership. Moreover, he 
claimed at this time some villagers were under pressure from residents in Cuiabá  who wanted to buy 
land.  
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The TAC is a document compiling the information collected during the socio-economic survey of the 
land and has guidelines for future actions. Copies of the TAC were stored in the offices of the Green 
Action Institute, SEMA and the public prosecutor, these were very detailed. The TAC document I viewed 
in the Green Action Institute office contained detailed drawings, photos, annotations and comments of 
roughly 40 pages. In contrast, residents were given a more concise summary.  
Most villagers had heard about the TAC at the village assembly and had to travel to Cuiabá to sign it. 
Senhor Rodrigo recalled the hardship of going to the building. At the time he did not have access to a 
boat and had to pay a neighbour to take him 35km by river to Santo Antonio do Leverger, he then had to 
get a bus to Cuiabá where he changed to another bus to get to SEMA’s office. Inside he was made to 
wait for a technician to become available who then read the TAC to him. He is functionally illiterate and 
he remembered not being given time to think about the TAC or discuss it, he was just told to sign it and 
leave. He then had the repeated journey home where he had to wait for another neighbour to pick him 
up in Santo Antonio do Leverger, he recalled this as taking all day (PP 7). 
The two TACs I saw were in the communities were both very similar. One was from Pesqueiro Florida, 
the other from Barranco Alto I. The TAC issued to Jacinto Pinto Tapajos in Barranco Alto I, exemplifies 
the document. As he told me, he had lived in Barranco Alto is whole life and like most people he found 
out about the TAC at the village assembly meetings (interview PP3).  
 Senhor Tapajos’s TAC was signed in December 2011 by SEMA and himself. Significantly, the TAC opens 
by stated that Mr Tapajos was contributing to river bank erosion. It then gave clear, detailed instructions 
of what his necessary actions were to comply with the law: 
- Isolate 27 metres of APP (up to the road) along the 33m length of land running parallel to the 
river. This is to prevent access of people, domestic animals and cars. A fence is to constructed by 
only using the specified materials, this is to allow the free movement of wild animals.  
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- Access to river is allowed by wooden walkway only, a maximum of 2 metres in diameter. This 
should also be suspended above the river bank to prevent stepping directly onto the slope. 
- Plant seedlings of native species with maximum spacing of 2x2m, more dense on the slope of 
the river bank. For three years maintain and monitor the seedlings, including pest control, 
irrigation, fertilization and replanting. 
- Not clean the understory of the trees and do not plant vegetables and exotic species such as 
mango, banana and lemon.   
- Currently he does not have a floating fishing platform, if he wants to install one at a later date 
he must register with SEMA before installation. 
- His house is 108m2 and built 51m from the embankment with the river, he cannot increase the 
size of his house.  
- Use the rubbish bins provided for waste 
- Adopt preventative measures to stop fires during the drought period if necessary. 
 
In March 2013 SEMA returned to the village to verify whether residents had complied with the TAC. The 
monitoring report for Senhor Tapajos stated that although he had planted trees the density was not 
adequate; he had created a walkway as the TAC demanded, however, it was not a wooden structure, 
but a cleaned area of vegetation; he had also put wooden stakes into the soil but did not have the wire 
in place to form a fence. It also noted cattle on the boundary of the APP but conceded this was allowed 
because of the lack of wire.  The TAC went on to conclude senhor Tapahos had 30 days to comply with 
the TAC or face a fine. It was not stipulated how much this fine would be. In our 2014 interview, senhor 
Tapajos confirmed that SEMA had never returned to verify if he had completed the required actions. 
The experience of senhor Tapajos is typical of Barranco Alto I and II where residents had to take similar 
actions to comply with the TAC. 
170 
 
While most residents were unhappy at planting their most fertile land with threes, they were also 
frustrated about other terms of the TAC which they felt was unreasonable. Perhaps the requirement 
they were most upset about was the fact that the TAC prohibits ‘cleaning’ under the trees in the APP. 
‘Cleaning’ is the clearance of shrubs and cutting the grass between the trees. The President of Barranco 
Alto I described why they felt this was unreasonable:  
They came and said we couldn’t cut under the trees that we have to leave it to be natural. 
But I have two young children and the front of my house is in front of the APP. It is not safe 
for them, the long grass is where snakes are. How can I let my children play here with 
snakes? If they are bitten who will pay for a doctor? I bet it will not be them (the Green 
Action Institute) (interview CS8). 
Dona Matilia spoke of the impact of not ‘cleaning’ on her property. She told me that wild animals were 
able to hide in the dense vegetation and take her livestock. After this, fearing for own safety, she 
resumed cutting under the trees (interview PP24). The danger of dense vegetation (Fig 23) within the 
village gathered a mixed response.  
  
Figure 23. Reforestation left naturally to the left and a cleaned area to the right, author photo 21/7/14 
 
While many residents did not comply with the TAC, in some instances it was due to the Green Action 
Institute failing to supply material. An example of this is the fence at Dona Nancy’s property (Fig 24): 
‘The TAC we have says we need a fence with wooden posts and wire. The Green Action 
Institute are supposed to supply us with the wood and wire, they are also to give us wood 
to make the walkway to the river…The fence is so cows cannot go in the APP but wild 
animals can. This is fine, so far I have wooden stakes for the fence and no wire’ (interview 
PP6).  
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This corresponds with the monitoring report in Mr Japatos’s property, which suggests cows were found 
on the APP boundary because the fencing did not have wire. 
 
Figure 24: Example of a typical boundary in Barranco Alto I, author photo 21/7/14 
In contrast to the residents of Barranco Alto I and II, the residents of Pesqueiro Florida experienced the 
TAC as a nuisance. For these much wealthier land owners, it did not impinge on their lives or livelihoods 
in a significant way. In some cases, these wealthy property owners were able to mobilise personal 
connections to negotiate better terms. This is exemplified by the way Robson responded to the TAC:  
‘Other residents along the river here were hostile towards them. But that’s not how I do 
things. I invited them in, told them [SEMA representatives] to sit down at my table- gave 
them drinks and said ‘what is it you want me to do?’ There were some things that were 
impossible, I had to say no. But plant some trees and pay a little fine. Sure, we can discuss 
this. But I was lucky, I had to pay a fine just for the bathrooms, not the restaurant. So it was 
fine. I think also, I know the manager of Dr Ana so perhaps this helped me a little too. But 
we paid the fine, and planted those trees. Actually, they wanted us to remove the Bamboo 
and Lemon trees here and plant native trees instead. I told them this is ridiculous, the 
Bamboo is so big and strong, it is basically holding the whole bank together. But we agreed 
that I could leave the Bamboo and Lemon trees and plant some native trees elsewhere…I 
remember the Public Prosecutor coming here. For me, it was lucky we had Dr Ana, if we 
had Domingo things would be different. We do not get along. But Dr Ana came, with two 
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more people, they were from the Green Action Institute or SEMA, I do not know. But it was 
fine’ (interview C2). 
Robson had to pay a fine of R$6,000 (£1,408) which was paid over three months, after this, he heard 
nothing more from the Green Action Institute. Other residents in Pesqueiro Florida had different 
dealings with the TAC. The owner of the other hotel in Pesqueiro Florida refused to allow the SEMA 
representatives on his property which resulted in him being fined significantly more. Additionally, some 
residents were absent when the TAC was issued. The owner of one holiday home in Pesqueiro Florida, 
lives in Sao Paulo. As he recounted when I interviewed him, he only visits his property in Pesqueiro 
Florida once every two months. He was away when the TAC was issued and did not have the 
opportunity to negotiate the terms. He also alluded to the fact that as he was from Sao Paulo he did not 
have the personal connections to do so. Although he felt aggrieved at having to pay the fine, 
nonetheless, the amount was insignificant in relation to his income.  
7.6: Payment for ecosystem services 
 
For the residents of Barranco Alto I and II participation in the Green River Project and compliance with 
the TAC supposedly meant they would receive financial benefit through the Payment for Ecosystem 
Services system. In 2011 both FIFA (2011) and Secopa (AGECOPA, 2011) separately reported that 
residents of the two communities were receiving these payments. According to Secopa, this amount was 
worth R$710,000 (£166,652) (Ascom, 2011, de Cassia, 2011). In 2011, FIFA and Secopa both reported 
the payment of the credits to the communities could have been either transferred in yearly instalments 
to the community as a whole, or to individual producers of carbon credits. The reports then go on to 
discuss how Barranco Alto chose to use the payment for community benefit and purchased two wells 
and two water tanks (FIFA, 2011a, Agecopa, 2011). All the respondents I interviewed in Barranco Alto I 
and II contest this official version of what happened around the ecosystem services payment. 
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As noted in chapter six, these reports seem to refer to the symbolic cheque presented to the 
communities at the carbon offsetting ceremony. This symbolic gesture was repeated in 2012 when the 
communities were presented with another cheque, this time worth R$86,800 (£20,373). According to 
the President of Barranco Alto I, the residents chose to receive monetary payments, which they have 
not received. He further describes his experience: 
 ‘We have meetings once a month, or whenever it is needed. Usually there is about 50 
people in our group, but only 15 regularly attend the meetings. Everyone knows their 
President talks a lot and no one wants to listen!...The Green Action Institute came here to a 
meeting once, they told us we would be receiving money for planting the trees. They said 
we could do with it what we wanted. To this day I have not received any money. We had a 
meeting in Santa Clara (a nearby village) yesterday (August 10th 2014), they said the money 
had run out. I know they have more money, I have received two [symbolic] cheques in 
ceremonies, but I have received no money in my pocket. I know where the money is, I know 
they have it’ (interview CS8). 
In some accounts of village negotiations, some villagers mention that at an early meeting about 
ecosystem payments they asked for a health centre and a computer room and they were disappointed 
that nothing had happened about this. However, nobody I interviewed mentioned asking for a well. This 
decision seems to have been taken by the Green Action Institute without any consultation with the 
villagers, and in the case of Barranco Alto II, which already had a well, without any discussion or 
verification of their needs.  
The first well was installed in Barranco Alto I on the 22nd May 2014 (Fig 25). But no tank ever arrived and 
the well initially had problems which the village had to pay to rectify. The main problem seems to have 
been with the original pump. The President of Barranco Alto I described how the pump did not work: 
The pump was installed by the Green Action Institute, but we have to pay for the electricity, 
this is about R$15 (£3.52) per month per household, and I collect this. This is not so much 
money. Any money left then goes into savings for servicing the pump. We had some trouble 
with the pump when it was first installed. It rarely worked and it was not powerful enough 
to pump to every house. The Green Action Institute, and the company which installed the 
pump would not pay for a new one, so we had to pay for one. This cost R$4,000 (£938) and 
works very well. I just worry if it breaks, no one knows how to fix it and we will have to take 
everything to Cuiabá to get it fixed’ (Interview CS8). 
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The manager of the Green Action Institute described how the well had a two year warranty but ‘it could 
well be the pump is not included. I do not know’ (interview CS4). During the period that there were 
problems with the pump, some households had to draw water from the river to their homes using a 
hose (Fig 26). One resident described this as an essential back-up: 
‘I use this water for when the pump is not working…I do not have any choice, when 
the well is not working I need water, it is polluted and nasty but we need to clean. 
They (the Green Action Institute) said we should buy mineral water to drink and not 
drink the water from the well, but what choice do I have? I am poor, I cannot afford 
to buy mineral water’ (interview PP5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Commemorative plaque on the well in Barranco Alto I, author photo 21/7/14  
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Although the water well in Barranco Alto I was beset with problems at the beginning, by the end of 
fieldwork in September 2015 the well was working consistently and was providing all houses in Barranco 
Alto I with water. By this time, some residents had recognised the benefits this had brought. A 
professional fisherman in Barranco Alto I was among a 3 people who described that the well had 
brought some benefits: ‘before the well there was lots of health problems. The quality of the river water 
is very bad and it was making us sick. Now the well is here things are better’ (Interview PP16).  
In Barranco Alto II however, the decision to provide a well was completely unnecessary as the village 
already had a well which was installed in 2001 by the mayor and was fully functioning. Despite the 
Figure 26: Hose from river to a house which is used when the well does not work, author photo 21/7/14 
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existence of this well, the Green Action Institute installed the well at the same time as the well in 
Barranco Alto I. The President of Barranco Alto II described his experience with the Green Action 
Institute in the following way: 
‘I have met the Green Action Institute to discuss our payment, a well was never mentioned 
to me. They brought the well here one day and that was it, but this well does not work and 
never has done. They say there are issues with the water quality and it was built too near to 
the river. We do not need a well, we already have one (Fig 27), it was built in 2001 and 
works fine’ (interview CS5). 
The two wells that were installed by the Green Action Institute, cost R$30,000 (£7,041) a fraction of the 
R$710,000 (£166,652) promised for the Payment for Ecosystem Services associated with the Secopa 
project. This is notwithstanding the money due for the offsets from previous companies. 
 
 
The villagers I spoke to seemed to be resigned to this impunity: ‘in Brazil this happens all the time, the 
political men come here promising things but leave with more money. It is not fair but there is nothing 
Figure 27: Plaque next to the water well in Barranco Alto II. It was installed in 2001 by the President of the 
community, not by Green Action Institute, author photo 21/7/14 
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we can do’ (HP 7). A resident in Barranco Alto I also reflected on the projects ‘for the young people 
there is nothing here. The best they can do is get an education and get out of here. We have been 
promised many things many times, better schools, better roads, but nothing comes. No one cares for us 
here, we are on our own’ (PP 5). 
7.7: Conclusion 
 
This chapter explored the Green River Project from the perspective of the local community. 
The first section explored the history of the studied villages, from their formation to contemporary 
poverty alleviation projects. This set the context for the rest of the chapter which sought to highlight 
how the Green River Project fit into the social relations of the area. This was demonstrated with the 
location where the project began.  Two academic studies which inform this piece suggest that erosion is 
concentrated on particular areas. This was confirmed through interviews which suggested that Barranco 
Alto I and II does not have a specific issue with river bank erosion, it was in fact Pesquiero Florida which 
suffered from extreme bank erosion. Nevertheless, the residents of Barranco Alto I and II were 
pressurised into accepting legal responsibility for erosion on their land. The placement of the project in 
Barranco Alto I and II therefore had political, not ecological influence. 
The third section explored the claims of public consultation by the Green Action Institute more 
thoroughly. Participation did not form any part of SEMA’s initial plans for the project and it was the 
Green Action Institute which made these claims. After passive resistance where the community did not 
make the required changes, the TAC was created as a coercive method to ensure participation. The 
communities were therefore not part of the planning process.   
The application of the TAC was then discussed using two examples, one from Barranco Ato I and the 
other from Pesqueiro Florida. The TAC of the peasant from Barranco Alto I was administered very 
differently to the TAC by the hotel owner in Pesquiero Florida. Personal connections allowed for 
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negotiation in Pesquiero Florida which resulted in trees not being planted on the river bank. The result 
of this project for the wealthy in Pesqueiro Florida was an inconvenience. However, for those in 
Barranco Alto I and II the project removed their livelihood and they lost considerable financial 
investment.  
Finally the Payment for Ecosystem Services associated with the project was suggested to be much less 
than what was pledged in 2012. The two wells which were supplied to the community were not part of a 
negotiation process and are now not under warranty. One of the wells was dug too close to the river 
bank and was not finished, moreover, this well was not needed as Barranco Alto II already had a well. 
The economic development claims made by project organisers then also have very little impact on the 
villages. 
Overall, this chapter focused on the carbon offsetting project from the community perspective.  
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-Discussion – 
The 2014 FIFA World Cup as a vehicle to 
enhance and entrench the elite agenda 
 
A critical management approach which questions ‘established social orders, dominating practices, 
ideologies, discourses, and institutions’ (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000:x) has allowed me to investigate the 
environmental and social claims surrounding the 2014 World Cup in Mato Grosso. As I have shown in 
Chapters 4-7 established orders and dominating practices are evident in the way the regional elites were 
able to subvert the mechanisms of environmental governance. They achieved this though clientalism, 
impunity, profiteering and institutional corruption to ensure a re-distribution of wealth upwards. As 
Chapters 6 and 7 highlighted, the Pantanal Stadium was offset through a project which did not plant the 
required trees, was organised and verified by the same decision makers and did not deliver on social 
benefits for the affected communities.  
 
As I have argued, these events in Mato Grosso occurred within a neoliberal sporting event which gave 
emphasis to intense competition, consumerist lifestyle and freedom of the markets (Coakley, 2011). 
Some characteristics of the neoliberal sporting event were observed in Brazil and Mato Grosso. In 
Chapter 4, the monopoly that corporations who sponsor FIFA had in regard to access to the markets was 
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exposed. VISA were able to enter new markets when match tickets were only available to buy with a 
VISA card, and Budweiser gained access by the Brazilian state’s changing laws regarding the sale of 
alcohol in the stadiums. In Chapter 5 exposed how contracts were won through cronyism and 
institutional corruption, therefore preventing competition. These instances worked in the favour of 
elites who were able to ensure, through different mechanisms, that they maximised their profits. The 
transnational corporations were able to prevent competition through sponsoring FIFA, whereas the 
regional elites in Mato Grosso used personal connections.  
  
This chapter explores the findings from the data chapters in relation to the concepts and theoretical 
framework as discussed in Chapter two. First, my results are discussed in relation to the literature, 
which discusses social benefit and environmental claims at sport mega-events. The second section then 
focuses on the critical arguments of the carbon offsetting literature and explores the case of the Green 
River Project. The third section discusses the organisation of the Green Action Institute in light of the 
NGO literature, which suggests not all NGO are progressive. Special acknowledgement is given to the 
time in which the Green Action Institute was created, when NGOs were given more decision making 
capabilities in Brazilian governance. The Fourth section then explores the theoretical implications of 
these findings. I discuss the role the Green Action Institute had in securing hegemonic relations and the 
furthering hegemonic project in Mato Grosso which was instigated by a global process, implemented at 
the regional scale.   
 
8.1: Sports mega-events and social benefit claims 
 
Ricardo Texieria, the then head of the Brazilian Football Association, was reported to have declared 
‘over the next few years we will have a consistent influx of investments. The 2014 World Cup will enable 
Brazil to have a modern infrastructure…In social terms will be very beneficial…Our objective is to make 
Brazil become more visible in global arenas…The World Cup goes far beyond a mere sporting event. It’s 
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going to be an interesting tool to promote social transformation’ (CNN, 2007). This declaration, on the 
day FIFA announced Brazil was host to the 2014 tournament, did not match the realities on the ground, 
as I have shown throughout the previous data chapters.  
 
The World Cup provided an opportunity for Brazilian elites to ‘re-imagineer’ Brazil into a modern and 
open country through an extensive infrastructure development programme. Corneilsson (2010), 
Panagiotopoulou (2012) and Sugden and Tomlinson (2002) all suggest that ‘re-imagineering’ through 
sports mega-events is a particularly useful tool for developing countries, as they are able to showcase 
the type of country and society they want to create. Throughout the World Cup in Brazil this was evident 
on all scales.  
 
The 2008 financial crisis left the Brazilian economy relatively unscathed (Cull and Peria, 2013). This 
provided impetus for the Brazilian government to ‘re-imagineer’ Brazil as a prosperous country, ready 
for investment and trade. This process also had to reflect the contemporary global political economy, as 
Brazil wanted to be perceived as an environmentally concerned nation with a cohesive social fabric. The 
choice of mascot, the opening ceremony and graphics in the official documentation all built an image of 
cohesion between the economy, the environment and the Brazilian people. This ‘re-imagineering’ effort 
failed when over a million people took to the streets in June and July 2013 to challenge the ruling classes. 
 
As Chapter 4 showed, the mobilisations directly challenged the vision of the elites and in an attempt to 
squash these protests, the Brazilian government deployed the military police. Videos and photos 
displaying the military police’s violent methods were spread through social media, and eventually 
mainstream media, when journalists were injured whilst covering the protests. This conflated the feeling 
of anger towards the government and the protests intensified. Thus, the deployment of military police 
did not aid the ‘re-imagineering’ project of Brazilian elites, instead, drew comparisons from some 
protestors about the similarities to the previous dictatorships. Pablo, a student from Brasilia was 
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particularly vocal in this, calling the deployment of the military police outside the football stadium in 
Brasilia as ‘absurd’ (Chapter 4). 
 
In addition, the social unrest did not reflect well on FIFA and their corporate partners. They attempted 
to distance themselves from the grievances from the protestors by releasing a FAQ document described 
in Chapter Three (FIFA, 2014a). This was the first time FIFA defended its position and actions in relation 
to the World Cup. These mobilisations were the first large scale protests against hosting the World Cup, 
and, for the first time, the themes that scholars discussed in the literature were evident on protest 
placards (Tilley, 2006, Hagn and Maennig, 2009, Mol, 2010, Chalip, 2006, Hall, 2012, Whitson and Horne, 
2006, Whitson et al., 2006, Roche, 2000, Roche, 2002).  
 
The ‘re-imagineering’ project in Mato Grosso was even more of a failure. Mato Grosso is viewed by 
those outside Mato Grosso as a backward, rural state with only soya fields run by corrupt elites. 
Internationally, there was also the ‘hamburger connection’ (Myers, 1981), which blamed deforestation 
on the production of commodity exports. The ‘re-imagineering’ project and in particular, the 
infrastructure programme in Cuiabá , was thought to present Cuiabá  as a forward thinking, 
environmentally friendly and innovative capital city. The airport renovations, new stadium and new 
railway system infrastructure projects all failed, and in fact, reinforced the images of corruption, 
ineptitude and backwardness. I will now discuss each in turn. 
 
First, as described in Chapter 5, the VLT could be viewed as similar to the Gautrain in Johannesburg  
(Van Der Westhuizen, 2007, van der Westhuizen and Swart, 2011) and was thought to enable Cuiabá  to 
compete as a ‘world city’. However, the institutional corruption, profiteering and kickbacks to elites 
resulted in an unfinished project. For the residents of Cuiabá  it now acts as a daily reminder of 
corruption. This view is exemplified by the view of a college teacher from Verzae Grande: ‘what the 
international community see and hear about is good, however, what we as locals see and experience is 
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not good. They do not care about us, what we have to do, what we have to see every day. They only 
care about the international community’ (Chapter 5).  The supposed environmentally friendly 
construction of the Pantanal Stadium would also make it a globally competitive stadium. However, 
Chapter 5 again illuminated the cronyism and impunity associated with the contracts, this led the 
stadium to have structural problems and it fell short on the criteria to be certified LEED standard. Again, 
the stadium does not deliver the social benefit claims made for the residents of Cuiabá. Third, again as 
Chapter 5 illustrated the airport renovations would enable visitors to arrive in Cuiabá at a modern and 
beautiful airport. This was important as the airport is often the first experience visitors would have of 
Cuiabá. However, for the World Cup, the renovations were incomplete and signage was hung around 
the airport to hide unfinished work. The first impressions of visitors during the World Cup would have 
been of a construction zone. This is in line with to Curi et al. (2011) who discuss how ‘unsightly’ Favelas 
that were visible from the roadside between the international airport and hotels on Copacabana beach 
in Rio de Janeiro were hidden by advertising boards during the Pan-America Games in 2007. These 
short-term measures contribute to the ‘re-imagineering’ of a place by physically hiding the truth from 
visitors. However, in the case of the airport renovations, the dust and noise from the construction work 
was not hidden by the posters. As I have shown throughout Chapter 5, the ‘re-imagineering’ project in 
Cuiabá had dramatically failed. This is an exemplary case where corruption and impunity prevented the 
successful ‘re-imagineering’ of a place. 
 
These three infrastructure programmes, in addition to the contribution to ‘re-imagineering’, were also 
supposed to leave a social benefit for the residents of Cuiabá . These social benefits were negated by 
corruption or appropriated by elites through large contracts. As shown in Chapter 5, the Pantanal 
Stadium is a ‘white-elephant’. Even though the official capacity of stadium was reduced from 44,000 to 
10,000 after construction concerns, there is no demand for it. The exterior of the stadium, which was 
meant to provide a safe route for runners and cyclists, is cracked and unfit for use. It has turned into a 
burden on tax payers as the state paid for repairs and seeks to prosecute contractors who have not 
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finished work. This speaks to those scholars who suggest that the sporting facilities after a sports mega-
event are either not publically available, or are inappropriate (Whitson et al., 2006, Horne and 
Manzenreiter, 2004). The VLT which promised to solve traffic issues and over-crowding on local buses 
instead exacerbated these problems.  
 
Had the infrastructure programmes worked, the social benefits would have been shared by both the 
residents and elites. However, the short-term view of the elites, by appropriating these benefits and re-
distributing wealth upwards, has resulted in an infrastructure programme which worked to reconfirm 
the view that most outside of Mato Grosso has of the state. The residents of Cuiabá are left with old and 
over-crowded buses that contribute to heavy traffic in the city. 
 
8.2: Sport mega-events and environmental claims 
 
In addition to the social benefits that elites claim, the FIFA World Cup is also claimed to provide 
environmental neutrality. FIFA created the ‘Football for the Planet’ programme to ensure the World Cup 
can be environmentally friendly through focusing on three areas: monitoring and compensation for 
greenhouse gases emissions resulting from the activities, certified green stadiums and waste 
management and recycling (FIFA, 2011b). However, Reis and DaCosta (2012) argued that there is often a 
gap between what elites claim to have achieved in environmental programmes at sports mega-events, 
and what actually happens on the ground. Those that have discussed the aims of environmental 
programmes at sports mega-events have not investigated the claims (Diederichs and Roberts, 2015, 
Witt and Loots, 2011). This thesis then addresses this gap by providing a critically informed, qualitative 
analysis of these claims. The investigation draws from the concepts of the critical carbon offsetting 
literature (Bachram, 2004, Bailey et al., 2011, Bello, 2009, Bumpus and Liverman, 2008, Cabello, 2009). I 
therefore draw from these studies to discuss carbon offsetting in the context of the FIFA World Cup. 
185 
 
 
My findings throughout the thesis constructed an overview of the mechanisms used by elites to co-opt 
environmental governance. At the national level, FIFAs approach to host a carbon neutral event was 
supporting by domestic climate change politics. It was found that politicians who supported a more 
radical view of environmental protection were isolated under a power struggle between two opposing 
factions in the Climate Change Committee. The conservative faction, who supported financial 
mechanisms and in turn, the neoliberalisation of nature, were able to develop policies to reflect this. 
Both the FIFA and Brazilian government approach to environmental protection was then approached 
through the ecological modernisation paradigm and enabled for a clear programme to be established 
which was reliant on technological innovation and offsetting. This included certified green stadiums and 
a carbon offsetting programme (FIFA, 2011c). 
 
 Specifically, it is the findings in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 which speaks to the assertion of Reis and DaCosta 
(2012) that there is usually a gap between what organisers claims by the way of environmental 
programmes and the reality on the ground. The Pantanal Stadium was supposed to be a green stadium 
and contribute to the World Cup being environmentally neutral. However, as Chapter 5 illustrated, the 
unfinished construction works meant that it is yet to gain LEED accreditation. The problems with 
construction, including the leaking roof, were attributed to the management of the construction process 
itself. The state did not act to reprimand unfinished work and have since paid for the maintenance 
charges. This financial commitment is in addition to the fine payable to the Federal Development Bank 
as a consequence of not attaining the LEED accreditation. To date, the failure of the Pantanal Stadium to 
gain green certification questions the environmental claims of the green World Cup in Cuiabá . 
 
 
 
.  
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Carbon offsetting  
 
The carbon offsetting programme which was claimed to offset the Pantanal Stadium was the Green 
River Project in Barranco Alto I and II. FIFA claimed in 2011 that 3,000 families would receive direct 
Payment for Ecosystem Services by planting 1.4 million trees (FIFA, 2011). Secopa also claimed in 2011 
that R$710,000 (£166,652) would be ‘allocated in the form of payments for ecosystem services to 
bankside municipalities’ (Ascom, 2011, de Cassia, 2011). As Chapters 6 and 7 showed, these claims were 
not implemented on the ground. The NGO who organised the offsetting project, the Green Action 
Institute, also controlled the organisation that verified the emission reductions. As I demonstrate in 
Chapter 6, the Green Action Institute were allowed to abuse this position, changing the methodology 
used to calculate the emissions. This saw the number of trees needed to be planted fall from 1.4 million 
to 70,000. However, Chapter 6 also illustrated how no new trees were planted for the offsetting of the 
Pantanal Stadium. Instead, the Green Action Institute used trees already assigned credits to other Mato 
Grosso based organisations who had previously purchased credits.  
 
This case aligns with arguments found in the critical carbon offsetting literature. In particular, it aligns 
with Bumpus and Liverman (2008), Böhm et al., (2011) and Lohmann (2009) who fundamentally 
question the appropriateness of carbon offsetting as a climate change mitigation tool. Through 
offsetting the construction of the Pantanal Stadium, elite classes were able to spectate the football 
matches in what they were led to believe was an environmentally friendly stadium. This is supported by 
the notion of Gilbertson and Reyes (2009) and Bumpus and Liverman (2008) that carbon offsetting 
allows the global North to continue their high emission lifestyle at the expense of the global South. The 
Green River Project was a small scale carbon offsetting project which encouraged global football fans to 
travel to Cuiabá  and watch the football matches, under the illusion of a carbon neutral stadium. To 
those fans, not only would the stadium be carbon neutral, but local poor communities would receive 
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benefits. However, as Chapters 6 and 7 illustrated the local population were detrimentally affected. First, 
Chapter 6 showed how the Green Action Institute fraudulently sold the carbon offsets from the trees 
twice, with no repercussions. This speaks to Bachram (2004) who suggests that the market is 
‘dangerously reliant upon the integrity of corporations to file accurate reports of emissions levels and 
reductions’ (Ibid:8). Second, Chapter 7 illustrated that the local community had their livelihoods taken 
from them and had to surrender a valuable part of their land in the name of conservation. Again, 
Bachram (2004) cautioned how peasants in Amazonia were removed from their land to make way for 
carbon offsetting. For these reasons, the global North were able to continue their high emissions 
lifestyle by travelling to the Pantanal Stadium so the false presumption the stadium was 
environmentally friendly. 
 
Referring back to organisational integrity (Bachram, 2004: see above), the integrity of the Green Action 
Institute was also questioned by the SEMA ecologist as problematized in Chapter 6. She explained how 
the Green Action Institute was supposed to monitor the compliance of the project participants and 
continue working with the communities. However, in 2015 the nursery in Barranco Alto I was 
abandoned and, in March 2016, the Green Action Institute’s website had changed. The previous 
homepage had several articles and photos relating to the Green River Project, however this was 
replaced with new projects in Cuiabá (Green Action Institute, 2016). Monitoring and evaluation of such 
projects are said to be essential for the success of a project (UN REDD+, 2012), but the critical carbon 
offsetting literature suggests the conflict of interest inherent in the system has led to a lack of funding 
into monitoring of the carbon trading mechanism (Boas, 2011). It is perhaps the conflict of interest that 
led to a lack of monitoring of the Green River Project. The project could be seen to work in the interests 
of trade and elite tourism. As I have shown in Chapter 7 it had little to do with environmental protection, 
and therefore the monitoring of the project was not in the interest of the Green Action Institute. 
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The literature also suggests that carbon offsetting can lead to the entrenchment of pre-existing power 
relations. However, these arguments were made without empirical evidence and based at the 
international level where the Global South were suppressed by the Global North (Lohmann and Böhm, 
2011, Böhm et al., 2011). This argument can be seen empirically in the case of the Green River Project 
on a regional and local scale. In Chapter 6, the ruralistas maintained their hegemonic social relations and 
even furthered their presence in the less economically important areas of South-West Mato Grosso. The 
Green Action Institute developed activities in areas which were not of economic importance to the elites. 
At the regional scale, it contributed to the actions to ‘re-imagineer’ Mato Grosso as environmentally 
friendly. The actions in South-West Mato Grosso then had positive benefits for those agri-industrial 
actors in other areas of the state. This was thought to deflect and pre-empt further international 
environmental criticism of the state. They were even able to create new alliances with SEMA. This 
further secured their social relations in the area.  
 
The organisation of the project, in addition to the project itself, was seen to also contribute to 
entrenching social relations. The location of the project is one such example of this. According to the 
logic of carbon offsetting, the project could have occurred in any location (Lohmann, 2012). It was 
placed in a strategically important area for the ruralistas. Chapter 6 discussed how the asphalting of the 
MT-040 highway has increased the potential of tourism in the area. Infrastructures needed to host these 
tourists are also becoming more common on the river bank. The project then could be seen to increase 
the aesthetic appeal of the area and cater for tourist ideals. In reality, the project could have occurred 
on the ranches of the landed elite, instead it was in peasant and tourist communities that would not 
directly impinge on the activities of the ruralistas. In Chapter 7, it was shown how at the local scale the 
local residents lost their investments in a new income generating activity and had to turn over their 
most fertile land to conservation. The Green River Project then furthered the interest of elites whilst the 
local population were detrimentally impacted, further entrenching the current social relations. This case 
can then be said to support the arguments of Lovell and MacKenzie (2011) and Bailey et al., (2011) that 
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the carbon trading mechanism works in the interest of the elite, not the environment. This then adds to 
the sports mega-event literature which until now has assumed carbon offsetting brings environmental 
benefit. It opens a new area of literature which critically engages with the claims.  
 
Moving onto the literature which addresses carbon forestry projects, the Green River Project reflects 
several of the arguments previously identified in the literature and was empirical evidence was 
presented in Chapter 7. The residents of Barranco Alto I and II received payments for planting the trees 
on their land. This was supposedly two wells and two water tanks, although the water tanks were not 
delivered (FIFA, 2011). The first well in Barranco Alto I worked after replacing the pump. The second well 
in Barranco Alto II was not constructed as the pit was dug too close to the river bank and the quality of 
water produced from the well was not deemed adequate. It was also inappropriate for them as they 
already had a functioning well supplied by the mayor of Santo Antonio do Leverger in 2001.  
 
Iversen et al. (2006)’s work in Nepal illustrate how weak institutions allow local elites to appropriate 
benefits. Mathur et al. (2014) then call for institutional control to ensure equal payments to all 
participants. However, in the case of the Green Action Institute, it is the institutional actor who 
appropriates the benefits. A total of R$5,000,000 (£1,173,610) was paid to the Green Action Institute by 
the state government for the carbon offsets of the stadium. Chapter 7 illustrated that these trees were 
never planted and questions the benefits the residents of Barranco Alto I and II received. The 
communities received two water wells which cost R$30,000 (£7,041), a small percentage of the 
R$710,000 (£166,652) promised by Secopa. It is clear to see, that just from this one instance of Secopa 
purchasing carbon credits (it was reported over 18 companies brought carbon credits) that there has 
been unequal benefit distribution. The call for stronger institutions is not applicable to all cases, as in 
the case of the Green River project, it was the NGO that appropriated the benefits.  
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The well was also chosen by the Green Action Institute, even though other benefits, and direct cash 
payments, were requested by the residents. Gross-Camp et al. (2012) suggest in their study direct cash 
payments were also not supported by project elites as they thought the community would ‘waste’ the 
money. Although this was not directly said by the Green Action Institute, they admitted they did ask the 
community what they wanted, but ignored this and chose what they thought was a suitable payment. 
As Chapter 7 illustrated, according to them, direct payments were never a possibility. The trail of money 
is also not in the public domain, making any transactions impossible to trace. It has become apparent 
that the institutional elites have appropriated some proportion of the money collected for carbon 
credits and used the remainder to deliver inappropriate benefits.  
 
In summary, the empirical evidence presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7 contributed and extended key 
arguments in the critical carbon offsetting literature. It also opened new areas of investigation in the 
sports mega-event literature which had not previously engaged with carbon offsetting. 
 
 
8.3: NGOs 
 
As I discussed in the previous section, and in addition to the specific problems associated with carbon 
forestry projects, the governance of projects can also be problematic. The following section explores the 
role of the NGO, the Green Action Institute, in the carbon offsetting project.   
 
Unlike other rural states, Mato Grosso does not have a large Landless Workers Movement, Movimento 
dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), and the civil society sector is generally viewed as weak (Jesus, 
2006). This has allowed for elite actors to control some areas of civil society. The local media is one 
example of an important civil society actor that is controlled by elite interests. When the Folha de 
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Estado newspaper published articles that opposed the activities of some elite actors, the editor-in-chief 
was shot dead. Similarly, Diario de Cuiabá  was only viable through the personal connections of the 
editor and the publication of articles which furthered the agenda of the elites (Martins, 2013). Thus 
these cases illustrated how some aspects of civil society were already controlled by elites. The Green 
Action Institute has another example of how elites were able to manipulate a weak civil society (Jesus, 
2006) to further their own interests. 
 
However the OSCIP mechanism created a different mechanism for which elites could secure control in 
civil society.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the OSCIP mechanism in Brazil was designed to give progressive 
NGOs more voice. This was in the hope that a more active civil society sector would encourage 
participation in politics and therefore deepen democracy. However, Chapter 6 illustrated how in Mato 
Grosso it created another space for elite control. The founding industrial organisations control all 
decision making at the Green Action Institute, and, hence, instead of deepening democracy in Mato 
Grosso, the OSCIP acted as a vehicle for elites to maintain their social relations.  
 
Foweraker (2001) suggested that alliances can form between the state and NGOs. Under the OSCIP 
mechanism, these alliances are legitimate as an NGO can only become accredited OSCIP status if it 
works together with a state agency. It could be argued that this alliance could lead to the state 
manufacturing civil society, as proposed by Hodgson (2004). However, as we have seen in the case of 
the Green Action Institute, the NGO was actually manufactured by the elite corporate associations of 
Mato Grosso. In addition, the argument of Tvedt (1998) can also be furthered. Initially, it could be 
argued the Green Action Institute did start as a ‘transmission belt’ of ideas from the state. The Green 
River project was created by SEMA and therefore by joining with SEMA, the Green Action Institute 
supported their ideas. As the SEMA ecologist described in Chapter 7, SEMA already had planned the 
project before the Green Action Institute became involved. However, as the project developed, the 
Green Action Institute sought external sources of funding through carbon offsetting, thus changing the 
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relationship between the state actor and the NGO. The corporate elites, through the development of 
the carbon offsetting project were able to use the Green Action Institute as a ‘transmission belt’ for 
their ideas. The power changed from the state actors to the corporate actors who controlled the NGO. 
 
The role of the corporate sector in influencing NGO behaviour in the environmental sector has recently 
been addressed (Klein, 2015, Choudry and Kapoor, 2013, Sapinski, 2015). These studies, as previously 
noted, focused on corporate actors influencing NGOs through funding. This thesis develops the 
argument to show how some elite actors have been able to manufacture a civil society actor in their 
interests. Control of the NGO did not come from the dependency of the corporate sectors financial 
contributions, but instead, from the corporate actors who formed the board of directors of the NGO. 
 
These elite actors were able to ensure the ‘transmission belt’ of their ideas to the NGO was consistent 
through ‘interlocking’. Sapinski (2015) names ‘interlocking’ as the phenomenon of when a board 
member has a seat in both a G500 company, 500 of the largest transnational corporations, and an 
international environmental NGO. This, he argues, creates ‘greater cohesion among corporate elites’ 
(Ibid: 269), which further secures their social relations. ‘Interlocking’ can be found in the case of the 
Green Action Institute (as discussed in Chapter 6), as the board members also all had prominent 
positions in the corporate founding institutions.  
 
Tvedt (1998) argues that some NGOs do not act in their own interests. The Green Action Institute could 
be argued to be working to a different agenda. The aim of the Green Action Institute, as displayed on 
their website, was to further educate the population about their environmental awareness and create 
employment for the local community through a reforestation project (Green Action Institute, 2012). The 
aim was challenged by the evidence I provided in Chapters 6 and 7. Perhaps the aims of the NGO are 
more aligned to that of the then director, Paul Borges, who reportedly said ‘since NGOs are coming here 
to talk about what we are doing wrong, we will create an NGO to show what we are doing good’ (Galvão 
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and El-Jaick, 2010). In this sense then, the NGO works to deflect international environmental criticism 
and contribute to the hegemonic project of the ruralistas in Mato Grosso.  
From this case, it can be suggested that the corporate sector have found new ways to ensure their 
ideology is the dominant one in civil society. Previously, the state and corporate sector had influenced 
already established civil society actors through partnerships and funding. However, the OSCIP 
mechanism presented a new opportunity for elites and allowed them to legitimately create their own 
civil society actor with an environmental guise. The elites could then make decisions on the actions and 
aims of the NGO. This control was further secured by the organisational structure which was an example 
of ‘interlocking’ (Sapinski, 2015).  
8.4: Neo-Gramscian approach to environmental governance 
 
The data presented in Chapters 5,6, and 7 has shown that elites in Mato Grosso were able to use 
personal connections to further their own agenda and profiteer with impunity. This section explains 
these elite dynamics through a neo-Gramscian frame of analysis. Central to this understanding is the 
concept of ‘hegemony’, whereby social relations are secured through alliances. The corporate, state and 
civil society sectors all contribute to the maintenance and enhancement of these relations (Simon, 
1991).  
 
As I have argued in Chapter 1 and 2, the global hegemonic project can be seen as neoliberal capitalism 
with the FIFA World Cup firmly positioned within it. Challenges to the neoliberal project include 
environmental concerns and wealth inequalities. FIFA’s attempts to respond to these challenges are 
programmes such as ‘Football for the Planet’ and ‘Football for Hope’.  The ‘Football for the Planet’ 
programme works within the ecological modernisation paradigm, which suggests the World Cup can be 
environmentally friendly through offsetting emissions, constructing green stadiums and managing waste 
and recycling (FIFA 2011c, Chapter 4). As it is assumed these actions lead to an environmentally friendly 
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tournament, environmental criticism is deflected. The ‘Football for Hope’ programme works to help 
alleviate poverty through creating projects that work with young people. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 have 
shown that the assumptions of FIFA do not necessarily lead to an environmentally friendly and socially 
beneficial event. The neo-Gramscian lens helps to explain how these power relations help to build and 
maintain hegemonic social relations that benefit the elites. The next section unpacks this further in 
regard to the elites of Mato Grosso. 
 
The hegemonic project of the ruralistas  
As discussed in Chapter 5, the ruralistas hegemonic project is to ensure the economic and social 
conditions for a commodity focused export economy. This project fits with the national hegemonic 
project of export-led growth, which in turn fits into the global hegemonic project of neoliberal 
capitalism. The ruralistas of Mato Grosso and other surrounding states have an important role in 
Brazilian society as it is believed their income has helped to fund national development programmes 
(Ban, 2013). The ruralistas are the agro-business elites and their associated networks who migrated 
from Southern Brazilian states in the 1960s and 1970s under a Federal programme, this was discussed in 
Chapter 5. They are predominantly white, upper-class rural land owners (Trevathan, 2015), an example 
of one such farmer, Dona Maria was given in Chapter 5. Through agricultural modernisation techniques 
they were able to quickly gain control of the Mato Grosso economy and have since secured positions of 
power in nearly every level of the state government. This has resulted in them becoming the ruling class 
of Mato Grosso and they have been able to secure their power base at the regional scale through 
various social relations. The control of the local media was one example of this.  
 
The ability of this class to ‘jump scales’ (Smith, 1992) means they are gaining control at the national 
level. Representatives from political institutions and civil society groups, such as the agricultural lobby, 
are able to influence policy at the national scale. The appointment of Blairo Maggi as first the 
Environmental Minister, then Agricultural Minister, is a further example of how the ruralistas are able to 
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develop a power base at the national level. This power at the national level works to secure their social 
relations at the regional scale as they can work to ensure their interests are further entrenched in 
national policy.  
 
With a secure power base at the regional level and developing influence at the national scale, the 
ruralistas have absolute power at the local scale. As discussed in Chapter 7, the local residents do not 
have an alliance at the regional or national scale and therefore were unable to ‘jump scales’ and 
challenge the project. These actions work in opposition to the emancipatory view of scholars writing on 
empirical instances of jumping scales. Zanotti (2011) described how the subordinated class were able to 
obtain leverage by creating alliances on the higher scale, an indigenous group in the Amazon were able 
to challenge elite actors by forming a network with sympathetic actors at the regional and international 
level. This group were able to successfully defend their land. However, the residents of Barranco Alto I 
and II had their livelihoods and investments taken from them in the name of conservation. As discussed 
in Chapters 6 and 7, the location of the project meant it did not encroach on elite interest, in fact, it 
worked to strengthen their elite leisure activities. The carbon offsetting project could have been located 
on the land of the agri-businesses, however, peasant small holders bore the brunt of offsetting a project 
they had no part in. 
Further, naming Pesqueiro Florida as a ‘traditional village’ in the project documents can be seen to 
further the interest of the elite and help to legitimise the carbon offsetting project. Recent carbon 
sequestration projects, and in particular REDD+, have advocated the idea that carbon offsetting can also 
help achieve sustainable development goals (Leggett and Lovell, 2012, Sukhdev et al., 2012, Watson et 
al., 2013). These goals, including poverty alleviation, are foundational to many projects seeking to 
achieve entry onto the carbon markets. Therefore, by the documents suggesting Pesqueiro Florida was 
in fact Barra do Aricá, a peasant community, makes the project appear to be working towards 
sustainable development. 
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At the micro level, it was only the residents of Pesqueiro Florida who benefitted from the project. They 
received a gabion to prevent river erosion, although this was part of SEMA’s project, not the carbon 
offsetting aspect. These residents were also elites and many of the properties were holiday homes for 
residents in other cities in Mato Grosso (Chapter 7). The project then worked to entrench elite, local 
level interest and reproduce social relations in line with the hegemonic project. The carbon offsetting 
project did not work for environmental protection and erosion of the river bank, instead it worked for 
elite tourism and trade of mega crops. The elites who use this stretch of river for recreational fishing are 
able to enjoy an aesthetically pleasing tree-lined river bank. A wider implication of this project is that it 
did not affect the agri-business elites and they were able to continue their economic activities. This is in 
stark relation to the residents of Barranco Alto I and II. One of the mechanisms the elite had at their 
disposal was the network of alliances between the civil society and state sectors, an integral state 
(Simon, 1991). 
The integral state and coercion  
Levy and Egan (2003), Banerjee (2011) and Dimitrov (2010) in their investigations all discuss how civil 
society legitimises the ideology of the elite class. The Green Action Institute, through the guise of 
environmental protection, were able to legitimise the ideology of the ruralistas in the civil society 
sector. These relations were further strengthened by the integral state formed between the Green 
Action institute, SEMA and the public prosecutors. As Chapter 7 illustrated, the initial passive resistance 
to the Green River Project by participants, by not planting the trees, was met with legally binding 
contracts, a coercive method drawn by the state prosecution. In effect, the integral state of the NGO 
and the state actors created an ‘amour of coercion’ (Simon, 1991:73) which prevented residents 
challenging the project without legal consequences. They therefore conformed to the project although 
consent was not given willingly.  
Other forms of coercion can be seen throughout the thesis. At the national scale, the anti-World Cup 
mobilisations were coercively controlled through the military police. This method was not as successful 
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as the TAC at the local scale, as social media spread images of the police using violent force on 
protestors which further strengthened the mobilisations.  
The methods available to elite actors to control society can be seen to be different, at different scales. 
Although arguably both had the desired effect – to coercively control the population into consenting to 
the hegemonic project – they were achieved in different ways, and to different degrees of success. The 
consent of the project participants at the local scale was won immediately with the issuing of the TAC 
and the Green Action Institute could begin to sell the carbon.  Chapter 4 discussed the coercive control 
of the military police at the national scale during the mobilisations was further challenged by the 
intensification of the mobilisations organised through social media. This added to general ill-feeling 
towards the government which continued into the economic recession and subsequent government 
corruption investigation.  
At the regional scale coercion was not needed as assumed impunity for elite actors led to the consent of 
the hegemonic project. The impunity is not absolute as was highlighted by the arrest of the former 
governor, Silval Barbosa. This could indicate that the hegemonic relations, who for so long ruled Mato 
Grosso, are starting to become destabilised. From this empirical evidence, it can then be seen how the 
tool on an integral state was essential to the elites maintaining their powerful positions. This evidence 
supports literature which suggests alliances form between elite actors (Taylor, 2004, Levy and Newell, 
2002) but shows explicitly how it is achieved. Namely, by manufacturing civil society elites were able to 
co-opt the environmental projects of the World Cup in Cuiabá  and further their agenda. Through these 
hegemonic relations the residents in the villages were coerced into participating into a project which 
forced them to surrender their livelihoods (Chapter 7). 
 
8.5: The World Cup and sustainability 
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This thesis has shown that through the appropriation of the green discourse of the FIFA World Cup, 
elites were able to work to further their own agenda. The infrastructure programmes in Mato Grosso 
did not provide residents with sustainable, public infrastructure. Instead, they were an example of re-
distribution of wealth upwards through impunity. The carbon offsetting project failed to have any 
significant environmental benefits for the construction of the Pantanal Stadium. Instead, it coerced 
residents into taking responsbility for river bank erosion and emissions which they did not create. This 
acceptance of responsibility meant that the residents had to change land use from the sugarcane 
project to planting trees (Chapter 7). This essentially removed their livelihood and has the potential to 
impact the affected communties into the future. 
As shown in Chapter 7, the President of Barranco Alto I suggested that young people are migrating out 
of the villages and he saw the sugarcane project as the answer to ensuring a viable community. The 
Green River project essentially prevented this project and has reduced the opportunities for young 
people in the villages. The long-term impacts of this small scale project are important as it is the legacy 
of a global event, which claims to bring social benefits to the residents of host countries. 
This thesis reacted to the claim of Reis and DaCosta and supports their assertion that there is a gap 
between what elites claim and what happens on the ground in relation to environmental claims at the 
World Cup. Further research into the long-term effects of this project and research into environmental 
claims at different sports mega-events will further develop the understanding of how elites appropriate 
the green agenda to further their own interests. 
 
8.6: Conclusion 
 
This discussion chapter aimed to explore the results of my empirical research in relation to the literature 
presented in Chapter 2. The conceptual arguments of ‘greening’ sports mega-events, carbon offsetting 
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as a climate change mitigation tool, and the role of NGOs have all been taken forward. The actions of 
the elites in Mato Grosso were understood through the neo-Gramscian framework which saw how their 
agency was affected by their ability to ‘jump scales’.  
The social benefit claims of many host nations and cities have been challenged in academic literature 
(Roche, 2000, Roche, 1992). However, the 2014 FIFA World Cup was the first which saw a large 
mobilisation against hosting the event. Central to many social benefit claims is the ‘re-imagineering’ of 
host cities. It was found the ‘re-imagineering’ project in Mato Grosso and Cuiabá  yielded greater 
benefits for local elites than the local population. The unfinished and sub-standard infrastructure 
programmes gave elites the opportunity to profiteer through contracts whilst the local population have 
increased traffic problems and inadequate public transport. Chapter 5 was central to this argument 
which explores the national claims at the regional level. 
The understanding of the role of corporate actors and their influence on NGOs was significantly 
furthered in this discussion chapter. This study illustrated that corporate actors have now developed 
their sphere of influence to actually create a NGO which serves in their interests. The ruralistas were 
able to legitimately create an NGO through the OSCIP mechanism, this NGO, with the façade of 
environmental sustainability was able to co-opt a project which served to re-image Mato Grosso as an 
environmentally friendly state. Previous studies had linked corporate actors and NGOs through direct or 
indirect funding, but this is the first study to identify an environmental NGO which was created by 
corporate elites. The role of the NGO, the Green Action Institute in organising the implementation of the 
carbon offsetting project was investigated in Chapter 6. This provided a unique case where it was seen 
the NGO was manufactured by corporate elites. The organisation of the NGO then lent itself to 
‘interlocking’ as all directors of the NGO were employees of the industrial associations which formed the 
NGO. The conflict of interest of the NGO was further exacerbated but the Green Action Institute 
controlling the organisation which verified the carbon offsets (Chapter 6).  
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The mechanisms of control that the elite used were viewed through a neo-Gramscian approach. This 
enabled an understanding in how elite actors were able to configure their social relations to further 
their interest. Of particular importance was the role of the integral state. The relationship between the 
Green Action Institute and SEMA and the public prosecutors meant challenging the project was difficult. 
  
201 
 
 
 
-Conclusion - 
 
 
The current global hegemonic project of neoliberal capitalism has contributed to the rise and 
intensification of many global issues. The environmental crisis is just one example of a global problem 
that neoliberal capitalism has addressed by incorporating it into the organisation of capitalism. Through 
the ecological modernisation paradigm the environmental crisis was thought to be well on the way to 
being solved when the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997. However, after 19 years the earth continues 
to warm and the transnational capitalist class continue to earn. 
This thesis illustrated how the ecological modernisation paradigm enables an impasse on environmental 
action as it allows mechanisms which assume environmental protection and economic growth are 
compatible. In particular, this thesis focused on carbon offsetting.  
Carbon offsetting has caught the attention of a range of scholars from different disciplines. Scholarly 
debate in the social sciences has been divided by those who believe that carbon offsetting provides an 
opportunity to mitigate against GHG emissions whilst industries adapt to carbon neutral energy sources; 
and those who fundamentally disagree with the assumptions of the market. In both sets of literature 
concerns over benefit distribution, land tenure, hegemonic relations in addition to questioning the 
environmental impact of these projects can be found. This has led some scholars to suggest carbon 
offsetting is not an appropriate mechanism to fight climate change (Bohm, 2008, Lohmann 2012, 
Bumpus and Livermann, 2008). Nonetheless, carbon offsetting, particularly from forestry is gaining in 
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importance in the international climate change discourse. It has been accepted by the UNFCCC as an 
appropriate mechanism to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in COP 20.  
 
The overall aim of my thesis was to explore a carbon offsetting project on the ground, however, the data 
led me to explore how the environmental discourse had been co-opted by rural elites in Mato Grosso. 
Environmental awareness had increased in Mato Grosso, primarily due to increased international 
attention to the Amazon rainforest and international NGO campaigns such as the publication of the 
2006 Greenpeace report. Over time, the elites in Mato Grosso worked to change the image to an 
environmentally forward thinking state. The FIFA World Cup held in Brazil 2014 provided a vehicle to 
showcase Mato Grosso as an environmental friendly state, and the green agenda was subsequently 
pushed through various infrastructure programmes. The new football stadium in Cuiabá  aimed to 
obtain an international accreditation standard, LEED, which acknowledged the ecologically aware 
construction methods. As part of this programme, unavoidable emissions were offset through a 
reforestation programme which was located in the South West of the state. 
 
The case was chosen as the subject of the thesis as there was a lack of literature on carbon offsetting at 
sports mega-events, and the overall agenda of staging a ‘green’ event. The Pantanal Stadium was a bi-
lateral project between a Mato Grosso based construction company, a Mato Grosso based NGO and the 
Mato Grosso World Cup organising committee. This therefore allowed for an analysis of scales to be 
applied. In addition, to investigate the hegemonic relations among government departments, 
corporations and NGOs within the distinctive empirical setting of rural Mato Grosso this thesis has 
argued for a neo-Gramscian approach to environmental governance. The neo-Gramscian approach was 
advocated as the current ecological modernisation paradigm seen in contemporary environmental 
decision making neglects the concept of power and strives toward maintaining the status quo. The 
emancipatory theoretical framework of the neo-Gramscian approach encourages an investigation of the 
relations of power and identifies potential for counter-hegemonic movements in civil society. This 
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framework then directly challenges ecological modernisation and seeks to disrupt the powerful elite in 
their quest to secure hegemony. It also challenges the increasingly ubiquitous ideology that ecological 
modernisation is the only option in the global fight against climate change.  
Neo-Gramcian approaches incorporate multiple actors from the state, civil society and corporate sectors 
in their understanding of governance (Simon, 1991).  The organisation of governance in Mato Grosso 
was unique as regional elites can be found in powerful positions in all sectors. The relationships 
between actors are enhanced and maintained through events such as the World Cup. The neo-
Gramscian approach in this thesis was applied in a new context, previously studies have concentrated 
on policy level projects on a global scale. The scalar theorisation therefore allowed this analysis at a local 
scale. Additionally, new methods were introduced in this framework, previously it had been reliant on 
case studies and ethnography allowed the researcher to gain access to the field and understand the 
realities on the ground.  
The methods used in the fieldwork phase of the research enabled a new perspective on how hegemony 
is contested at the local level. I undertook eleven months of ethnographic research in 2014 and 2015. 
Ethnographic research was important for the thesis as previous studies using the neo-Gramscian 
approach had not addressed the claims elites had made and their results on the ground. Due to the 
nature of the investigation, and my position as an ‘outsider’, it was essential to develop long-term 
relationships with the participants and build their trust. Formal interviews, semi-structured interviews, 
participant observations, observations and documentary analysis were used to triangulate the claims of 
project elites against accounts from the local community. Documentary analysis was used at the 
national and regional scale, complemented with interviews to understand the dialectic relationship of 
the scales.  
The use of scales in this thesis was particularly important when exploring the role of NGOs. Civil society 
actors have a prominent role to play in the carbon trading mechanism through roles including 
monitoring and evaluation (Bachram, 2004). The role civil society actors have means there is increased 
204 
 
potential for corporate and state actors to influence the actions of civil society. Civil society actors, 
particularly NGOs have a long history of being influenced, co-opted and funded by both state and 
corporate actors (Tvedt, 1998, Foweraker, 2001, Klein, 2015). To further the understanding of NGOs 
within the carbon trading mechanism then has value, the scale approach allowed for an understanding 
of how the NGO legitimately created the project. Although the NGO actions at the local scale were 
questionable, the actions were legitimised through actions at the regional scale. 
 
This conclusion chapter aims to consolidate the arguments and outline the unique contribution to 
knowledge this thesis made.  I first discuss the empirical findings in relation to my research questions, 
second I analyse the theoretical implications of my empirical data, recommendations for future research 
are given in the context of these implications and finally the limitations of this study are explored. This 
chapter finishes by suggesting that further understanding of the governance of carbon offsetting 
projects need to be understood in order to prevent further impasse on climate change action.  
  
9.1: Empirical findings 
 
This section synthesises the empirical findings in relation to the research questions. My research was 
guided by the following research questions: 
 What are the political, social and economic contexts within which the Green River Project 
operates? 
 What was the process in which the carbon offsetting project was established and implemented? 
 How have actors on different scales been affected by the project?  
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Research question one 
What are the political, social and economic contexts within which the Green River Project operates? 
 
This question was answered on all three scales by contextualising the project into historic, and 
contemporary, socio-political events. First, the global hegemonic project of neoliberal capitalism was 
identified as the over-arching phenomena guiding the actions. A national elite were identified in chapter 
4 which wanted to create a ‘green’ discourse around the World Cup. In the current environmental crisis 
Brazil are in a unique position as owners of the majority of the world’s largest rainforest. They stand on 
the line between protecting the rainforest for global good or developing the area for private and 
national economic wealth. A green agenda at the World Cup was thought to enhance the international 
‘green’ reputation of Brazil. This was seen as especially important during the neoliberal era where 
competition for direct foreign investment and trade is high (Harvey, 2005). 
 
In the national context of Brazil, the Brazilian economy consented to this project by being a major 
exporter of commodities, this directly fitted with Mato Grosso at the regional scale who are the largest 
commodity exporters in Brazil. At the local scale, peasant small holders are continually and strategically 
isolated from the export industry. These different scales dialectically formed the context of the Green 
River Project.  
On a regional scale, Mato Grosso was seen as a key area to challenge the negative associations that 
Brazil has to environmental issues. The legal boundary of the Amazon falls within Mato Grosso and it is 
also home to the North Western section of the Pantanal biome. These two ecosystems are habitats for 
an array of endangered flora and fauna and are both UNESCO biome reserves.  The Cerrado region and 
increasingly the Amazon and Pantanal, are of national importance for soya and cotton cultivation, 
important export commodities for Brazil. Mato Grosso is therefore at the heart of Brazil’s quest for 
economic development whilst ensuring environmental protection.  
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On a local scale it was seen how the population of Baixada Cuiabána is diverse and economic inequality 
is high. The indigenous population were displaced or killed during the colonisation period then wage 
labourers were brought to work in the sugar plantations. These workers were left in-situ when the sugar 
industry demised in the early 20th century. Throughout this period, political organisation was based on 
oligarchic relationships. This has developed into a regional elite of corporate and political actors who are 
tightly networked. The peasant population are left isolated from decision making and have experienced 
numerous projects that are incomplete or do little to improve the standard of living.  
In terms of decision making this led to the creation of the projeto agregação de valor a produção 
através da agro industrialização (added value production through agro industrialization) it was designed 
to increase the industrial output of the villages. The project in Barra do Aricá was never implemented 
due to organisational issues within the village and by the project organisers. The second project in 
Barranco Alto effectively stopped when the Green River Project began as it used the APP, an area which 
is prohibited to cultivate. The failure of these projects highlights how they were not created with the full 
participation from the community. As in many other areas of the world this population experience one 
development project after another, all in the name of rural development (Ferguson, 1990).  
The elites in all of these scales can be seen to further their own agenda whilst contributing to the global 
hegemonic project of neoliberal capitalism. The hegemonic class at the national scale used coercion 
through the military police to quash the popular movements and coercion through the passing of the 
new law to ensure project participation at the local scale. Subtler forms of coercion such as tax breaks 
and contracts were used at the regional scale to stabilise the hegemonic project.  These coercive 
methods were different at the different scales but were influential in ensuring the project continued at 
all scales. 
However, this was not stable. The political relations strained at the regional scale to the extent the 
former governor of Mato Grosso is now in jail. The contracts and kickbacks he endorsed were found to 
be illegal, the World Cup infrastructure in Mato Grosso was seen to be part of the illegal activities. The 
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Pantanal Stadium and VLT were the two largest infrastructure programmes in Cuiabá. Both were said to 
have environmental benefits and furthered the ‘green’ agenda of elites in Mato Grosso. However, the 
infrastructure for the residents has also not been successful. After only one year from the construction 
of the stadium, the Arena Pantanal can be seen to have numerous problems. The VLT run over budget 
and became financially unviable, large tracts of road which were made for the VLT now lay unused 
increasing traffic and air pollution in the city. Cuiabá has been show cased in several FIFA outlets as an 
example of a ‘green’ city, therefore the hegemonic class in Mato Grosso succeeded in their aim, to the 
detriment of the local population and wider environment.  
At the local level, the co-optation of the civil society sector by the rural elites ensured relations of 
domination which was legitimised coercively through SEMA and the public ministry. This domination 
meant there was no space for the local population to challenge the Green Action Institute and there was 
a broad acceptance that there would be no more money for the community. Once again the local 
population were isolated from the project benefits whilst the local elites could capitalise.   
The context of the carbon offsetting project and other infrastructure projects around Cuiabá can then be 
seen to have elites on a number of scales working to create a ‘green’ discourse surrounding Mato 
Grosso. The hegemonic class have been able to prevent civil unrest through coercive means and 
relations of domination on all scales. This resulted in several actors gaining from the project and the 
local population and environment becoming disadvantaged. 
Research question two  
What was the process in which the carbon offsetting project was established and implemented? 
 
Although data chapters four and five provide context, this research question was the main focus of 
chapters six and seven.  
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The Green River Project was found to initially be a conservation project implemented by SEMA; this was 
in response to an academic paper which suggested the Pantanal was being silted up by human induced 
erosion on river beds. In 2007 they were joined in the project by a local NGO named the Green Action 
Institute. This partnership was legitimised through a federal initiative, the OSCIP mechanism, which 
aimed to deepen democracy in Brazil by encouraging civil society actors to create partnerships with 
state agencies. The project was also created legitimately to enforce a federal environmental law which 
prohibits construction on river beds. These two legitimate forces, the project acting in response to a 
federal law, and the link between the NGO and the state department meant there was little opposition 
to the project at the local level.  As Simon (1991) describes, the NGO and state had built an ‘amour of 
coercion’ which was impenetrable to the local population.  
In addition to the legitimate relationship between the NGO and the state, the Green Action Institute 
also had links with the corporate sector. It was found that members on the board of the NGO 
‘interlocked’ with boards of corporations in Mato Grosso. Sapinski (2015) used this term to describe 
when a director of an international environmental NGO was also a director of a G500 organisation, one 
of the biggest 500 companies in the world. In the case of the Green Action Institute all decision makes 
were found to be ‘interlocking’ with other institutes or organisations in Mato Grosso. This was due to 
the organisational structure of the NGO which sees one director from each of the founding institutions 
as a member of the board of the NGO. Their environmental expertise was also questioned, as none of 
them had a background in environmental management. At the regional scale it could be seen how 
relationships between the elite of the political and corporate sectors had the ability to control the civil 
society sector. 
As a result of the power at the regional scale, the project was implemented in a top-down fashion. 
Those at the local scale were found to have little ability to influence the decision makers who were 
active at the regional scale. An ecologist from SEMA described how the project was already planned 
before they entered the villages and had little time for public participation. As a conservation project, 
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their primary focus was the conservation of the river bank, not sustainable development. This only 
changed when the Green Action Institute wanted to use the project for Payment for Ecosystem Services. 
The placement of the project was also of interest as it began in villages with little economic importance. 
It was not on land in an area of high agricultural significance, the areas which had previously been 
subject to international criticism. Therefore the agricultural elite could continue to use their land at the 
expense of the rural poor population. Once again, the rural poor population had to make sacrifices for 
the regional hegemonic project which places Mato Grosso as a leader in producing commodities for 
export.  
In order to ensure the hegemonic project at the regional scale was successful, coercive methods were 
used at the local scale. Passive resistance to the project occurred when the population did not 
voluntarily remove their cultivated crops and replace them with native vegetation. Project organisations 
then went to the public prosecutors to ensure participation in the project; again this furthered the top-
down implementation of the project. The public ministry passed a TAC which would make non-
participation in the project a criminal offense. This undemocratic approach to project implementation is 
not supported by international recommendations for carbon offsetting projects, yet the project was still 
able to award the Pantanal Stadium carbon neutral status. 
The official number of trees planted was 70,000, less than the claimed 1.4million trees at the beginning 
of the project. The project organisers at the regional scale were able to change the methodology used to 
calculate the carbon emissions and 70,000 trees was enough to certify the Pantanal Stadium as carbon 
neutral. The methodology used originally was an international guideline, however, the project 
organisers claimed to then change to a national guideline which made many indirect emissions invalid. 
This reduced the amount of carbon sequestration needed. However, further investigation also found 
that the trees claimed to be used to offset the Pantanal Stadium were also used to offset emissions from 
other organisations in Mato Grosso whom had purchased the carbon credits. One case could be proven 
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to be double counted, however, it cannot be proven that all trees in Barranco Alto I and II were double 
counted.  
 
The Payment for Ecosystem Services was also seen to be short of what the organisers had promised the 
villagers. The payment coincided with international recommendations for carbon offsetting projects and 
outwardly made similar claims to REDD+ projects in that the local population would benefit from 
education, payment and sustainable development. However the initial sum of R$700,000 (£166,652) 
was reduced to an estimated R$30,000 (£7041) without any explanation from project organsiers. 
The Green River Project can then be argued to have been implemented with the agenda of furthering 
the elites who created the NGO, rather than the conservation on the Cuiabá river bank. This project was 
established to implement the federal law but had been co-opted by corporate actors who created an 
NGO which had the support and financial means to influence the project from the very beginning. 
 
Research question three 
How have actors on different scales been affected by the project?  
 
This question was answered in all data chapters due to the dialectical relationship between the local and 
global hegemonic projects, although those actors at the local level were more directly affected than 
those at the national level. 
The ruralistas of Mato Grosso were found to be the main protagonists of the project. They gained from 
creating kudos associated with hosting the ‘green’ World Cup. The World Cup acted as a vehicle for 
them to re-frame the narrative of Mato Grosso into an environmentally friendly state. This was seen as 
important in a global environment where trade and investment is competitive. They then further 
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strengthened their position in the national scale as a supplier of commodities, which in turn was able to 
stabilise Brazil’s placement in the global economy. The Green River Project worked in conjunction with a 
number of other projects at the regional and national scale to stabilise the hegemonic project. This 
stabilisation at the regional level also helped the actors at the national level who were also keen to host 
a ‘green’ World Cup. A ‘green’ World Cup would contribute to continuing efforts for Brazil to gain 
control over its own environmental issues whilst contributing to the global effort to reduce the threat of 
global warming.  
As well as national and regional elites there are a number of actors with smaller levels of responsibility 
who also were affected by this project. The Environment Ministry of Mato Grosso are one such example. 
The involvement of the Green Action Institute in the Green River Project undoubtedly changed the 
characteristics of the project significantly. In their leaflet which outlines the project outcomes they 
remove themselves from the carbon offsetting aspect. They also do not focus on the numbers of trees 
planted, but instead on the other impacts the project has had, such as the fishing points and litter 
collection. From their perspective the project was a success as they reforested the river banks in line 
with Federal Government laws. The development and environmental claims that were made the Green 
Action Institute are absent from the official documentation of SEMA. Their aims were different from the 
Green Action Institute and they were able to, for them, successfully complete their project. The 
involvement of the Green Action Institute brought financial stability to the project, but this was at the 
expense of some of the projects aims. Under OSCIP regulations, the state organisation has to show the 
project would not be able to function without the NGO, however, in this case, it appears the project had 
already started before the NGO became involved. The balance of power then shifted from SEMA to the 
Green Action Institute as they were able to make claims which were unfounded. 
The local populations in the villagers were also affected in different ways. The population in Pesquiero 
Florida were fined; the amount of this fine varied among households and was dependent on the 
relationship between the land owner and the public prosecutors. The socio-economic characteristics of 
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the land owners in this village are different to that of Barranco Alto I and II. These land owners usually 
had another house either in Cuiabá  or in cities further afield. Arguably the population here were in a 
position that they could afford to not comply with the project and pay the fine. In the example of 
Robson in chapter 7 this was seen to be the case where he was able to negotiate a fine and the location 
of the trees he planted. Whereas the population in Barranco Alto had their livelihoods removed as a 
result of this project. Field observations from previous scholars had suggested the inhabitants were 
subsistence farmers and used this area of land to grow crops. The Green River Project effectively 
stopped this as the APP prevented cultivation. It also stopped an agro-industry project which was 
already active in the village and prevented this development project from increasing the economic 
development of the villages.  
From this it is possible to see that the rural peasant population were most severely adversely affected, 
whilst the ruralistas were the group which gained the most from the project. In terms of the 
environmental outcomes of the project, it could be seen these were negligible. On a global scale, this 
project has severe weaknesses in the offsetting verification. Cases of double counting and change in the 
methodology suggests the emissions from the stadium were not adequately offset.  This then indirectly 
adds to the overall global GHG in the atmosphere and has not had the desired climate change effect. 
The local environment could have had marginal improvement, although the long-term benefit of this is 
yet to be seen, and the Green Action Institute have not continued their verification project, the health of 
the planted trees is left to the responsibility of the individual land owner. A wildlife corridor along the 
river Cuiabá would be beneficial for local fauna and flora.  
9.2: Theoretical implications 
 
This thesis made five key contributions to the literature. These are explored below in light of the 
empirical evidence presented in the data chapters. 
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The literature highlighted a historical belief within mainstream institutions, such as the UN, that NGOs 
are ‘unchallengeably good actors’ (Holmes, 2010). The development discipline has long questioned the 
role the state has in funding NGOs and suggested development NGOs can become a conveyor belt of the 
state’s ideals (Tvedt, 1998). More recently, the private sector have been identified as having an 
influential role in environment NGOs (Klein, 2015). Newell (2008) called for further investigation into the 
relations between civil society and the corporate sector. This thesis answered this call.  
The Green Action Institute as a civil society organisation was seen to be founded by a number of 
alliances of corporate actors. These corporate actors were then able to put themselves in a decision 
making position within the NGO. The example of the Green Action Institute extends the argument of 
Klein (2015), that corporate actors can influence civil society through funding by showing that the 
corporate sector has learnt how to create an NGO to further their own agendas. Once they had created 
the NGO they then ensured control though ‘interlocking’ (Saplinski, 2015) where the members of the 
board of the NGO are also elite corporate actors. This was achieved legitimately through the OSCIP 
mechanism, created by Lula in an effort to deepen democracy. It can be argued through this thesis that 
the notion of NGOs being ‘unchallengeably good actors’ (Holmes, 2010) led to the creation of an 
organisation which worked in opposition to the OSCIP agenda, to deepen democracy.  
By exposing the relationship between the Green Action Institute and its founders and decision makers it 
has led to further understanding of environmental governance. In a time when the state is taking on 
new roles and other actors are beginning to be involved in the governance structure it is important to 
understand and acknowledge the interests of each actor. The Green Action Institute acted as a green 
veneer for the commodity export elites of Mato Grosso. In doing so, they enabled the elite agricultural 
actors to continue their environmentally destructive practices. This case represents a first step in 
understanding the relations between the corporate, state and civil society sectors in relation to 
contemporary environmental governance.  
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The commodification of nature as a means to save it has been the preferred environmental protection 
strategy at the global scale. Some scholars have long argued that selling nature will not save it (Lohmann, 
2009, Bumpus and Livermann, 2008). As critique grew, the international decision making community 
made social benefit claims in order to legitimise this approach (UNFCCC, 2013). Carbon offsetting is one 
such mechanism. Critiques have pointed to the assumption that actors in the global North can continue 
their polluting lifestyles as those in the global South will act to compensate it (Bohm and Dabhi, 2009). 
This can be seen in the case of the Green River Project as transnational elites who travelled to watch 
matches in the Pantanal Stadium could do so thinking the construction had little ecological impact. FIFA 
were able to make green claims and there was little evidence of actors in the global North questioning 
these claims. The Green River Project case illustrated that not only did the Pantanal Stadium not offset 
all its emissions but evidence points strongly that the trees were already used to offset previous 
activities. In addition, the social benefit claimed by the project organisers can also be seen to be miss-
leading as project participants claimed their benefit was never delivered. In this case, this can be seen 
how actors in the global North were encouraged to continue their high emissions lifestyle under the 
pretence their actions are minimalized through carbon offsetting. This case also contributes to the 
growing amount of literature which questions carbon offsetting as a suitable climate change mitigation 
mechanism. This carbon offsetting project is an example of how the ecological modernisation paradigm 
fails to act to prevent fossil fuel emissions and in fact contributes to the impasse on appropriate climate 
change action. This study therefore contributes to these scholars who continue to critique the UNFCCC’s 
approach to climate change action (Lohmann, 2009, Bohm and Badhi, 2009).  
In addition to contributing to the general literature which critiques carbon offsetting, I have also 
contributed to the empirical literature which problematizes some carbon forestry practices. A 
qualitative critical approach within studies of carbon offsetting is not a new phenomenon (Gilbertson, 
2009), however, the context of a forestry project associated with the FIFA World Cup is new. Equitable 
benefit distribution has been discussed in the literature as a particular problem within forestry carbon 
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offsetting projects. Some advocated strong institutions, others suggested strong institutions did not 
contribute to equitable distribution (Iversen et al., 2006, Mathur et al., 2014, Sommerville et al., 2010) . 
These publications were all written by scholars who were part of a professional organisation 
implementing the project. They also come from a normative philosophical background and do not 
engage with power or elites as concepts. 
This thesis approached the data as a critical scholar without any professional association to the project. 
As with other critical scholars, power and elites were seen as key concepts and central to the 
understanding of the project (Escobar, 1992). In doing so, I was able to identify the social relations 
which enabled the completion of this project. These social relations, particularly the relations of the 
Green Action Institute, the organisation controlling the project, saw unequal benefit distribution. It was 
the powerful position of the NGO over the local population, and the relations to state actors which 
enabled the NGO to gain to the detriment of the local population. In the case of the Green River Project, 
the benefit for the local population was two wells, one of which was never built and the other which 
worked after investment from the local community. The initial sum of the benefit was released to the 
press but did not reflect the evidence collected in the villages. Due to these power relations, the local 
population could not challenge the benefit. Although tracing money through the Green Action Institute 
was not possible, the financial and reputational benefits brought to the Institute through this project 
was illustrated throughout the thesis. 
This thesis also contributed to the small amount of literature which questions environmental and 
developmental claims made by sports mega-event organisers. Reis and DaCosta (2012) suggested there 
is a gap in knowledge between what elites claim in terms of environmental sporting events and what 
occurs on the ground. Additionally, Fan (2006) suggested sports mega-events often make 
developmental claims when hosting a sports mega-event. Using the case of the Green River Project and 
the infrastructure improvement programme in Cuiabá  it is possible to argue that organisers for the 
World Cup in Cuiabá  made unsubstantiated claims. In order to understand the claims made by the 
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organisers, documentary analysis was undertaken on a number of official documents and media reports. 
These claims were then investigated through ethnographic research which resulted in questioning the 
claims made. The organisers claimed the new stadium would provide new leisure infrastructure for the 
city, a social benefit, however, there are still ongoing structural issues with the stadium which has 
reduced capacity from 44,000 to 10,000. In addition, the Pantanal Stadium has been unable to gain LEED 
accreditation, a green claim made by the local organising committee. The new VLT was a public 
transport project which claimed to be green through reducing the need for car usage in Cuiabá  and 
running on electricity; it also made social benefit claims through being an accessible way for commuters 
to travel around the city. In October 2016, the VLT was still incomplete and diversions for cars due to the 
construction have increased traffic congestion in the city. Ethnography allowed for these claims to be 
investigated and extend the current literature which frequently uses documentary analysis and 
quantitative approaches (Death, 2011, Hall, 2012).  
Finally, this thesis extended the application of the neo-Gramscian approach to environmental 
governance (Levy and Egan, 2003, Levy and Newell, 2002). In the case of the Green River Project, 
hegemony was stabilised through relations of domination and power at different geographical scales. 
The theory of scales was then applied to understand how elites made and maintained these relations 
(Zanotti, 2011, Swyngedouw, 2004). It was seen that although the Green River Project was implemented 
at the local scale, it was at the regional scale where it was created and legitimised. This enabled the 
Green Action Institute, an actor at the regional and local scale to have a powerful voice at the local scale. 
As project participants at the local scale did not have the ability to ‘jump scales’ in the same way the 
Green Action Institute did, the result was a project which worked in favour of the Green Action Institute. 
This was understood through using the neo-Gramscian approach to question power relations in 
governance and applied with the use of scalar theory to understand elite agency at a number of scales. 
The result of these actions by elite actors was the Green River Project contributed to the maintenance of 
the ecological modernisation paradigm when viewing environmental protection at sports mega-events. 
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9.3: Recommendation for future research  
 
The use of the neo-Gramscian approach could prove to be particularly effective as current trends 
indicate scholarly activity associated with governance is becoming more popular. Although this is a small 
scale investigation the relations of dominance on all scales created many more questions than answers. 
The intertwining of hegemonic relations from all perspectives and to all scales is worth of proper 
investigation, therefore a larger scale investigation looking at ecological modernisation in Mato Grosso 
could unearth further investigation of hegemony. 
At the local scale, the livelihood of the villagers in Barranco Alto has changed since the first field reports 
of Guarim (2000). The impact of wealth distribution programmes such as ‘bolsa de familia’ and ‘bolsa de 
scholar’ in the community, coupled with increased outward migration would be of particular interest to 
me. The changing fortunes of the communities are intertwined with the rhythms of the Pantanal and I 
feel is worthy of investigation.  
At a national scale the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro were held under a deep economic recession 
where public money was carefully spent. An investigation of the environmental projects associated with 
the Olympic Games would add a temporal perspective to this study. 
Finally, from a theoretical perspective, I would like to further the use of scales in the study of hegemony 
to see further how the dialectic relationship between global policies such as the Kyoto Protocol and local 
projects are played out.  
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9.4: Limitation of the study 
The limitations of this study mainly lay around my own ability in the field. It took a long time to 
acclimatise to the research setting and develop my Portuguese language skills to a degree that I could 
begin collecting research. 
The translation of all interviews was done by myself and therefore there is a possibility of some 
interviews not being accurately translated. Due to the nature of the data collection, particularly in the 
villages, interviews were conducted informally and written up after. It could be therefore that some 
information was forgotten or miss-interpreted. This was mitigated as much as possible by discussing the 
interview with my guide immediately after the interview and allowed for a collation of the information.  
Theoretically, a limitation proved itself in the understanding of the mechanisms elites used to maintain 
their social relations. In the environmental governance literature these theorisations are 
underdeveloped. Perhaps the future will see an increased number of similar studies of hegemony ‘on 
the ground’ and further understanding of theories will help us unpack how elites maintain their power.  
As a case study, this thesis only provides one example in a bounded time-scale. It would be 
strengthened by other case studies which illustrate other instances of carbon offsetting at sports mega-
events. Again, the future may see a development in this field as FIFA have continued to use carbon 
offsetting as a mechanism to claim a carbon neutral event for the next World Cup. 
9.5: Conclusion 
 
This thesis began as an investigation into the local experiences of a carbon offsetting project used as 
part of a mega-sports event. It developed into an investigation of how local elites were able to co-opt a 
conservation project to further their own agenda. In doing so, this thesis highlighted how the ecological 
modernisation paradigm is used by decision makers at a range of scales and neglects to confront the 
relations of power which strives to ensure the status quo.  The power relations which ran through this 
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project allowed unsubstantiated claims to be made at a regional scale which further entrenched social 
relations at the local scale.  
This investigation used the neo-Gramscain approach to environmental governance to highlight how the 
environmental project, through governance strategies can be co-opted and work in the favour of local 
and regional elites. It provides a sound case study to question the current ecological modernisation 
paradigm and contributes to the neo-Gramscian environmental governance literature. This thesis also 
contributes to the literature which questions carbon offsetting as a climate change mitigation tool.  
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Appendix 1: Sources 
In addition to the secondary data presented in the references list, there are a number of other sources I 
used to obtain information.  
Interviews: 
The following list refers to recorded interviews which were conducted by arranged appointment. The 
length of the interview varied from 10 minutes to several hours, although not all parts of the interview 
were recorded. The usual length was approximately one hour. Many interviewees also gave additional 
information in informal conversations over the duration of the fieldwork. Hotel participants were not 
recorded as these were wholly informal conversations but were implicit in my orientation to local 
society.  
Civil Society Actors     
CS1 Carla Valentini   Teacher Cuiabá     27th April 2014 
CS2 Fernanda   Teacher Cuiabá     28th April 2014 
CS3 Technician   GAI Cuiabá     18th May 2014 
CS4 Manager   GAI Cuiabá     18th May 2014 
CS5 Sr Amelo   President of BAII BA II  20th August 2014 
CS6 Elder    Researcher Pousada Itaicy  15th June 2015 
CS8 Antonio   President of BAI  BA I  25th May 2014 
CS8 Maurice Servasse  Journalist Skype   1st May 2014 
SC9 Paul    Student Brasilia    April 2014 
SC10 Patriciya   Student Cuiabá     2nd October 2014 
     
State Actors     
S1 Sr Addilton  Retired sustainability manager at Maggi  20th May 2014 
S2 Sr Sequirra  Retired Judge St Antonio   20th August 2014 
S3 Antonio Kata Jr   Health care worker BAII  20th August 2014 
S4 Sr Addilton   Deputy Govonor MG                    9th September 2014 
S5 Blairo Maggi   Senate  Pousada Itaicy                9th September 2014 
S6 Joao    Profeitura of Santo Antonio             25th September 2015 
S7 Marcelo   Profeitura of Barrao Barrao de Malgaco Sep-15 
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S8 Ecologist   SEMA Cuiabá     23rd June 2015 
S9 Domingo Savio   Public Prosecutor Cuiabá   3rd July 2014 
     
Corporate Actors     
C1 Rodrigo    BBQ restaurant owner   Cuiabá   
C2 Robson de Brito Hotel owner            Various informal interviews from May- August 2014 
C3 Lunira Hotel owner St Antonio Various informal interviews from May- August 2014 
C4 Luniel Hotel manager  St Antonio   Various dates July 2014 
C5 Sr Galas Hotel owner  St Antonio   8th August 2014 
C6 Pousada Arica Hotel owner St Antonio   8th August 2014 
C7 Fishing group Campo Grande Tourist St Antonio  August 20th 2014 
C8 Robelo Owner of Jaguar camp Porto Jeoffre   16th September 2015 
C9 Henry Manager of Arena Pantanal Cuiabá    24th September 2015 
C10 Patrycia  Holiday Home Owner Pousada Itaicy  1st June 2015 
     
Project participants     
PP1 Lo  Fisherman  St Antonio  June 10th 2014 
PP2 Tata  Fisherman  Barao   June 10th 2014 
PP3 Sr Jaquinta retired   BA I   25th May 2014 
PP4 Sr Germane None   BA I   25th May 2014 
PP5 Dona Elizabeth Bar owner  BA I   25th May 2014 
PP6 Dona Nancy retired   BA I   25th May 2014 
PP7 Sr Rodrigo retired   BA I                           25th May 2014   
PP8 Sr and Snr Romildo Nona  BA I   25th May 2014 
PP9 Sr Goncalo Pastel shop worker BA I   25th May 2014 
PP10 Dona Monica Pastel shop worker BA I   25th May 2014 
PP11 Sr Jackson Bar owner  BA II   20th August 2014 
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PP12 Dinho Fisherman  Pousada Itaicy  Various September 2014 
PP13 Nilza  Cook  Pousada Itaicy  Various September 2014 
PP14 John Pedro Student  BA1   October 2nd 2014 
PP15 Snr João Retired  Barra de Arica   27th September 2014 
PP16 Chacho  Fisherman  BAI   2nd October 2014 
PP18 Chacho  Fisherman  Pousada Itaicy Various June-September 2015 
PP19 Carlinhos  Fisherman  Pousada Itaicy  Sep-14 
PP21 Dona Sandra  Retired   BAI  24th September 2015 
PP22 People at the bar various   BAI  24th September 2015 
PP23 Dona Nancy  Bar owner  BAII  24th September 2015 
PP24 Dona Elizabeth  Retired   BAI  24th September 2015 
PP25 Luiz Henrique Student P ousada Itaicy Various July/ August/ September 2014 
     
Hotel Participants     
HP1 Dinho   Fisherman Pousada Itaicy Various June-September 2015 
HP2 Robson Doctor    Pousada Itaicy  27th July 2015 
HP3 Fernandas partner, Joao Airport Handler Pousada Itaicy May-14 
HP4 Dona Maria Farmer Pousada Itaicy   Various 2014/2015 
HP5 Alinelia Hotel worker Pousada Itaicy    Throughout August 2014 
HP6 Carol Hotel worker Pousada Itaicy   Throughout August 2014 
HP7 Adilo Fisherman Pousada Itaicy  
 
Observations: 
Observations were used to verify or challenge claims made by different actors at various points 
throughout my fieldwork.  
Estádio Nacional de Brasília Mané Garrincha, Brasilia, 4-7th May 2014 and 29th September 2014 
Maracanã, Rio de Janeiro, 7-10th July 2014 and 20th September 2015 
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Arena Pantanal, Cuiabá , 10th May 2014, 13th, 17th, 21st, 24th June 2014, 15th September 2015, 18th 
September 2015 
Tree nursery, Barranco Alto, 10th May 2014, 16th July 2014, 14th September 2015 
Media outlets consulted: 
BBC News 
The Guardian 
The New York Post 
Globo 
Diário de Cuiabá 
Websites consulted: 
www.fifa.com  
www.acaoverde.org.br 
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Appendix 2: Green River Project pamphlet from SEMA 
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Appendix 3: A short history of the Usina Itaici 
 
Prior to the sugar industry in Mato Grosso there was a gold mining industry in the north and central 
areas of the state. The Baxaida Cuiabá na region was not industrialised until the late 1880s. The Usina 
Itaici was built in 1886 and was one of 13 sugar mills constructed along the River Cuiabá. It was 
economically and politically the most important sugar mill in the region. Located 40km south of Santo 
Antonio do Leverger, 4km south of Pesquerio Florida, the Usina Itaici acted as the economic and political 
base for oligarchical relations in Mato Grosso for over 50 years, at its height of productivity the mill and 
surrounding plantation is said to have housed over five thousand people, most of whom were migrants 
from Sao Paulo state (Novaczyk, 2005, Marchetti et al., 2013). The workers who lived in the central mill 
complex had a variety of services. Aside from the mill, this area also had social and cultural facilities such 
as: a pharmacy, chapel, school, music classes for children and its own currency an unique organisation at 
the time (Novaczyk, 2005). The economic success of the mill meant the owners were able to invest in 
technology and became the first location in Mato Grosso to have electricity. It was also the first mill in 
Mato Grosso to have a motorised engine to power the sugar processors (Siqueira, 2002). Although the 
Usina Itaici never used slave labour, Eisenberg (1972) suggested conditions of wage labourers in the mill 
and plantations were similar to that of slaves, and were heavily dependent on plantation owners 
(Engerman, 1983). At the Usina Itaici, Siqueira (2002) and de Oliveira and Marta (2014) suggested that 
12 hour working days, 7 days a week were common, in addition, due to its isolation there was a lack of 
opportunity to leave the plantation.  
Although the working and living conditions of the workers was tough, the economic success of the 
plantation meant the owners lived a prosperous life. In spite of the plantation being in an isolated area 
in Brazil, it was a key component in the power struggle of elites in Cuiabá. Weak political institutions and 
clientalistic relations during this period resulted in a sporadic violence and the time of the Usina Itaici’s 
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economic dominance was a particularly violent period which altered the political landscape of the 
region. 
The military had a strong presence in Mato Grosso politics and the economy and a military coup in 1892 
saw General Ponce lead 400 men into Cuiabá to overthrow the state Governor. A military selected 
governance regime then remained and Manural Mutinho became the state Governor. In 1901, the then 
state Governor, Alvez de Barros, faced a threat from a group of men gathered at a farm in Pocone. As 
the previous military coup was still fresh in his mind, this gathering caused him great concern. The 
owner of the farm was the brother of Toto Paes de Barros- the then owner of the economically booming 
Usina Itaici. Under threat from Alvez de Barros, Toto sent several letters asking his brother to disperse 
his men, a request which was unheeded. After several months, Alvez de Barros sent armed forces to 
arrest the men and bring them to Cuiabá. On the journey back to Cuiabá, the 17 prisoners were killed in 
what is known as ‘The Massacre of Baia do Garcez’. The men sent to arrest them disappeared and the 
massacre was only exposed when the river retreated the following year and exposed the bodies. The 
perpetrators of this crime were never identified; Frank (2001) suggested Toto Paes may have been 
involved to further his political career.  
Toto Paes de Barros’ political career reached a high in 1903 when he became President of Mato Grosso, 
his economic standing within the region allowed him to create clientalistic relations with individuals who 
then supported his Presidency. Toto Peas served until 1906 when he was murdered in a violent attack 
led once again by General Ponce and Manuel Mutinho. The two men led this attack fuelled by the 
popular belief it was Toto Peas de Barros whom ordered the massacre of the prisoners. Mutinho 
returned to his previous position of Governor of Mato Grosso and also took control of the Usina Itaici, 
refusing to acknowledge the heirs of Toto Paes de Barros (Frank, 2001, Siqueira, 2002). Power and 
control within Mato Grosso in this time was won through violent means as the law and police were 
weak. Civil society was also under developed and prevented legitimate, organised opposition. 
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The relationship between the wage labourer and owners at the Usina Itaici was oligarchic in nature as 
was common throughout Latin American in the 18th and 19th centuries. Oligarchic relations are 
maintained by dominance and dependency, or clientalist relationships (Malloy, 1976), where services 
for the poor are often given in exchange for votes or loyalty. Ferguson (2006) suggests that the services 
offered by the Usina Itaici should not be thought of as services to serve the population, but instead as 
‘services which serve to govern’ (Ibid:253). The Usina Itaici provided workers with services so they did 
not need to leave the site, the owners believed that if the workers were on site, they would be more 
likely to work and easier to control. The services also fulfilled the needs of the workforce which kept 
them at the Usina Itaici and prevented them from having to leave to find work elsewhere. These 
relations therefore then won the ideology of the masses and consent was created through clientalism. 
The lack of care for employees was exposed when the Usina shut in 1957 leaving the population without 
work or services. When the capitalist class left, the peasant population were left and became 
subsistence farmers and fishermen in the villages now known as Barranco Alto and Barra de Arica.  
 
